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Glossary & Abbreviations 
 
‘…is interpreted…’ – the author’s interpretation of a particular piece of empirical 
material. 
 
‘…is perceived…’ – project team member’s perceptions of, for example, their work or 
a particular situation or phenomenon. 
 
‘…this dissertation…’ – the volume of text presenting the Ph.D. research. 
 
‘…this research project…’ – the research work carried out by the author during the 
Ph.D. study from June 2013 – June 2016. 
 
BIM – Building Information Modelling, digital modelling of geometry (3D), planning 
of construction process (4D), economy (5D) (Berard, 2012).  
 
IDBM - Integrated Design-Build Management (concept developed as part of this 
research project). 
 
Main design project – [in Danish: hovedprojekt] a design proposal, typically in the 
form of a BIM model, a set of drawings, and technical specifications, developed 
during the detailed design phase (Danske Ark, 2010). 
 
MTH - MT Højgaard.  
 
Preliminary design project – [in Danish: forprojekt] a preliminary design proposal 
developed during the basic design phase (Danske Ark, 2010). 
 
Project delivery method – a particular collaboration form supported by a legal 
framework to deliver a building, for example, design-build (Ashcraft, 2006). 
 
Project freeze – the practice of locking and no longer making changes to a particular 
part of a project, for example the structural design. 
 
Project phases – temporally bracketed periods of time around which the project is 
organised. Project phases typically include: project conception (where the idea of the 
project and early effort to establish a project team are made); early design (typically 
where a conceptual architectural design is developed); basic design (typically where 
engineering and architectural design is further developed); detailed design (typically 
where the contractor, architect and engineer collaborate to detail the project); building 
phase (where the contractor constructs the building); commissioning, hand-off and 
occupancy (where building systems are tested and regulated, the building is officially 
handed-off to, and occupied, by the client) (Danske Ark, 2010). 
 
Project team – the group of organizations collaborating over a period of time in order 
to purposefully develop a project together, typically, but not necessarily, including an 
owner, architect, engineer, contractor, sub-contractors, and suppliers.  
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Project team members – the individual organizations or individual representatives 
from each organization in the project team. 
 
Reflective – the ability to critically consider and take account of a particular 
phenomenon and the conditions for what one is doing (Alvesson, 2009). 
 
Reflexive – a particular methodological approach to conducting research. 
 
Self-perform sub-contractor [in Danish: egenproduktion] – the general contractor’s 
in-house concrete, carpentry and civil work sub-contractors. 
 
VDC – Virtual Design & Construction. A process method emphasizing the use of 
digital tools and digital collaboration to develop design and construction projects 
(Kunz & Fischer, 2012). 
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Abstract 
 
An increasing number of actors contributing with their skills to design-build projects 
increase the need for and complexity of coordination. The design-build project 
delivery method proposes to coordinate actors through collaborative interaction; 
however, even design-build projects result in poor coordination and building of 
relatively poor quality. 
     Therefore, the purpose of this research is: to gain a deeper insight into how 
coordination is respectively enabled and constrained; to understand how coordination 
relates to project performance; and, to propose methodological elements for an 
integrated design-build management concept. 
 
An institutional work perspective explains how design-build projects are social 
phenomena characterised by structures, purposeful reflective interactions and political 
negotiation. Furthermore, coordination is interpreted as an institutional phenomenon 
and specifically coordination is defined as bringing together potentially social, 
temporal and spatially separated work elements. Coordination mechanisms include 
formal structures, relational interaction, and integrative institutional processes. 
     Similarly, project performance is defined as a temporary negotiated order of 
multiple institutions. 
      
The research design consists of three literature studies combined with a double-
qualitative empirical study of six design-build projects. The six projects are studied 
through a quadric-hermeneutic method enabling insight into the phenomenon of 
coordination. 
 
The analysis shows that during the design process peaceful co-existence, 
fragmentation and occasional integration occurred. During the detailed design phase a 
conflict between project quality and efficient construction arose. As a result, the 
design process dragged on, stalled and re-circuited and the project was not fully 
representative of all the institutions in the project. Nevertheless, due to a combination 
of structure, loose coupling and informal interaction the project team was able to 
begin and progress the build. 
     Further, the analysis shows that a project’s constellation of institutions is reflected 
in the project’s performance.  
 
Following the analysis, an integrated design-build management concept proposes new 
meanings and formal structures for enabling integrating constellations of institutions 
to improve project coordination and performance. 
 
This research project concludes that project coordination is a process of mutating 
constellations of institutions where conflict, competition, blending, fragmentation and 
the lack of collective on-going institutional work are the primary constraints to project 
coordination. Similarly, integrating constellations of institutions and occasional 
fragmentation through temporary competition enable project coordination and 
increase project performance.  
 
Keywords: coordination; institutional work, design-build; and, project performance. 
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Introduction 
  
Complexity, collaboration & coordination 
 
‘I know I probably sound like an old fool, but in the past, it was simpler after 
all. Today it is much more complicated, because you have all these people 
who have to participate, who have to make a contribution, whom you wait for, 
and you can’t work on anything until they have had their say and this and 
that. Today, we have managed to complicate such a [project] process more 
than ever… there are so many things… people, that… …have opinions and 
whom… you have to take into account.’ [Engineer, Project 1]. 
 
An increasing number of the actors in the design and construction field wish to 
contribute with their knowledge early in the design process (Værdibyg, 2013; Gray & 
Hughes, 2001). This is attributed to increased regulations and owner demands, e.g. 
requirements for energy performance, sustainability more broadly, an increased 
number of building products, use of BIM, and increased technological complexity of 
buildings. 
     The more organizations that wish to contribute with knowledge in the early design 
processes, the more complex coordinating the project becomes. Furthermore, the 
complexity of coordination is not only a result of increased project knowledge, 
information and requirements, but also a result of potentially divergent interests, 
norms, values and underpinning understandings of what constitutes a ‘good’ and 
‘legitimate’ project (Söderlund, 2010). 
     Also, the project team has to work towards a particular, ‘but often ambiguous and 
negotiated’, goal (Bresnen & Marshall, 2010, p.154). As a result, projects require 
extensive technical and social coordination (Kadefors, 1995).  
     This is reflected in the literature, where the notions of collaboration and 
coordination are overlapping and concern ‘bringing together actors’ and both 
technical and social ‘work elements’ (Urup & Koch, 2014). However, in this research 
project, collaboration is defined broadly as the bringing together of individuals and 
organizations, while coordination specifically concerns gradually integrating 
potentially spatially, socially and temporally separated work elements.  
 
Low productivity & poor quality 
 
The increased project complexity results in a number of specific problems: poor 
quality of design information (Berard, 2012); lack of coordination (Apelgren, et al., 
2005); insufficient knowledge sharing (Thuesen, 2006); and collective shirking 
(Henisz et al., 2012). Ultimately, these problems result in rework of design work, 
rework of construction work, and poor quality of the final building (Apelgren et al., 
2005; Schultz, 2012).      
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Design-build project delivery 
 
A number of project delivery methods propose to address these problems by 
coordinating processes, actors and social structures. A project delivery method is 
defined as a framework for organising the collaboration on a project. Relatively 
established collaborative project delivery methods include, design-build, partnering, 
integrated project delivery and project alliance. 
     It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to elaborate on all the project delivery 
methods. However, there are several overlaps between the collaborative project 
delivery methods (Lahdenperä, 2012).  
     While partnering has been used in projects in Denmark, no records of IDP and 
project alliance projects have been found. The lack of diffusion of these three 
methods in the Danish construction field may be due to the project delivery methods’ 
lack of ability to place the economic risk with the contractor (Licitation, 2013). 
Research from other countries suggests that selective adaptation determined by 
organizational norms, perceptions and values (Phua, 2006) may also explain the 
limited diffusion.  
     Of the collaborative methods, the design-build method is the most common in 
Denmark making up around 33% of all projects (Jørgensen, 2012). In Denmark, 
design-build projects are characterized by collaboration among typically the architect 
and owner (and potentially the engineer) during the early design phase, while the 
contractor engages in and leads the detailed design and construction phase. Also, 
characteristically, there is a temporal overlap between the design phase and the 
construction phase, where detailed design is being developed alongside the build 
progressing. Furthermore, design-build projects develop through a number of 
standardized phases (Danske Ark, 2010). These phases typically include: project 
conception (where the idea of the project and early efforts to establish a project team 
are made); early design (typically where a conceptual architectural design is 
developed); basic design (typically where engineering and architectural design is 
further developed); detailed design (typically where the contractor, architect and 
engineer collaborate to detail the project); building phase (where the contractor 
constructs the building); commissioning, hand-off and occupancy (where building 
systems are tested and regulated, the building is officially handed-off to and occupied 
by the client). 
 
The design-build method was established in Denmark during the early 1970’s (Dansk 
Byggeri, 2005). In 1972 the first set of guidelines for design-build execution was 
published by Dansk Byggeri. Design-build project delivery gradually became diffused 
in the Danish construction industry and in 1984 and 2005 the guidelines were revised 
to reflect current legislation and best-practice based on the extensive experience that 
the field had gained with design-build projects since 1972.  
     In Denmark design-build projects are becoming increasingly popular for three 
reasons: they are perceived to place the financial risk with the contractor, which is 
desirable to many owners (Licitationen, 2013); the owners perceive to be more in 
control of the project (Licitationen, 2013); and increased collaboration between 
contractor, owner, architects and engineers during the design process results in better 
management of project time and budget and buildings of higher quality compared to 
projects delivered as design-bid-build or individual trade contracts (Jørgensen, 2012).  
     According to an analysis from MTH’s Customer & Marked department, design-
build projects make up 51% of the total fiscal amount bid for in 2016, an increase 
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from 44% in 2013, when this research project was begun. This reflects, not only the 
field’s shift towards increased collaboration as a whole, but also, according to MTH’s 
sales director, a purposeful effort on behalf of MTH to pursue design-build projects. 
Design-build projects are pursued because they increase contractor’s control over 
project cost and profits, and they are perceived to enable the contractor to gain a 
deeper insight into the project before the building process begins. 
 
Design-build – an institutionalized phenomenon 
 
The design and build of projects is a social phenomenon: a number of organizations 
interact over a period of time, typically months or years (Thuesen, 2006) in order to 
design and build a building. Once the project is completed the interaction and the 
temporary organization gradually disperse as the aftermath of the project settles. 
When a new project begins, particular patterns of interactions among organizations 
(potentially previous collaborators) are resumed again. 
     Each project concerns a new building on a new site, with a new project team and 
in that respect each project is unique, in that no two projects are perfectly identical 
(Morris, 2010). As a result, much literature on building projects have emphasised the 
uniqueness and temporality of projects (e.g. Lundin & Söderholm, 1995) and that 
uncertainty and novelty are the most significant challenges for project teams to 
manage (Morris, 2010). And while no two projects are perfectly identical (due to 
geographical, technical, functional, social and temporal variation), design-build 
projects vary little in terms of process and outcome, which indicates that design-build 
projects adhere to well-established social structures (Kadefors, 1995; Dille & 
Söderlund, 2011).  
     According to Kadefors (1995) similarities across project process and outcomes 
indicate a heavily institutionalised social phenomenon. Specifically, Kadefors (1995) 
points out that building codes, regulations regarding work environment and worker’s 
protection, design-build contract template, consultants’ agreement template, tendering 
systems, standardized roles, standardized skills and knowledge, and repetition in task 
content, are all regulative and normative work elements with a homogenising effect 
on design-build processes and project outcome. 
     Furthermore, for building projects, not only design-build ones, roles are also 
supported by cultural-cognitive understandings that provide knowledge about 
hierarchal order and decision-making authority (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Gray & 
Hughes, 2001). Also, event-based and chronological pacing, e.g. coordinating 
building projects with the use of deadlines, timelines, and milestones (Jones & 
Lichtenstein, 2008), are also structures adding to homogenised project processes. 
     However, the homogenising mechanisms highlighted by the contributions of 
Kadefors (1995), Gray and Hughes (2001) and Jones and Lichtenstein (2008) do not 
lead to institutional determinism. Hansen (2013) show that there are at least four 
variants of the design-build delivery method. Furthermore, the introduction of new 
project delivery and process methods indicate that there is room for agency, potential 
for change, and efforts towards disruption of current design and build institutions – 
even if these project delivery and process methods have not become prevalent 
institutions themselves.  
      Despite the recognition that projects, not only design-build ones, are significantly 
institutionalised, relatively little research has studied how collaboration developed in 
a multi-organizational context of complex projects from an institutional perspective 
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(Bresnen & Marshall, 2010, p, 155.). Exemptions include Viking and Lidelöw (2013) 
who studied institutional logics in home builders in Sweden, Rowlinson and Jia 
(2015) who studied health and safety on construction sites in China, and, Bresnen and 
Marshall (2010) who studied multiple institutional logics in relation to the diffusion 
of partnering in the UK.  
 
The high performance project 
 
Due to the perception that projects are unique and uncertain, much literature on 
project management has developed, and still is developing, an understanding of 
project performance as execution-oriented (Morris et al., 2010), e.g. concerned with 
how to deliver buildings on time and on budget (e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2010) and managing 
risk and uncertainties (e.g., Winch & Maytorena, 2010). In sustainability literature, 
high performance buildings typically refer to buildings with low energy consumption 
and user comfort (Gylling et al., 2011). However, other contributions refer to 
buildings as ‘facilities of new value’ (Winch, 2009) and define project performance as 
a matter of creating or adding value to the project as well as the organizations 
involved in the project (Ashcraft, 2006; Værdibyg, 2013).  
     Accepting that project performance follows certain social structures then high 
performance projects depend less on managed uncertainty, but rather on managed 
shared meanings, perceptions, and norms for what constitutes value. However, no 
studies were found that shed light on a potential relationship between institutions and 
project performance. 
 
Contribution & Research Questions 
 
Accepting that the construction field in general, with its current organization, so far 
has been unable to leverage the increased complexity to increase productivity, this 
research project assumes that the construction field wishes to be able leverage 
complexity to increase productivity. 
     Therefore, the first purpose of this research project is to provide practitioners as 
well as the academic community with a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of 
coordination on design-build projects. 
     The second purpose of this research project is to understand potential relationships 
between coordination and project performance. 
     The third purpose is to propose how coordination may be enabled in design-build 
projects.  
    
In order to make this contribution, a set of specific research question have guided the 
research: 
 
RQ #1: What theoretical and methodological framework would enable a systematic 
development of insight and understanding of the coordination of design-build 
projects? 
 
RQ #2: How and why is coordination, interpreted as an institutional concept, 
respectively enabled and constrained in design-build projects? 
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RQ #3: How does coordination or the lack of coordination relate to project 
performance? 
 
RQ #3.1: What constitutes a high performance project? 
 
RQ #4: What would a design-build management concept that enables coordination 
and high project performance consist of? 
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Theory  
 
To gain a deep understanding of coordination of design-build projects, this research 
project is informed by institutional theory, in particular current streams of institutional 
work (Lawrence et al., 2009). The following sections elaborate institutional theory, 
specifically institutional work, and how it can inform coordination of design-build 
projects. In the following sections I will introduce, build-on, and extend the notion of 
institutional work. In an attempt to overcome the conundrum of presenting nonlinear 
arguments in the linear format of this dissertation, I here offer the reader some 
guidance. 
     First, the notion of an institution is defined. Second, the co-existence of multiple 
institutions is developed followed by an introduction to the concept of institutional 
work, with a particular focus on the relationship between agency and structure. Third, 
potential relationships between multiple institutions are presented. Fourth, enabling 
and constraining mechanisms of multiple institutions are elaborated and lead to a 
discussion concerning temporary stability and incremental change. Fifth, institutional 
work processes concerning the creating, maintaining and disrupting of institutions are 
presented. Subsequently, project performance and coordination are defined in the 
context of institutional theory. Finally, a summary of the theory chapter is provided. 
 
Institutional theory 
 
Institutions 
 
Sociological institutional theory is concerned with grasping the social human world 
that generates perceived universal laws (Zilber, 2008, p.163). Central to the concept 
of institutional theory is the understanding that there are structuring social elements – 
institutions – that affect human interaction (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Scott (2008, 
p.48) defines institutions as ‘social structures that have attained a high degree of 
resilience’ and consist of ‘regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements’ and 
‘provide stability and meaning to social life’.   
     According to Scott (2008, p.51) the regulative pillar is associated with rules, laws 
and sanctions following a logic of instrumentality. The normative pillar is associated 
with social and moral obligation, and guided by a logic of appropriateness. The 
cultural-cognitive pillar is associated with common beliefs, taken-for-grantedness and 
orthodoxy.  
     Once rules and norms have become well-established and their inherent meaning 
has become taken-for-granted ‘explicit social control and justification’ becomes 
superfluous (Zilber, 2002, p.235) and the institution has the ability to reproduce itself 
(Scott, 2004). While such an understanding of institutions explains why project 
process and outcome are stabilized, it is unable to inform how variation across 
projects and time occurs. 
     Other scholars, who seek a less deterministic view of institutions, have proposed to 
define institutions as ‘organized, established procedures that reflect a set of 
standardized interaction sequences’ and ‘product of purposive action’ (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006, p.4). While this definition of institutions implies that an institution is 
part of a larger and temporary negotiated order (Yu, 2013). Lawrence and Suddaby’s 
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(2006) definition raises two issues. First, while agency is interpreted to be reflective, 
agency is interpreted to be less empowered in projects than suggested by ‘product of 
purposeful action’ due to the constraint that institutions afford on agency. These 
constraints are considered to be a result of partly overarching structures (Scott, 2008), 
and partly a result of ambiguity, potential paralysis caused by, and necessary 
negotiation among, multiple co-existing institutions in the project. The co-existence 
of multiple institutions shall be elaborated on later in the following sections. 
     Second, while ‘established procedures’ are clearly less deterministic than taken-
for-granted cultural-cognitive structures, reducing structure to procedures implies that 
institutions and institutional change can be measured through change in procedures, 
action and practices alone (Zilber, 2002). Reducing manifestations of institutions to 
procedures, action and practices alone means it is only possible to capture the more-
or-less visible conduct of institutions and, on the other hand, accept to neglect the 
‘content’ or meaning of the institution. Meaning is central to the foundation of 
institutional theory: Berger and Luckmann (1966, p.54) defined an institution as ‘a 
reciprocal typification of habitualized action…’. Reciprocal typification is understood 
as ‘the development of shared definitions or meaning that are linked’ to the 
habitualised actions (Zilber, 2002, p.235). Berger and Luckmann (1966) also stated: 
institutionalism is the notion of institutionalization as a process in which… ephemeral 
interactions become objectified patterns, and meaning… becomes part of the social-
historical a priori (Meyer, R., 2008). Thus, in order to understand the efforts and 
motivations of institutional workers on design-build projects, understanding not only 
normative conduct, but also the shared meanings, is important. 
     In studies on institutional change, Suddaby and Greenwood (2009) propose the 
following definition of an institution: ‘an institution may take the form of juridical 
regulations, informal rules or codified social arrangements, norms of conduct, or 
cognitive structures that provide understanding and give meaning to social 
arrangements’ (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009, p.176). This definition offers a 
balanced view of structure and agency that is useful for understanding coordination 
on design-build projects. 
     However, in order to emphasize the importance of meaning and the temporary 
negotiated order of multiple institutions that characterizes the design-build project, I 
specifically define an institution as a more-or-less taken-for-granted shared meaning, 
underpinned by normative understandings and conducts, and potentially rules, that 
guide and provide meaning to social interaction. 
 
Institutional work  
 
While institutions constitute more-or-less taken-for-granted social structures, 
institutional work, on the other hand, is specifically concerned with understanding 
how purposeful efforts can be made towards creating, disrupting and maintaining 
institutions at the organizational (or field) level (Lawrence et al., 2009; Kraatz, 2009). 
     The concept of institutional work was conceived by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) 
in an attempt to connect, bridge and extend work on institutional entrepreneurship, 
institutional change and deinstitutionalisation. 
     In the 1980’s neo-institutionalists became increasingly interested in institutional 
change resulting from exogenous pressure (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009) and as a 
result emphasised a deterministic view of agency. As scholars became increasingly 
interested in endogenous institutional change, neo-institutionalism was increasingly 
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criticized for over-emphasizing the regulative and cognitive framing element of 
institutions (e.g rules and shared meanings) (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) and 
depicting an over-socialised view of agency (Lawrence et al., 2009). 
     Institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009) took stance to neo-
institutionalism’s deterministic view of agency and allowed for a reflexive, self-
directed and empowered understanding of agency. Studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship often concerned actors who mobilised resources to create new or 
transform existing institutions (Lawrence et al., 2009). However, institutional 
entrepreneurship came under increasing criticism for depicting actors as super-
rational and heroic, neglecting to describe the institutional arrangements that 
constitute the context in which these entrepreneurs operate (Lawrence et al., 2009).  
     As a reaction to the voluntaristic view of institutional entrepreneurs, scholars 
became interested in understanding how actors affect institutions while also being 
affected by institutions: ‘How can actors change institutions if their actions, 
intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to 
change?’ (Holm, 1995, p.398).  
     Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) developed the concept of institutional work in an 
attempt to avoid depicting actors either as ‘cultural dopes’ trapped in institutional 
arrangements or as hyper muscular institutional entrepreneurs (Lawrence et al., 2009, 
p.1). 
     Thus, institutional work proposes a balanced view of the relationship between 
agency and structure (Lawrence et al., 2009) by considering institutions a product ‘of 
human action and reaction’ (Lawrence et al., 2009, p.6). Institutional work is 
characterised by politically savvy (Yu, 2013) and reflexive agency driven by interests 
and motivations, engaging in negotiations and making deliberate efforts to contribute 
to institutional change (Lawrence et al., 2009). More precisely, institutional work is 
the ‘purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining 
and disrupting institutions’ (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p.215). The key concern 
of institutional work is to understand the paradox of how actors can change the 
institutions that they are simultaneously conditioned by. This paradox was named ‘the 
paradox of embedded agency’ by Seo and Creed (2002).  
     Scholars have attempted to resolve the paradox of embedded agency by building 
on different ontological foundations. For example, Battilana and D’Aunno (2009) 
build on psychological models (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) to explain how 
individual actors consciously draw on past experience, contextualise current lived 
situations and hypothesizing future schemas. The psychological models are used to 
account for how actors at the individual level become aware of the cultural-cognitive 
institutions that they have come to take for granted, in order to initiate institutional 
change (Lawrence et al. 2009). This relates to the ontological foundations of 
institutional work, Berger and Luckmann (1966) who understand institutions to be 
‘embodied in routines that rely on automatic cognition and uncritical processing of 
existing schemata’ (Lawrence et al. 2009, p.11). 
      However, a psychological model is problematic in the context of design-build 
projects. As shall be elaborated in the following sections, a design-build project where 
multiple organizations collaborate can be characterised as a constellation of multiple 
institutions. If projects are characterised as complex constellations of multiple 
institutions, then multiple actors are dependent on each other and institutional agents 
themselves are multiply constituted, sociological entities adapting to and changing 
their institutional environment (Kraatz, 2009). As a result, institutional work is less a 
matter of individual cognitive process. Rather, institutional change is interpreted to be 
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a sociological phenomenon and a matter of collective efforts (Zietsma & McKnight, 
2009) and political processes (Pettigrew, 1986; Lawrence et al., 2009; Kraatz, 2009; 
Yu, 2013). This will be elaborated shortly. 
 
Multiple institutions 
 
While institutional work recognises the importance of understanding agency and 
action in a context of structure, institutional work is explicitly (Lawrence et al., 2009) 
not concerned with explaining how structures affect agency and action. 
     While not explaining how institutions affect action is useful in order to clearly 
define the contribution of institutional work, it nevertheless is a limitation of 
institutional work. Institutional work, as an isolated concept, doesn’t explain the on-
going process of institutions and agency interacting. In relation to understanding how 
coordination is respectively constrained and enabled in design-build projects 
recognising that institutions affect action alone is insufficient. 
      To explain how institutions afford discretion on agency, it is useful to review 
work that concerns multiple (more than two) institutions. Early work on institutional 
change was concerned with explaining how a single dominant institution can guide 
actors within a field (Greenwood et al., 2002). Similarly, early contributions on 
institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009) remain vague 
about the number of institutions that actors aim to change or maintain.  
     However, it is widely recognized that organizations operate within a societal 
sphere of multiple institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012); have to adhere to 
pluralistic institutional demands at the organizational level (Kraatz & Block, 2008); 
are faced with institutional complexity arising from the existence of multiple 
institutions (Greenwood et al., 2011); and, that multiple institutions can coexist in 
organizational fields (e.g., Zietsma & McKnight, 2009; Greenwood et al., 2010; 
Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009). 
     Also, institutional work’s emphasis on ‘politics brings to the fore the multiplicity 
of the institutional order. We have multiple meaning systems, multiple actors who 
hold multiple interests and who work in relation to multiple contexts. They may or 
may not share the same understandings, and they instill institutional structures and 
practices with meanings, at least part of the time, to further their own interests’ 
(Zilber 2008, p.159). Thus, institutional work lends itself to an understanding that 
multiple institutions coexist.  
     While many studies have focused on the co-existence of two institutions (see 
Waldorff et al., 2013 for a review), Goodrick and Reay (2011) developed the term 
constellations (e.g. ‘a set of logics in a recognizable pattern’ (p.403)) to draw 
attention to the co-existence of multiple institutions and that the multiple institutions 
are arranged in particular relationships. 
 
Relationships between multiple institutions 
 
By recognising that organizations (and projects) represent constellations of multiple 
institutions, understanding what characterises the relationship between these multiple 
institutions becomes relevant (Waldorff & Greenwood, 2013).  
     Many contributions have shown how a single institution can come to dominate 
another institution (e.g. Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), while others have shown how 
two, potentially conflicting, institutions compete for dominance (e.g. Greenwood et 
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al., 2011). Research on multiple institutions has proposed that relationships among 
institutions can be characterized as: conflicting or contradicting (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013-B; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013); one institution can be dominant over other 
institutions (Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011); multiple established institutions and 
institutions in the making compete for legitimacy and dominance (Zietsma & 
McKnight, 2009); institutions can be competing (Waldorff et al., 2013; Goodrick & 
Reay, 2011, p.372); institutions can exercise relative equal influence (Gestel & 
Hillebrand, 2011); institutions can co-exist in a neutral or peaceful manner (Gestel & 
Hillebrand, 2011; Koch & Buser, 2014); institutions can be cooperative (facilitative), 
complementary and mutually re-enforcing (additive) by amplify each other’s effects 
(Waldorff et el., 2013; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al. 2010; Jarzabkowski 
et al., 2013-B; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013); and finally, (proto-)institutions can 
blend, recombine, assimilate and coalesce to form one dominant institution (Zietsma 
& McKnight, 2009; Thornton et al., 2012). 
     Finally, and perhaps most importantly, institutions can relate in multiple ways to 
each other and thus for example, cooperative and competitive relationships among 
institutions can occur simultaneously (Waldorff et al., 2013; Goodrick & Reay, 2011).  
 
Enabling & constraining mechanisms of multiple institutions 
 
By proposing the image of a constellation of multiple institutions, Goodrick and Reay 
(2011) extended the research on how multiple institutions can simultaneously 
constrain and enable organizations, and thus give way to a new understanding of the 
relationship between agency and structure (Waldorff et al., 2013). Waldorff et al. 
(2013) use the terms reacting and enacting institutions, to signify, that actors are both 
required to respond to the multiple institutions that affect their work, as well as, make 
efforts towards institutional change.  
 
Constraining action 
Relatively few pieces of literature on multiple institutions have offered an 
understanding of how multiple institutions constrain organizations. 
     Without theorizing the relationship between multiple institutions Kraatz and Block 
(2008) highlight how the demand to adhere to multiple institutions causes 
organizational confusion, conflict and ambiguity. More specifically, multiple 
institutions means that organizations have to establish legitimacy with multiple 
institutions and social groups; have to reflect ‘the values, beliefs, and practices’ of 
more than one institution; are faced with ambiguity in decision-making processes due 
to incompatible prescriptions for organizational action (Greenwood et al., 2011); and 
have to balance maintaining old institutions and introducing new institutions in order 
to preserve legitimacy (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Also, institutional pluralism can 
generate competition among groups that profess allegiances to different institutions 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008, Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007).  
     Furthermore, constellations of multiple institutions impose ambiguity for 
organizations (Greenwood et al, 2011) and, potentially, paralysis in organizations 
(Pache & Santos, 2010). Pache and Santos (2010), although only considering two 
institutions, warned that organizational paralysis might be the outcome of having to 
adhere to conflicting institutional demands. Furthermore, Pache and Santos (2010, 
p.2) showed that ‘when no institutional constituent clearly dominated’ organization 
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may strike a balance between competing institutions by adopting a combination of 
intact practices from both (only two) institutions.  
      In the context of constellations of institutions Waldorff et al. (2013) propose that 
one institution dominating other institutions constrains organizational action aimed at 
changing the constellation of institutions because legitimizing a proto-institution 
becomes difficult.  
  
Enabling action 
While little is known about how constellations of multiple institutions constrain 
agency, an even fewer number of scholars have shed light on how constellations of 
multiple institutions enable action. Thornton et al. (2012) propose that multiple 
institutions offer potential avenues for ‘partial autonomy of actors’ by offering a 
repertoire of different meanings that actors can adhere to and act by, as well as, 
opportunities for blending institutions. Also, Thornton et al. (2012) further point to 
loose coupling and decoupling as mechanisms through which organizations can 
symbolically adapt practices, without taking their meanings for granted and thus 
enable actors to act according to other meanings. Also, Waldorff et al. (2013) propose 
that strengthening an alternative institution enables action because it enables 
organizations to legitimately engage in activities that are alternative to the norm, yet 
activities that correspond with their own values. Also, a facilitative relationship 
among institutions can enable action because adhering to one institution automatically 
results in the strengthening of another institution (Waldorff et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
much literature on institutional change has assumed that a conflict, contradiction or 
competition among institutions had to be resolved by one institution dominating or 
replacing the other for the sake of regaining stability (Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009). However, Waldorff et al. (2013) show that a 
competitive or conflicting relationship between institutions that would otherwise 
constrain action, can be resolved by partitioning work and thus enable the co-
existence of multiple institutions. Thus, action is enabled without resolving the 
inherent conflict or competition.  
     Similarly, Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) showed how multiple conflicting or 
competing institutions can co-exist without necessarily resolving the inherent conflict 
or competition and that coexistence of contrasting logics can be enduring (Yu, 2013). 
Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) specifically developed the notion ‘mechanisms for co-
existence’ to account for ways in which actors can react to conflicting or competing 
institutions when an obvious resolution is not possible. Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) 
identify negative choice and deliberate ambiguity as two mechanisms for co-existence. 
Negative choice refers to how actors, when faced with conflicting or competing 
institutions that don’t completely satisfy the logic of the actor, can choose to adhere to 
one of the institutions – the lesser of the two evils. Deliberate ambiguity refers to 
actors deliberately using wide rhetoric to encompass the meaning of all institutions 
represented and thus blur the actors’ perception of a conflict or competition.  
     Negative choice and deliberate ambiguity temporarily enable action by either 
allowing actor to proceed by adhering to one institution or by making the conflicting 
or competitive relationship more or less invisible. In that respect, mechanisms of co-
existence constitute defensive responses to handling multiple institutions 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2013-B). Defensive responses to institutional paradox offer 
short-term relief (as shall be elaborated shortly), but no deeper understanding of the 
institutional problem at hand. According to Jarzabkowski et al. (2013-B, p.248) 
defensive response mechanisms include: splitting, regression, projection, reaction, 
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formation and ambivalence. As opposed to defensive response mechanisms, active 
response mechanisms offer long-term relief because the paradox is accepted as an 
inherent part of the organization. Active response mechanisms include: acceptance, 
confrontation, and transcendence (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013-B, p.248). Similarly, Seo 
and Creed (2002) propose that organizational and individual reflexivity and 
awareness can enable action and institutional change to overcome long-term 
institutional contradictions. 
 
Incremental Change & Temporary Stability 
 
The mechanisms of co-existence do not transform institutions into novel constellation 
of institutions (Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011). Rather, temporarily enabled action leads 
to an ongoing incremental institutional change and maintenance work result in only 
temporary stability.  
     As a result, contending that the continuous co-existence of multiple institutions can 
respectively constrain and enable agency, the notions of stability and change require 
reinterpretation. 
 
Contributions on institutional change (Greenwood et al., 2002) have often assumed 
that stability simply is, and that change occurs occasionally due to actors responding 
to external pressures (Greenwood et al., 2002) or empowered actors creating 
endogenous change (Battilana et al., 2009). After change, it is assumed that a new or 
different institution settles and stability is re-established enabling institutions to self-
reproduce (Scott, 2004).  
     However, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) propose that the taken-for-granted 
presence of institutions is overemphasized and that mundane efforts made towards the 
emergence, instantiation, and change of institutions within organizations is 
inadequately explained (Jarzabkowski et al. 2013-B). Importantly, institutional work 
does recognise that institutions affect action and that agency is not always, even 
rarely, heroic individuals. For example, organizational positions are not properties, 
but socially negotiated and thus potentially fragile and temporary (Zilber, 2008). 
Therefore, institutional work concerns both the highly visible and dramatic as well as 
the nearly invisible and often mundane day-to-day efforts that are aimed at creating, 
maintaining or disrupting institutional arrangements (Lawrence et al., 2009).  
     Institutional work implicitly proposes an understanding of institutional change that 
is incremental and mundane as opposed to transformational and dramatic (Lawrence 
et al., 2013).  
     Incremental change occurs through institutional work where organizations in their 
daily work are involved in negotiating between multiple meanings, multiple norms 
and rules, and multiple actors who hold multiple interests and motivations (Zilber, 
2008, p.159). Contending that organizations are constellations of multiple institutions, 
then institutional change is a matter of on-going purposeful (inter-)action (Lawrence 
et al., 2009), collective efforts (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) and political work 
(Kraatz, 2009; Yu, 2013). Thus, ‘institutionalization is understood as fluid and 
dynamic, as an on-going process rather than an end point (DiMaggio, 1988)’ (Zilber, 
2008, p.159). Because purposeful action, collective efforts and political work 
encompass mundane efforts and happen on a routine, rather than an exceptional, basis 
(Schneiberg, 2013) change is more likely to be incremental than transformational. 
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     Furthermore, institutional work is concerned with the activities that are aimed at 
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions, irrespective of the effects on the 
institution. Attention to the accomplishment of institutional work would indicate that 
a stabilised constellation is the output of the change process. However, institutional 
work (Lawrence et al., 2009) is specifically concerned with the activities that are 
aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions. Lawrence et al. (2006) 
distinguish between, for example, creating and creation of institutions. While creation 
of institutions implies a focus on the effect of a given action, creating institutions 
implies a focus on the process through which actors attempt to create institutions. 
Therefore, institutional work, implicitly, understands institutional change processes as 
continuously evolving.  
     Explicitly demonstrating that stability is temporary, Zietsma and McKnight (2009) 
show that both established institutions and proto-institutions compete for legitimacy 
and that multiple institutions may continue to exist even after a dominant institution 
has been established. Specifically, Zietsma and McKnight (2009) ‘observe that 
institutional work involves iterative phases of conflict and cooperation’ (Lawrence et 
al., 2009, p.20). Because multiple actors have different interests and agendas, multiple 
efforts are made towards different types of institutional work with potentially 
different intended goals. As a result, the actions and efforts have to be negotiated 
among actors. As interests and agenda change or develop, actions, efforts and shared 
meanings have to be renegotiated and the institution can be interpreted as a 
temporarily negotiated order (Oliver, 1992: Yu, 2013). Thus, institutional change is 
not stable or linear but rather phases of incremental and iterative development and 
continuous change. 
     Finally, defensive responses to multiple institutions result in incremental change. 
For example, Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) show that multiple institutions can 
continue to co-exist without the settlement of a dominant institution. Gestel and 
Hillebrand’s (2011) study show that the mechanisms of co-existence (e.g. negative 
choice and deliberate ambiguity) allow for institutional settlement to be repeatedly 
postponed. Thus, co-existence of multiple institutions results in just a temporary 
stability. Negative choice may temporarily enable action by allowing actors to 
proceed with their daily work by adhering to a particular institution. However, neither 
negative choice nor deliberate ambiguity leads to a satisfactory situation for the actors 
in the long term. As actors continue to interact with each other they will start to 
question and oppose the institution that they chose to adhere to because the institution 
doesn’t satisfy their values. Similarly, over time continued interaction will make the 
conflict and competition resurface and visible if the inherent conflict is not resolved. 
As a result, the constellation of multiple institutions is subject to continuous 
questioning, opposition, negotiation and gradual mutation. 
 
As mentioned previously, institutions have been defined as deterministic and self-
reproducing (Scott, 2008), however, because change can be incremental and stability 
temporary in organizations characterised as constellations of multiple institutions then 
institutional change becomes self-reproducing too.  
      Keeping in mind that some orders may have come to be perceived as orthodox, 
incremental change is not only possible, likely to occur or something that happens, 
rather, change simply is. Viewing change as simply being reflects a truly processual 
understanding of institutional theory (Zilber, 2008) and has implications for our 
understanding of how institutions can be changed, disrupted or maintained (Lawrence 
et al., 2006).  
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Institutional work processes 
 
All institutions require institutional work 
As discussed previously, the conceptualisation of institutional change as mutating 
constellations of multiple institutions explains how agency is respectively constrained 
and enabled, by presenting avenues for partial autonomy and enabling co-existence of 
multiple institutions. Multiple institutions and mechanisms of co-existence can result 
in self-reproducing incremental institutional change, temporary maintenance and even 
disruption. However, the institutional process that mechanisms of co-existence result 
in can be more-or-less unintended (Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011) or the result of 
purposeful action (Lawrence et al., 2009).  
     Contending that organizations are reflective and interest driven, it follows that 
organizations are motivated to create constellations of institutions that are conducive 
to, in this case, designing and constructing buildings. As a result, institutional 
processes are interpreted to be inherently rooted in the organization because 
individuals taking action do so within the frame of an organization and will try to 
promote the interests, values and shared meanings of that particular organization 
(Kraatz, 2009). Disrupting existing and creating new institutions for the purpose of 
creating a particular constellation of multiple institutions conducive to further the 
interests of the organization requires purposeful and goal-oriented efforts (Lawrence 
et al., 2009). Also, Zietsma and McKnight (2009) show that even well-established 
institutions need intended maintenance to withstand competing proto-institutions 
(Lawrence et al., 2009). And, specifically in the context of multiple institutions 
creating integrative processes is important since ‘the pluralistic organization does not 
automatically hold itself together’ (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p.263) and Kraatz (2009, 
p.86) reminds us, that institutional maintenance becomes an on-going ‘concern 
approximately five minutes after the revolution’. 
     From this, the question that arises is of course, how do processes of creating, 
maintaining and disrupting occur? 
       
Institutional work as political process 
Lawrence et al. (2009) use the notion ‘effort’ to describe the purposeful and intended 
work made towards changing institutions. Since institutional work aims to overcome 
the ‘heroic agent’, institutional work concerns both the highly visible and dramatic as 
well as the nearly invisible and often mundane day-to-day purposeful efforts made 
towards institutional change or maintenance (Lawrence et al., 2009, loc.101).  
     Institutional work can be interpreted as political processes (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006) and many of these political processes have previously been theorised as 
‘rhetorical, normative or cognitive processes’ (Yu, 2013, p.126). However, later 
developments of institutional work (e.g. Lawrence et al., 2009; Kraatz, 2009; Yu, 
2013) focus increasingly on the process through which organizations negotiate 
multiple institutions and contend that institutional work is inherently political. In 
organizations constituted by constellations of multiple institutions, politics offers a 
possibility to negotiate between different institutions (Kraatz, 2009; Yu, 2013). 
Therefore, organizations operating within constellations of multiple institutions 
cannot act purposefully alone. They also have to engage in a range of political 
processes that constitute institutional work (Yu, 2013; Kraatz, 2009). Similarly, 
Zietsma and McKnight (2009) show that institutional work is a collective process of 
negotiating and experimenting with more-or-less novel and leftover institutional 
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material. Leftover material, referred to as institutional debris, consists of institutional 
fragments from previous institutions that through the process of co-creation come to 
form a particular institution. 
     Institutional work interpreted as political processes emphasise that institutional 
work is a process of repeated and concurrent success and failure, resistance and 
transformation (Lawrence et al., 2009, loc.329). Furthermore, institutional work is 
made by actors who on a routine basis, engage in ‘interpretive work to manage 
ambiguity and contradiction, exploiting interstices…’ (Schneiberg, 2013, p.279). 
Therefore, institutional work is often mundane and characterised as ‘muddles, 
misunderstandings, false starts and loose ends’ (Lawrence et al., 2009, p.11).  
 
Creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions simultaneously 
Early contributions on institutional work propose institutional work for creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions respectively. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) 
propose that institutional work aimed at creating institutions involves purposive 
action within each the three pillars of an institution (Scott, 2004). Altering 
institutional logics, shared meaning, and theorizing new shared meaning are ways of 
creating cultural cognitive elements (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Also, educating 
actors, providing them with new skills and knowledge as well as linking new 
practices with well-established practices, technologies and rules (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006) are ways of creating cultural cognitive elements. To Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006) political work is associated with creating new rules (as well as 
property rights and access to material resources). 
    Maintenance work, on the other hand, involves reproducing existing norms and 
belief systems and ensuring adherence to rule systems (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
Specifically concerning institutional maintenance, Washington et al. (2008) also 
suggest that institutional maintenance involves telling stories to build shared meaning; 
develop external supporting mechanisms; and, overcome external enemies by 
defending against the disruption of existing practices and prevent fragmentation of 
people who share that meaning. 
     An institution can be disrupted by undermining and delegitimizing the shared 
meaning supporting that particular institution. Also, institutions can be disrupted by 
disassociating practices, rules or technology from their moral foundations and by 
disconnecting rewards and sanctions associated with existing institutions. 
     While these actions implicitly refer to a single institution, Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) specifically identify ‘policing’ as a practice for managing conflict between two 
opposing institutions. Policing is defined as ‘ensuring compliance through 
enforcement, monitoring, auditing’ (2006, p.230) and intended to suppress proto-
institutions that ‘contradict the prevailing institutional logic’ (Hargrave & Van de 
Ven, 2009, p.123).  
     However, accepting that change is incremental and stability is temporary, the 
distinction between creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions fades. Therefore, 
Lawrence et al. (2009) propose that the three pillars are used as broader concepts to 
understand institutional work without proposing distinct actions for each type of 
institutional work. While, Lawrence et al. (2009) do not elaborate on how to do 
institutional work, they do state that institutional work is inherently political and that 
it involves negotiation, adjustment, adaption and compromise. 
     Similarly, in his work on institutional work as leadership, Kraatz (2009) points out 
that institutional work aimed at creating institutions involves ‘engaging in ongoing 
and highly consequential symbolic exchanges with different elements of [the] 
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organization’s heterogeneous institutional environment’ (Kraatz, 2009, p.73-75). 
More specifically, Kraatz (2009) proposes that institutional work includes making 
value commitments to win trust and sustain cooperation; creating coherence and 
purposiveness in the face of fragmentation; maintaining integrity by controlling 
emerging and on-going organizational processes; seeking legitimacy by winning 
external support and demonstrating ’cultural fitness’; making character defining 
choices in response to competing demands; and creating institutional integrity by 
knitting together different constituencies. Without specifically outlining the process 
through which organizations engage in symbolic exchanges Kraatz (2009) points out 
that it will require organizational actors to carry out integrative, adaptive and 
developmental work in an on-going process.  
      While Kraatz’ institutional work concerns responding to multiple external as well 
as internal demands, Yu (2013) is specifically concerned with integrative work in 
intra-organizational settings. Yu (2013) suggests that organizations characterised by 
intra-organizational collaboration need to succeed in integrating multiple institutions 
through intra-organizational political processes in order to sustain themselves. 
Integrative work occurs when organizations change or create institutions by layering 
institutions and compromising between institutions. Importantly, integration is 
distinct from hybridization (Battilana & Dorado, 2010) were multiple institutions 
merge and implies purposeful design (Yu, 2013). Contrary, integration, interpreted as 
layers of institutions and compromises among institutions, happens through on-going 
efforts to legitimise organizational actions and contests among organizations that 
pursue their own interests. The integrative process involves lobbying of higher 
authority and mobilizing resources and opinions (Yu, 2013) and therefore, also 
depends not only on interests (Lawrence et al., 2009), but also on perceptions and 
values (Yu, 2013, p.107-108; Phua, 2006). The result of the on-going contest is a 
constructed temporary negotiated order that enables organizations to gradually adapt 
to changing conditions (Yu, 2013).  
     Similarly, Zietsma and McKnight (2009) in their study of the Canadian forest 
industry show that creating a new institution involves on-going collaboration and 
competition among (proto-) institutions. Specifically, Zietsma and McKnight (2009, 
p.143) find that the becoming of a new institution is a ‘process of co-creation of 
institutions involving multiple members of the organizational field, who compete and 
collaborate through multiple iterations of institutional development until a common 
template becomes diffused’. The co-creation process results in multiple proto-
institutions coalescing into shared practices and meanings and thus, 
institutionalisation is characterised by adaptation and change. Importantly, Zietsma 
and McKnight (2009) also showed, that while action was purposeful, it included 
experimentation, learning and compromise along the way. In attempts to 
institutionalise a particular proto-institution, Zietsma and McKnight (2009) showed, 
that actors made efforts towards changing the normative framing and legitimizing 
institutions by linking them to orthodox meanings. Also, actors created supportive 
networks for proto-institutions and obtained sponsorships, which acted as coercive 
measures to make organizations adhere to particular institutions. 
     Furthermore, Zietsma and McKnight (2009) showed that creating institutions 
requires continuous maintenance at the same time. They further showed that intended 
disruptive work may not be accompanied by proto-institutions ready to replace the 
disrupted institutions and that an institutional order may be a by-product as opposed 
to a clearly defined solution to an acknowledged problem (Zietsma & McKnight, 
2009). Similarly, Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) showed that creating institutions can 
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be a by-product of maintaining particular constellations of institutions. Through 
mechanisms of co-existence, actors attempted to maintain certain institutional 
arrangements without resolving potential conflict or competition. As discussed earlier, 
negative choice refers to actors who choose to adhere to the least dissatisfactory 
institution when faced with multiple competing institutions. However, the negative 
choice will only lead to a temporary satisfaction and actors will start to question, 
oppose and re-negotiate the relationship between the competing institutions. As a 
result, while negative choice can be interpreted as a maintenance mechanism, it does 
also continuously enable the mutation of a constellation of institutions. Similarly, 
deliberate ambiguity (e.g. using wide rhetoric to wash-out the perceived competition 
between multiple institutions) is interpreted to be intended to maintain constellations 
of institutions, however, it contributes to an on-going mutation of a constellation of 
institutions. However, negative choice and deliberate ambiguity not only enable 
mutations but also postpones the point in time when a more purposeful and intended 
settlement of the relationship between institutions may occur through for example, co-
creation. Although the conflict or competition among institutions may never settle, 
deliberate ambiguity and negative choice can postpone creating and disrupting 
institutions and thus enable maintenance through what is interpreted to be a political 
process. 
 
Design-build projects & project performance as 
constellations of institutions 
 
Many of the contributions on institutional work discussed previously in this theory 
chapter concern institutional processes at the field level (e.g. Zietsma & McKnight, 
2009; Lawrence et al., 2009). These contributions can be transferred to the project-
based organization. For example, the temporal, technical, social and spatial distance 
between projects means that projects are relatively decoupled from one another, 
similar to organizations in a field. On the other hand, similarly to organizations in a 
field, project team members travel from completed to new projects, have similar 
interests, shared purposes and meanings because they adhere to the same regulations, 
have similar backgrounds, and conduct similar types of projects. Furthermore, 
collective co-creating of institutions in a field (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) is also 
found in project-based organizations where projects compete and collaborate to 
create, maintain or disrupt certain institutions. Also, projects typically employ the 
same project team members for the duration of the project, thus people, meanings and 
stories rarely travel from project to project in real-time. However, as each project 
develops and is completed, narratives about the project develop and form institutional 
debris for other projects. Therefore, contending that the project is an organization, 
then the design-build organization becomes an inter-organizational site for latent 
institutional material for projects to develop from and provide coupling between 
projects. 
 
As Kadefors (1995) showed, design-build projects are subject to many regulating 
mechanisms, and the product of taken-for-granted norms that stabilize project 
processes and performance. As a result, the project can be interpreted to represent an 
institution in at least some minimum sense. 
	 27 
However, while a project constitutes an individual organization it is made up from a 
number of organizations and involves inter-organizational collaboration. In that 
respect, the project can be considered an inter-organizational site in which multiple 
institutions come alive and actors identify and negotiate their meanings, norms, rules, 
and interests. Therefore, in the context of multiple institutions the project can be 
interpreted as a negotiated constellation of multiple institutions.  
     The design-build project represents a particular constellation of multiple 
institutions at the beginning of the project, yet this constellation mutates over the 
course of the project as the project shifts from one phase to another (e.g. design to 
build). Furthermore, because multiple interests, perceptions and norms have to be 
negotiated in the project, the project mutates as project team members make efforts to 
create certain constellations of institutions or promote certain institutions that satisfy 
their own perceptions and values. Also, the project contains institutional debris left 
over from previous projects that become part of a co-creation process. 
     Similarly, the final building and project performance can also be interpreted as a 
stabilization of the constellation of institutions developed during the design and build 
processes on a particular project. To elaborate, the building itself reflects what was 
perceived to be important and right for the project team, or the most dominant actors 
in the project team. For example, the successful design, installation and running of 
mechanical systems reflects, that an understanding of functionality was presented in 
the project. Similarly, inadequately designed and installed mechanical systems that 
don’t fulfil indoor climate requirement can be interpreted to reflect a lack of 
integration of the understanding of functionality. However, the constellation of 
institutions reflected in the final building and the project’s performance continues to 
mutate as people begin to occupy, commission, maintain, and eventually, demolish 
the building. Potentially, even after demolition, the project may remain an institution 
or at least provide institutional debris for future projects. 
     As mentioned previously, no contributions that explicitly inform any potential 
relationship between institutional work and organizational performance, let alone 
design-build project performance, have been found. Most literature on project 
performance adopts a functionalist perspective and are concerned with delivering 
project on time and on budget (Morris et al., 2010). These contributions are 
interpreted to reflect a normative understanding of project performance. For example, 
while there are no regulations regarding project performance in the Danish 
construction industry, the contractor’s project teams receive a bonus if profit ratio 
meets or exceeds a pre-agreed amount and if the project is handed off on time and 
with zero errors and deficiencies. While these criteria reflect what is normatively 
perceived as a successful project (i.e. a project that is delivered on time, with zero 
deficiencies and with a minimum profit ratio), these criteria are interpreted to be 
criteria only representing a limited number of interests (i.e. economy, efficiency, and 
to some degree quality). Evaluating project performance from a multi-institutional 
perspective is thus less about error and deficiencies at hand-off and meeting a 
particular deadline. Instead, it becomes a matter of the project team’s ability to create 
a particular constellation of institutions throughout the design and build process that 
results in a building that integrates the multiple institutions represented in the project. 
And while, for example, delivering the project on time may indeed be an interest that 
requires integration on a particular project, the institutions that require integration 
have to represent the interests of the entire project team and society at large. For 
example, profit for all the organizations in the project team, creating public space and 
developing state-of-the-art buildings, are also interests and norms that may have to be 
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integrated into the project.  
     Therefore, with a multi-institutional understanding of project performance, a high 
performance project is defined as a project in which the project team is able to create 
a constellation of institutions that result in a project aftermath that integrates multiple 
institutions.  
     On the contrary, a low performance project is defined as a project in which the 
project team is unable to create a constellation of institutions that result in a building 
and project aftermath that integrates multiple institutions. 
 
Coordination 
 
As mentioned previously, projects require coordination (Kadefors, 1995), especially 
due to an increasing number of actors interacting in projects resulting in increased 
design information (Berard, 2012), knowledge-sharing (Thuesen, 2006), 
communication and synchronisation of efforts (Söderlund, 2010).  
     The following sections will summarize a literature review of coordination (Urup & 
Koch, 2014) and further extend and develop the concept of coordination in an 
institutional works context. 
 
Coordination as structure & interaction 
 
Building on Urup and Koch’s (2014) selective review of coordination literature, the 
following section summarizes the points of Urup and Koch (2014).  
     Some literature on coordination has adapted a functionalist perspective and has 
defined coordination as: managing activities, tasks and uncertainty (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 
2010); time constraints and uncertainties (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008); managing 
temporal alignment (Burke et al., 2011); and propose coordination mechanisms such 
as temporal embeddedness in the form of deadlines and project phases (e.g. 
programing, design, and build phases) (Lichtenstein & Jones, 2008). Also adopting a 
functionalist view, yet developing an interactional dimension too is Mintzberg’s 
(2009) highly recognized work on coordination. To Mintzberg (2009) coordination is 
both a matter of standardization of processes, outputs, skills and norms (i.e. formal 
structure), and direct supervision (i.e. formal interaction) as well as mutual adjustment 
(i.e. informal interaction). Primarily focussing on coordination as interaction, Gittell 
(2008) introduced the notion ‘relational coordination’. Relational coordination refers 
to both formal and informal communication as well as informal relations among 
multiple parties. Similarly, Jones and Lichtenstein (2008) used the term social 
embeddedness to refer to how recurring relations between project parties results in 
coordination because roles, expectations and shared understandings become 
increasingly established and even taken-for-granted when collaboration recurs. Also, 
Hemphill’s (2009) work concerned coordination understood as social interaction and 
she extended the notion of adaptive capacity, and showed that project members used 
communication, multi-membership and perspective-taking to adapt to the changing 
requirements of a bridge-building project. Last, but not least, Melin and Axelsson 
(2005) showed that IT has the ability to coordinate work by for example introducing 
rhythm and schedule to work processes and by providing structure that guided 
interaction and communication.  
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Coordinating as institutions & institutional work 
 
Coordination is explicitly central to the concept of institutional work: ‘Institutional 
work draws a distinctly political approach to institutions in which our core puzzle is 
to understand the ways in which disparate sets of actors, each pursuing their own 
vision, can become co-ordinated in common project’ (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, 
p.249), although Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) interpret co-ordination in a broader 
sense than coordination aimed at designing and construction buildings. 
 
 
 Mintzberg (2009) Gittell (2008) Hemphill (2009) 
Melin & Axelsson 
(2005) 
Definition of 
Coordination 
No explicit 
definition. The 
structure of an 
organization is 
the division of 
tasks and 
coordination 
between them. 
Coordination is 
management of 
interdependencies 
between tasks. 
Coordination is the 
organization of 
different elements 
of a complex body 
or activity so as to 
enable them to 
work together 
effectively. 
No explicit 
definition 
developed. 
Paradigmatic 
Positioning 
Functionalist 
view with 
assumptions of 
given 
management 
prerogatives. 
Focus on 
structure. 
Phenomenological 
approach. Focus on 
agency. 
Social constructivist 
approach. Focus on 
agency. 
Interpretive social 
constructivist 
approach. Focus on 
agency and 
structure. 
Agency 
 
Human 
individual. 
Dominant 
agency is 
management. 
Collective human. 
At management and 
operational level. 
Individual human 
and non-human. At 
all organizational 
levels. 
Non-human. At all 
organizational 
levels. 
Coordination 
Mechanisms 
 
Mutual 
adjustment. 
Direct 
supervision. 
Standardisation 
of output, skills, 
norms. 
Frequent, timely 
and accurate 
communication. 
Shared goals, 
knowledge and 
understanding. 
Mutual respect. 
Adaptive capacity: 
perspective-taking, 
communication, 
shared objects, 
affect, and multi-
membership. 
IT provides: tool to 
accomplish tasks, 
rhythm to work 
processes, technical 
vocabularies. 
Relation to 
Institutions 
 
Structure focus 
fits classic 
institutional 
theory. 
No structure, no 
explicit 
relationship. 
Implicit, 
institutional 
entrepreneur-ship. 
No structure, no 
explicit 
relationship. 
Combined structure 
and agency fits 
institutional work. 
Relationship 
to Projects 
and Project 
Based 
Organizations 
 
Equal to 
Mintzberg's 
innovative 
organization 
with its 
adhocracy. 
Inter- and 
intraorganizational. 
Intraorganizational. Inter- and 
intraorganizational. 
 
Table 1. The table summarizes the key criteria analysed in the selective literature 
review on coordination (modified from Urup & Koch, 2014). 
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The selective review of literature on coordination by Urup and Koch (2014) showed 
that the understanding of coordination can be interpreted to be a matter of structure as 
well as interaction. Similarly, the coordination mechanisms proposed are intended to 
either impose structure or nurture social relations. 
     While several of the contributions mentioned above understand coordination as a 
matter of both structure and agency, none of the contributions explicitly understand 
coordination as an institutional concept, let alone a form of institutional work.       
     However, the reviewed contributions on coordination and coordination 
mechanisms can be interpreted as a form of institutional work. To elaborate, 
Mintzberg’s (2009) coordination mechanisms of standardization and direct 
supervision, as well as IT (Melin & Axelsson, 2005) introduce formal structure that 
assist to legitimize, maintain and stabilize institutions (Slager et al., 2012). In that 
respect, coordination mechanisms can be interpreted as (potentially overarching) 
structures.  
     The majority of the reviewed contributions on coordination do not consider the 
process of disruption, with the exception of Jarzabkowski and Le (2012) who 
explicitly understand disruption as an integral part of the coordinating process. While 
this may be a purposeful omission, it may also reflect the understanding that 
coordination is broadly interpreted to concern the ‘bringing together’ of something, 
while disruption can be associated with preventing the ‘bringing together’. However, 
purposeful disruption of a particular institution of constellation of institutions may 
also require coordinated efforts from multiple actors. For example, although rooted in 
a dialectic perspective, Karl Marx (1848), theorized, that the lower social classes 
would coordinate to initiate revolution against higher social classes and capitalist 
economic structures. 
     On the other hand, most contributions on coordination concern the creating process 
(of institutions). The contributions on relational coordination propose coordination 
mechanisms that allow for organizations to adapt to and co-create institutions. More 
specifically, mutual adjustment (Mintzberg, 2009), communication (Gittell, 2008) and 
adaptive capacity (Hemphill, 2009) can all be interpreted as potential purposeful 
mundane efforts that gradually enable the incremental development of shared 
meanings, norms and rules. Similarly, coordinating through creating recurring social 
relationships (Lichtenstein & Jones, 2008), developing shared goals, knowledge and 
mutual respect (Gittell, 2008), and mutual adjustment (Mintzberg, 2009) all require 
interaction and negotiation of meanings, norm, interests and values, and enables co-
creation and adaptation to new institutions.  
     Furthermore, according to Jarzabkowski and Le (2012) coordinating work in 
changing organizations require improvisation which can be interpreted to be 
overlapping with Zietsma and McKnight’s (2009) finding that institutional co-
creation requires experimentation. Also, Zietsma and McKnight’s (2009) concept of 
co-creating institutions (e.g. political negotiations to move between continuous 
competition and joint collaboration to legitimize and adapt to proto-institutions) can 
be interpreted to be somewhat overlapping to Hemphill’s (2009) concept of adaptive 
capacity, in which parties exercise multi-membership in order to coordinate or resolve 
conflicts of interests. 
     In an attempt to bridge the literature on coordination and institutional work, Urup 
and Koch (2014) drew inspiration from Greenwood et al.’s (2008, p.525) 
conceptualization of  ‘institutional fields as floating… and temporally, socially and 
spatially separate…’ and proposed to define coordination as‘the interactions and 
structures that bring together related, yet potentially spatially, socially and 
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temporally separated, work elements’ (Urup & Koch, 2014, p.821). 
     Similarly, Urup and Koch (2014) proposed two coordination mechanisms: the 
building of an institution in the making; and the building of institutions by 
establishing relations between a number of institutions to create a constellation of 
institutions. 
 
Temporarily stable organizations & dynamic coordination 
processes 
 
The definition of coordination offered by Urup and Koch (2014) proposes that work 
elements may be temporally separated and that coordination involves bringing these 
together. This suggests that coordination is an on-going process in which interactions 
and structures at one point in time can enable and/or constrain interactions and 
structures at a later point in time. 
     In contrast, some literature on coordination appears to assume that coordination is 
self-maintaining in stable organizations. For example, Mintzberg’s (2009) 
coordination mechanisms of standardization and direct supervision assume that 
organizations are relatively stable entities (Melin & Axelsson, 2005), as 
standardization can be implemented and seemingly maintained without the need for 
continuous work.  
     Similarly, Gittell’s (2008) concept of relational coordination can be interpreted to 
implicitly assume that organizations are stable, even if work elements that need to be 
coordinated are uncertain and may change. The relational coordination mechanisms of 
shared goals, shared knowledge, and mutual respect can all be interpreted to 
characterize a stable relationship. However, Gittell’s (2008) coordination mechanisms 
concerning communication (e.g. frequent, timely, accurate and problem-solving 
communication) allow for continuous adaption to changing shared goals, shared 
knowledge and mutual respect. Also, and perhaps more importantly, the coordination 
mechanisms enable actors to adapt to changing goals and new knowledge. Thus, 
implicitly, Gittell (2008) supports a dynamic view of coordination. The dynamic view 
of coordination is made explicitly by Melin and Axelsson (2005) who criticize 
Mintzberg’s (2009) static understanding coordination for not adequately accounting 
for the complexities of coordinating work in contemporary construction companies 
where flexibility to accommodate changes is required. Accepting this criticism, it can 
however, be argued that mutual adjustment, as opposed to standardization and direct 
supervision, enables organizations to change or adapt to change, because it allows 
organizations to gradually adjust to and collectively establish new meanings, norms 
and rules.  
     Even more explicitly understanding coordination as a dynamic phenomenon is 
Hemphill (2009) who proposes that the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances 
in a construction project is a coordination mechanism in itself. Adaptive capacity, 
which involves perspective-taking (e.g. being able to understand the perspective of 
other organizations and individuals), empathy and multi-membership (e.g. being able 
to assist other organizations with their work), is interpreted to be an entirely 
interactionist concept explicitly aimed at handling exogenous changes or disruptions 
to the project.       
     Finally, Jarzabkowski et al. (2012) developed a process model for how 
coordinating mechanisms develop proposing that coordinating is an on-going activity 
to enable actors to respond to exogenous organizational change. Jarzabkowski et al. 
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(2012) propose the following steps in the coordination process: 1. disruption; 2. 
orienting to absence (actors becoming aware of what coordinating mechanisms are 
missing); 3. creating elements; 4. forming patterns; and 5. stabilizing patterns. While 
the model does understand coordination as a process, it assumes that coordination 
processes start with disruption and follow a relatively linear and rational development 
and finally settles in a stabilized form. This is due to Jarzabkowski et al.’s (2012) 
model of coordinating being primarily concerned with exogenous and 
transformational change. No contributions were found to show how co-creating and 
integrative institutional processes enable endogenous and incremental change. 
However, as discussed previously, creating new structure may arise from competing 
proto-institutions, institutional debris, and/or out of a muddled process with no clearly 
defined goal and is only temporary. 
 
Summary of theory 
 
In the context of design-build projects and project organizations, an institution is 
defined as: as a more-or-less taken-for-granted shared meaning, underpinned by 
normative understandings and conducts, and potentially rules that guide and provide 
meaning to social interaction.  
     The concept of institutional work is introduced to overcome the image of 
institutions as overarching structures and institutional entrepreneurs as heroic 
individuals. Institutional work provides the understanding that actors are reflective, 
driven by interests and make purposeful efforts towards creating, disrupting and 
maintaining institutions.  
     Furthermore, projects are interpreted to be characterized by multiple institutions 
were institutions co-exist in a variety of relationships, including conflict, competition, 
blending, peaceful co-existence, and domination.  
     Contributions on institutional work on multiple institutions propose that 
institutional work requires that actors create, maintain, and disrupt motivations, 
interests, shared meanings, normative conducts, values, perceptions and rules in a 
concurrent on-going process characterised by negotiation, experimentation, learning, 
compromise, collaboration, competition, co-creation, adaptation and integration. 
Because actors continuously negotiate the institutional order the constellation of 
institutions mutate over the course of the project. As a result, stability is temporary 
and change on-going and incremental. 
     Constellations of multiple institutions afford discretion on reflective action 
because multiple institutions cause ambiguity and potentially paralysis due to the lack 
of ability to satisfy multiple conflicting institutions at the same time. On the other 
hand, co-existence of multiple institutions enables partial autonomy and deviation 
from institutional pressures by providing multiple institutions for actors to adhere to, 
room for proto-institutions, co-creation of new institutions and provide room for 
negotiation of the institutional order.  
     The concept of co-creation (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) is interpreted to be 
overlapping with integration (Yu, 2013; Kraatz, 2009), and layering (Yu, 2013). 
These concepts all understand institutional work as a collective on-going process in 
which a new temporary constellation of institutions is created from multiple 
established and proto-institutions. An inherent part of the institutional process is 
compromise, negative choice, adjustment, contest, competition, deliberate ambiguity, 
which are also considered to be related concepts. These concepts all understand that 
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no single institution uncontested dominates the constellation or that any institution 
‘survives’ mutation and remain entirely stable. 
     Apart from interpreting the project as a mutating constellation of institutions, 
project performance is also interpreted as a multi-institutional concept. Project 
performance is defined as a temporarily stabilised constellation of institution as the 
project transitions from building phase to hand-off, commissioning and occupancy. 
Furthermore, project performance is evaluated based on the project team’s ability to 
create a constellation of institutions that result in a building and project aftermath that 
integrates multiple institutions.  
     Coordination is also defined as an institutional concept. The literature review 
shows that previous contributions understand coordination as either a functionalist or 
relational concept. In order to describe how actors negotiate to coordinate a particular 
project, coordination is defined as ‘the interactions and structures that bring together 
related, yet potentially spatially, socially and temporally separated, work elements’ 
(Urup & Koch, 2014, p.821). Also, two coordination mechanisms are proposed: the 
building of an institution; and the building of institutions by establishing relations 
between a number of institutions to create a constellation of institutions. 
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Method 
 
The first part of this research project concerns gaining insight into how project 
coordination, interpreted as an institutional process, is respectively enabled and 
constrained. The second part concerns understanding how coordination (and the lack 
of coordination) relates to project performance. 
     The third part of this research project involves using these insights to further 
propose how project coordination and performance can be improved. 
 
First of all, the phenomenon in question, coordination of design-build organization, is 
interpreted to be inherently social. Design-build projects are social structures that 
involve multiple actors interacting over time and across inter- and intraorganizational 
arrangements in order to produce a building.  
     Secondly, over the course of a project, these actors also interact with, for example, 
materials, equipment, and IT that, in the ontological context of this research project, 
cannot be considered to be actors, but rather constitute structures.     
     Thirdly, the project based organizations and the projects are characterised by 
multiple levels (e.g. social, temporal, spatial etc.) of interactions that require 
coordination (Söderlund, 2010, p.46). Coordination itself is thus a social process, and 
the coordination mechanisms that these organizations develop are equally social.  
      In summary, an appropriate method for this research project is one that is 
concerned with capturing the coordination process as it develops in a larger 
institutional context. It also calls for a method that enables close interaction with, and 
is highly sensitive to, the empirical world of design-build projects.  
 
In the following sections, the method for how to research institutional processes (i.e. 
project coordination and performance) will be elaborated. 
     First, the research design is presented. Secondly, a hermeneutic method is 
presented to account for how this research project provides insight into complex 
social phenomena, specifically, context dependent design-build processes. Third, the 
hermeneutic method is discussed in the context of institutional processes. Fourth, an 
account of how the literature study and empirical study were conducted is presented, 
followed by a presentation of how the empirical material was interpreted. Fifth, the 
method by which the Integrated Design-Build Management [IDBM] concept has been 
developed is presented. Finally, the trustworthiness and authenticity, as well as the 
limitations, of this research project are discussed. 
 
Research design 
 
The research design for this research project was intended to be a mixed method 
design combining a qualitative and quantitative component. The qualitative 
component was intended to illuminate the questions concerning why, how and what 
institutional processes are developed in the design-build project. The quantitative 
component was intended to illuminate how institutions relate to the performance of 
design-build projects. However, it turned out that gaining access to quantitative data 
(e.g., financial performance, number of errors and deficiencies, profit ratio, duration 
of project, owner satisfaction and more) of the design-build projects was difficult. 
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First, the project team members were reluctant to share information for fear of sharing 
what was perceived as confidential information. Second, the projects often weren’t 
completed in practice even when officially completed, which means that performance 
developed and varied as the ‘after-math’ of the project gradually settled. Third, the 
quantitative data were social constructions made by the project organization to make 
the project appear to have finished on time or without deficiencies to avoid fiscal 
sanctions or to enable the release fiscal bonuses to the project team members. These 
were not cases of fraud, but rather juridical and normatively legitimized ways of 
manipulating project performance numbers. Therefore, these fabrications did more to 
add to the qualitative analysis of how institutions shape design-build project 
performance than to provide hard facts on project performance. Therefore, I consider 
the final research design a double qualitative study combined with a minor relative 
quantitative dimension. 
 
Why study projects? 
 
This research project builds on a multi-level study of seven design-build projects. The 
study of projects enables a detailed and empirically grounded analysis of coordination 
of design-build projects and thus enables a deeper understanding (Bryman, 2012, 
p.66) of the mutating constellations of institutions that characterise design-build 
projects. 
     To understand why, what and how certain institutions are developed on design-
build projects, an in-depth ex-ante project study has been conducted. The ex-ante 
study provided the opportunity to collect ‘naturally occurring data’ (Silverman, 2013, 
p.55) enabling a rich record of what an how institutions are developed and how and 
why actors make purposive efforts to coordinate projects. 
     To further understand what constellations of institutions characterise design-build 
projects and how these constellations of institutions relate to the project performance, 
five ex-post project studies have been conducted. The ex-post studies generated 
emerging patterns of potential relationships between constellations of institutions and 
project performance. However, as mentioned above, due to manufactured project 
performance data, comparing project performance was difficult and ambiguous at best. 
Nevertheless, and perhaps more importantly, the ex-post studies highlighted variation 
and similarities in meanings, normative conduct and rules across projects (Bryman, 
2012).  
     Because this Ph.D. project was carried out as an industrial Ph.D. and my main 
work place was the contractor’s head office, an informal ex-ante study of the 
contractor’s organization was carried out. The informal ex-ante study of the 
contractor’s organization enabled an understanding of which and how institutions 
travel from one project to another and from design to building phase. The study serves 
as a meta-analysis informing the ex-ante analysis of project 1 and the ex-post analyses 
of projects 2-6.  
 
Quadri-hermeneutics  
 
In order to gain insight into how coordination is enabled and constrained in design-
build projects, and relates to project performance, this research project applies an 
interpretive sociology perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). The reflexive 
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interpretation perspective does not aim to reach ‘the truth’ of a phenomenon 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.101), which would be unfittingly reductionist for the 
purpose of describing the on-going negotiation of socially constructed meanings, 
norms, and rules that characterise design-build projects. Rather, the premise of 
reflexive interpretation is that all empirical material is context related. Because all 
empirical material in relation to its context is related, the researcher has to interpret 
the empirical materials and its context to gain insight and a deeper understanding of a 
particular phenomenon (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). 
    ‘Reflection’ refers to a particular systematic and critical method of interpreting the 
interpretations while, the term ‘reflexive’ refers to a particular type of reflective 
research that involves reflecting on multiple levels (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.7-
10).  
     While these multiple levels can potentially be expanded or modified as appropriate 
relative to the research phenomenon in question, the term ‘quadri-hermeneutics’ 
refers specifically to a variant of reflective interpretation that consists of four 
particular levels (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.273). These four levels are 
summarised in the table below. 
 
Level of interpretation Focus Theoretical inspiration 
Interaction with empirical 
material 
Accounts in interviews, 
observations of situations and 
other empirical material 
Grounded theory 
Interpretation Underlying meanings Hermeneutics 
Critical interpretation Ideology, power, social reproduction Critical theory 
Reflection on text production 
and language use 
Own text, claims to authority, 
selectivity of the voices 
represented in the text 
Post-modernism 
 
Table 2. The table summarizes the four levels of interpretation in reflexive 
hermeneutics (adapted from Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.273). The first two levels 
concern interpretation of the empirical material and require the ‘utmost awareness of 
the theoretical assumptions, the importance of language and pre-understanding' 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.8). The third and fourth levels concerns reflection of 
‘the person of the researcher, the relevant research community, society as a whole, 
intellectual and cultural traditions, and the central important, as well as problematic 
nature, of language and narrative in the research context’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2009, p.8). 
 
Reflexive interpretation & structure 
 
Due to its social-constructivist orientation, Alvesson & Sköldberg’s (2009) quadri-
hermeneutic method is explicitly concerned with how to capture process. However, it 
is less explicit about how to capture process in relation to structure. Therefore, in 
order to understand how to analyse coordination processes in relation to social 
structures, the interpretive method is further informed by Pettigrew’s (1986) work on 
organizational change.  
     In his seminal work ‘The Awakening Giant’ Pettigrew (1986) criticises previous 
studies on organizational change for neglecting the influence of the broader context in 
which the change processes occur. Pettigrew (1986) advocates that it is the structures 
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and contexts that give form, meaning and dynamic to change and that ‘Change and 
continuity, process and structure, are inextricably linked’ (Pettigrew, 1986, p.1).  
     In fact, he suggests that organizational change can best be identified and studied 
against a background of structure of relative constancy (modified from Pettigrew, 
1986, p.36). In Pettigrew’s own words: ‘The interest [of the analysis] is both catching 
reality in flight, and in embeddedness’ (Pettigrew, 1986, p.37).  
     Central to Pettigrew’s analysis of organizational change, is the understanding that 
organizations are social phenomena developing in a continuous process that is linked 
to the historical, cultural and political context of the organization. Pettigrew (1986) 
suggests a research approach with a vertical multi-level dimension. The vertical 
multi-level dimension advocates interpreting the empirical material on the following 
levels: the actor, language, power relationships, social structures, and history. These 
levels are similar to the first three levels of Alvesson and Sköldberg’s reflexive 
hermeneutics, however Pettigrew (1986) specifically advocates a focus on history and 
politics. 
      Pettigrew’s research approach also includes a horizontal dimension, one that is 
concerned with capturing the process of organizational change. In practice, Pettigrew 
(1986) proposes conducting longitudinal ex-ante studies of events to describe past, 
present and future events for the purpose of capturing the change process. Specifically, 
Pettigrew (1986) advocates ex-ante studies in order to use the events to explain 
processes of language, interacting, acting, reacting, responding and adapting at the 
actor level and processes of emerging, elaborating, mobilising, continuing, changing, 
dissolving and transforming at the organizational level (Pettigrew, 1986).  
     Pettigrew (1986, p.1) acknowledges that the change process is ‘untidy’ and 
recommends that the researcher look for ‘continuity and change, patterns and 
idiosyncrasies, the actions of individuals and groups, the role of contexts and 
structures, and the processes of structuring’. 
 
Reflexive interpretation & institutional processes 
 
The research questions presented in this research project aim to understand two 
different types of institutional processes: an incremental micro-process of 
coordination through an ex-ante study; and a longitudinal process across projects and 
from design and build to project performance through an ex-post study. In other 
words, the ex-ante and the ex-post study are intended to capture two different types of 
institutional processes. The ex-ante study is intended to provide insight and in-depth 
understanding of mundane efforts and incremental coordination processes.  
     Specifically in relation to institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2006) institutional 
change can be interpreted as a matter of interaction and structure developing through 
organizational micro-processes (Zilber, 2013). The ex-post study, on the other hand, 
is intended to understand the development of multiple institutions over the duration of 
the project in order to produce, what can be referred to as a still life of the design-
build process in relation to project performance. 
     Suddaby and Greenwood (2009) review four methodological approaches to 
researching institutional change: multivariate analysis, interpretive, historical and 
dialectic approaches. While multivariate analysis assumes that institutions and 
organizations are relatively fixed and stable arrangements, interpretive, historical and 
dialectic approaches understand institutions as on-going processes of social 
interactions. 
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Although multivariate and the proccessual approaches appear to represent a 
methodological conflict, Suddaby and Greenwood (2009) recommend using a mix of 
methodologies: 
 
‘The notion that institutions are comprised, simultaneously, of content and 
process elements directs us, necessarily, to the notion that the use of 
multivariate methods must be complemented by an equal use of qualitative 
methods, particularly those that focus on the interpretations and 
categorization of events by the participants, when studying processes of 
institutional change.’ (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009, p.189). 
 
While interpretative methods are indeed common in research on institutional change 
(Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) reviews of studies of institutional processes (Zilber, 
2008; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) identify that a wide range of research methods 
are used: quantitative, qualitative, ethnographic, participant observation, longitudinal 
case studies, content analysis, symbolic interactionism, cultural framing analysis, 
social psychology, software-based, discourse oriented, sense-making, triangulation, 
and multi-level.      
     However, as Suddaby and Greenwood (2005, p.182) point out, ‘the central idea 
spawned by interpretive assumptions is that institutional change is invariably 
accompanied by shifts in meaning, understanding, and values.’ With reference to 
Zilber’s (2002) study of an Israeli rape crisis center, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) 
highlight interpretive methods superior ability to give insight into highly complex and 
interwoven levels of analysis, for example, meaning and structure, and society and 
individual.  
     Similarly, for analyses in the context of institutional process specifically, Zilber 
(2008) calls for research methods that are increasingly sensitive to how meaning is 
created in action on a daily inter-actor level, yet understood as part of a greater 
physical, social and historical dynamic context. Specifically, Zilber (2008) suggests 
that researching institutional process requires a complex and sophisticated research 
design in which methods are combined to account for multiple organizational levels, 
multiple projects, constellations of multiple institutions and the on-going. 
 
The emphasis on qualitative research advocated by scholars of institutional process 
aligns with Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) understanding of how to appropriately 
interact with the empirical materials in order to gain insight into a particular 
phenomenon. On the other hand, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009, p.35) are very 
explicit about quantitative research: ‘mostly boring, not to say tinder-dry statistical 
investigations’ while Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) suggest ‘equal’ amounts of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. However, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) do 
highlight that quantitative methods were mostly used in neo-institutional studies 
concerned with organizational isomorphism (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and go 
on to point out, that interpretive methods are particularly useful to illuminate different 
institutional processes at different levels of analysis. 
     Furthermore, interpretive research methods that draw on phenomenologists such as 
Berger and Luckmann (1966), are distinctly subjective in focus and therefore suitable 
for understanding how social roles, routines, and patterns of interaction, become 
typified so as to appear as an objective reality (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009). This 
sits well with Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) first two levels, the double-
	 39 
hermeneutics, which are concerned with ‘interpreting interpretive beings’ (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2009, p.174). 
    Also, in alignment with Pettigrew (1986), longitudinal methods are recommended 
in studies of institutional processes. Suddaby and Greenwood (2009, p.183) advocate 
using a historical approach that enables the understanding of institutions and 
organizations ‘as the outcome of complex phenomena in which multiple causes 
interact’. Also, the historical approach is distinctly processual and enables the 
researcher to construct path dependency (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009, p.183), 
which is useful for understanding how coordination in the design-build process relates 
to project performance. Also, the historical approach enables an understanding of how 
current projects interact with past and future projects.  
     With a historical approach, organizations and institutions are not interpreted to be 
stable entities but rather historically contingent and temporary. In practice, historical 
methods suggest to arrange processes into phases defined as ‘relatively distinct and 
coherent clusters of activity, temporally bracketed, and organized around common 
themes’ (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009, p.184). Arranging the process into distinct 
phases is useful to understand the history of the building projects subject to analysis 
in this research project. The design-build projects are each relatively distinct 
temporally bracketed processes. Also, each project is divided into distinct phases 
(typically project conception, early design, basic design, detailed design, construction, 
commissioning, hand-off and so on).  
     However, Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2009) variant of historical analysis is a 
retrospective analysis that focuses on collecting data of past events. This type of 
analysis sits well with an understanding of institutions being relatively stable and 
undergoing transformational change to eventually regain some level of stability. In 
that respect, the historical approach doesn’t enable insights into on-going incremental 
change processes at the organizational level as collective narratives may sway actors’ 
anecdotes. Also, project team members may not be able to accurately remember and 
account for interactions retrospectively (Pettigrew, 1986). Instead, the historical 
approach enables a post-rationalised account of a past process. This of course poses 
the risk of misrepresenting the timing and content of events. However, the ex-post 
study does enable a characteristic of the design-build process that can be illustrated as 
a still life of constellations of institutions. 
 
The process of interpretation 
 
The term reflexive interpretation indicates an open play of reflection across the four 
levels of interpretation (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.283). According	to	Alvesson	and	Sköldberg	(2009)	the	hermeneutic	process	is	conducted	through	abduction.	Abduction	describes	an	iterative	working	process	in	which	the	researcher	moves	freely	between	the	empirical	text	and	the	four	different	levels	of	reflective	interpretation. 
     The abductive process is particularly useful in order to develop insight, because it 
does not, as opposed to deduction and induction, seek to verify a stated truth or 
experience, but rather seeks to develop a picture of a potential pattern in a particular 
social context by letting the process itself assist to expand on and reveal that very 
pattern (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Thus, abduction is a 
useful method for understanding patterns in phenomena characterised by complexity 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).  
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Figure 1. The figure summarizes the research process over the course of the Ph.D. 
study from June 2013 until June 2016. The figure illustrates that multiple research 
elements were overlapping in order to allow for an iterative process as per abduction.  
 
The literature reviews on coordination and institutional theory were conducted and 
prioritised in the beginning of this research project. However, the literature review 
continued throughout the research process alongside gathering and analysing 
empirical material and later alongside the development of the IDBM concept. The 
literature continued to provide new insights to the empirical material and resulted in 
reconsideration of how the empirical material was conducted and what the empirical 
material was aimed at. Equally, the empirical material highlighted topics that required 
further theoretical knowledge, thus requiring revisiting the literature, which then in 
return directed the analysis of the empirical material further. 
     The abductive method also enabled moving between the analysis of design-build 
projects and the development of the IDBM concept. Once the first draft of the 
analysis was completed it was very encompassing. From this first draft of the analysis 
the development of the IDBM concept was begun and at first the concept addressed 
almost every problem identified during the analyses. However, certain parts of the 
IDBM concept stood out as being more insightful and original than others. Focussing 
on these particularly insightful and original parts in turn helped to direct and sharpen 
the analyses, which again further refined the IDBM concept. 
 
Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) quadri-hermeneutic method presupposes that the 
researcher has an extended repertoire of theories, and historical and political 
references readily available to use in an intuitive interpretive process.  
     However, Dubois and Gadde (2002) offer a somewhat more pragmatic approach to 
abduction and they propose that the researcher systematically moves between the 
empirical world and a particular theoretical framework. This variant of abduction is 
also iterative in order to manage the interrelatedness of the various elements in 
research work (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). 
     Dubois and Gadde’s (2002) abductive model is perhaps less sophisticated than 
Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) since it only involves one level of interpretation 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3Study
Lit. study, institutional theory
Lit. study, coordination
Lit. study, other
Observations, project 1
Interviews, project 1
Interviews, projects 2-6
Site visits, projects 1-6
Document collection
Analysis, project 1
Analysis, projects 2-6
IDBM development
Implementation phase
Writing process
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(the theoretical one). However, Dubois and Gadde’s (2002) abductive model does 
enable a focus on a specific theoretical perspective (e.g. institutional work), while also 
allowing the researcher to be sensitive to context. To that end, Dubois and Gadde’s 
(2002) version of abduction explicitly calls for a tight and evolving theoretical 
framework. On the other hand, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) specifically advocate 
using multiple theories to broaden reflection and caution against totalizing any one 
theory. For this research project it has been my ambition to conduct relatively 
sophisticated multi-level interpretations and reflections. However, due to my modest 
research experience, Dubois and Gadde’s (2002) model did create a pragmatic 
starting point when I first set out to work with sociological theories in an interpretive 
and reflexive manner. 
 
Literature study 
 
Three literature reviews were conducted in order to review the main theoretical ideas 
relating to the research phenomenon in question (Hart, 2009; Bryman, 2012). More 
specifically the literature studies informed and guided the empirical studies; enabled 
identification of gaps in the literature; and, enabled the identification of relationships 
between theoretical concepts and design-build projects. 
     The three literature reviews included: first, a systematic literature review on 
institutional theory, more specifically institutional work, was conducted in order to 
provide the grand theoretical framework for this project; secondly, a selective 
literature review on coordination was conducted in order to provide the mid-range 
theoretical framework; and finally a selective literature study was conducted on 
collaborative project delivery and process methods. 
 
Selecting grand theory 
 
Three theories were reviewed for their ability to describe the relationship between 
agency, structure, and process: institutional theory (Scott, 2008), actor-network-
theory [ANT] (Latour, 1987; Callon & Latour, 1981), and structuration theory (Stones, 
2005). Based on prior experience from the design-build field, members of project 
organizations, in general, were interpreted to be reflective about how and why 
coordinating their daily work is constrained and would attempt, to varying degree, to 
improve projects based on past experience. In other words, the theory was required to 
handle and inform somewhat reflective agency. While members of the project 
organization (inter-)acted to increase collaboration and improve project performance, 
Kadefors (1995) points out how projects vary little in process and outcome because 
projects follow well-established social structures. Thus, the theory also needed to 
handle and inform structure. Therefore, institutional theory and in particular current 
vibrant research on institutional work was interpreted to be useful due to its ability to 
describe a balanced, yet dynamic, relationship between structure and agency in 
contemporary organizations as well as being process oriented (Zilber, 2008). 
Furthermore, structuration theory was deselected due to its emphasis of 
knowledgeable agency not offering a framework for understanding how less 
knowledgeable actors may change structures. Similarly, ANT was deselected due to 
its emphasis on process and lack of ability to capture structure. Therefore, 
institutional theory was selected as a framework for this research project.  
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As mentioned above, the quadri-hermeneutic approach advocates using multi-
theoretical positions (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). However, because institutional 
theory is currently developing widely and rapidly, eventually it became necessary to 
narrow down the breadth of the theory in order to sharpen the analysis. For example, 
institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012) and institutional scholars who incise their 
work with other theories such as sociology from a French context (Boxenbaum, 2014), 
pratice-oriented approaches (Jarzabkowski et al, 2012), cognitive psychology 
(Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009), just to name a few, were gradually deselected because 
they did not explicitly assist in the answering the research questions. 
 
Selecting mid-range topics 
 
Additional selective literature studies were done on coordination, leadership and 
management, project management, project performance and collaborative project 
delivery and process methods. However, all of these, except coordination and 
collaborative project delivery and process methods, were gradually dismissed as they 
didn’t explicitly contribute to understanding coordination and project performance as 
mutating constellations of institutions.  
     The research topics for the midrange theory were based on a number of themes 
relating directly to the research questions (Hart, 2009; Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). 
Initially, ten themes were identified. However, as the empirical research progressed 
and, for example, collaboration and project performance were defined inductively, the 
ten themes were gradually reduced to one that seemed particularly relevant: 
coordination. 
 
The Literature Review Process 
 
Since the literature review process was not just about accumulating as much 
knowledge as possible, but rather a means of gaining theoretical perspective to better 
understand the empirical material, the literature was revisited on several occasions.  
     Initially, I selected literature from the formal project description reference list, a 
list produced by my supervisors at MTH and Chalmers. From this point of departure I 
used a snowballing approach (Bryman, 2012) combined with systematic literature 
searches in digital databases in order to identify relevant literature and to identify 
significant authors. First, the literature was skimmed for relevance and in order for the 
overall theoretically ideas to manifest themselves intellectually. Subsequently, 
detailed readings were conducted on the literature considered to be of particular value 
to the understanding of the empirical material. 
     For example, in Q1 of 2015 I conducted a literature study on collaborative project 
delivery and process methods. Because I was already familiar with many of the 
collaborative methods from my previous work experience I did a selective literature 
study combined with snowballing (Bryman, 2012).  
 
For the review of literature on institutional theory I carried out systematic searches in 
leading digital article databases such as: Abi Inform, Science Direct, Scopus, and 
Google Scholar. For example, on August 3, 2013 I carried out a search on Abi Inform 
by searching for ‘institutional theory’ and received a staggering 191017 hits. 
Narrowing it down to articles released in the last three years resulted in an equally 
staggering 42175 hits. At this point in time I was not prepared to exclude any 
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literature on institutional theory based on specific criteria, because in keeping with the 
narrative spirit, I didn’t want to risk not finding that particular interesting piece of 
literature. Therefore, instead I sought out key pieces of literature in institutional 
theory based on the snow balling method and this resulted in a very focussed reading 
of five books, which then further directed my attention towards relevant articles. This 
meant that by December 18, 2013 I was able to conduct a much narrower search on 
‘institutional logics’ + ‘design-build’ in the Abi Inform database. This resulted in only 
18 hits. 
     Six months into this research project I had collected 279 relevant pieces of 
literature in the format of either scholarly articles or published books. For quality 
assurance purposes only peer-reviewed articles were used. Also, I focused my 
searches on the most recent literature working backwards in time in order to capture 
contemporary literature and then let that guide me back in time to find key pieces of 
historical literature. Scott (2004) was an exception that I identified early in the 
process.  
 
For the topic of coordination a selective literature review was carried out, with 
Mintzberg (2009) as a central starting point. Other pieces of literature were 
recommended by my supervisors and found through a literature search and 
snowballing. The literature search mostly provided literature adopting a functionalist 
perspective on coordination, while the snowballing method was useful for finding 
pieces of literature with a relational perspective. Finally, the literature on project 
management also contributed with articles on coordination (often overlapping with 
the concept of collaboration). 
 
A literature study was also conducted on project performance. While numerous 
articles were found on static project performance based on quantitative methods, I 
found no contributions that informed project performance from a social, let alone 
institutional works or institutional processes, perspective. Also, at the European 
Group of Organization Studies [EGOS] conference 2014, during a panel discussion in 
a stream particularly focussed on institutional processes, a strong call for scholars to 
begin linking research on institutional processes and organization performance was 
made. Therefore I turned to literature on collaborative project delivery methods, in 
particularly integrated project delivery (AIA, 2007) where project performance is 
discussed partly as a qualitative phenomenon. Also, I reviewed selected literature on 
key performance indicators to try and define project performance. This literature 
combined a qualitative and quantitative understanding of project performance. 
 
Empirical research 
Selecting projects 
 
The ex-ante project was the first to be selected and was chosen because it was on 
going in June 2013, when this research project began and allowed for immediate 
collection of empirical data. Furthermore, the project was approaching the end of the 
basic design phase and thus provided an opportunity to observe the development and 
potential institutional change from design to construction phase.  
     Also, the project was a representative or typical case (Bryman, 2012) of the 
design-build projects that MTH carry out. In that respect, it was considered possible 
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to capture the circumstances and conditions of everyday situations and thus exemplify 
design-build projects more generally (Bryman, 2012, p.70). Ultimately, it would have 
been difficult to predict which design-build project at MTH over the course of the 
following three years would develop into a particularly interesting case study. In that 
sense, one has no real choice but an opportunity to observe a small section of a project 
for a period of time and assume that this particular project and period of time will be 
as interesting and fruitful as any other. 
 
The ex-post projects were selected six months into this research project. The first step 
in selecting a number of projects for the ex-post analysis consisted of a search in the 
contractor’s project portfolio database and resulted in no less than a total of 3341 
design-build projects. The second step therefore was to determine a set of selection 
criteria. Guided by an increasing insight into the contractor’s project portfolio and the 
ex-ante project that I was already observing. 
 
1. The project must be carried out under a design-build contract. 
2. The project must have a contract target cost of 25 million Dkr. or more, to 
represent a sufficiently complex project. 
3. The project must be completed no later than by May 1st, 2014 in order to be 
able to generate data on project performance in time for the analysis. 
4. The project must have been completed no earlier than January 1st, 2009, in 
order to increase the chances that project members can still remember details 
about the process and to avoid the risk of severe after-rationalisation 
(Pettigrew, 1986). 
5. The project must concern only new build as this typically results in newly 
formed project teams, project contracts, and no pre-build structure that may 
pre-impose certain logics.  
6. The project must not concern the construction of infrastructure or agricultural 
buildings as these are considered less complex due to their mostly functional 
requirements. 
7. The project must be located in Denmark to ensure that projects are carried out 
in a similar field and societal context. 
 
The list of criteria reflects a desire to find a relatively homogenous group of projects, 
or matching organizations (Pettigrew et al., 2001), that resembled the ex-ante project 
in terms of complexity and project cost in order to be able to join the two analyses at a 
later point in time: one analysis that informs across design-build projects and across 
projects in relation to project performance and one analysis that informs coordination 
in depth.  
     In retrospect criteria five may have been unnecessary, since through my daily 
interaction with the contractor’s organization I interpreted renovation projects to be 
faced with similar institutional complexities as new build projects. Also, at one point I 
considered including projects located outside of Denmark as the ethnographic study 
showed that international projects are perceived to face many of the same problems 
and successes as projects located in Denmark. However, after having analysed a 
project located in Norway, I discarded international projects altogether to avoid 
engaging in a discussion on difference in institutional context.  
 
Based on the seven criteria a systematic de-selection of projects was conducted. This 
reduced the number of qualifying projects to 138. Due to considerations regarding 
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available time-related resources and the breadth of the analysis, around five projects 
was considered a suitable number. Ultimately, I met with one of the division directors 
to get his perception of what had characterized the process for the projects, as well as 
how he remembered the projects had performed. Some projects he simply didn’t 
remember, while others he could speak of in what I perceived to be great detail. Some 
projects he recommended I look into and others that I refrained from studying. As I 
was interested in projects that had performed differently, I wasn’t particularly looking 
for projects that had been institutionalised as either successful or unsuccessful. In the 
end I narrowed it down to five projects: Projects 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. These five projects 
represented a mix of projects that had been perceived as highly successful, highly 
unsuccessful and some that were barely perceived at all.   
 
Generating empirical material  
 
Different methods for collecting empirical material were used for the ex-ante and ex-
post analyses, respectively. While the different methods were distinctly applied to the 
ex-ante and ex-post projects respectively, references to projects 2-6 made during 
interviews and observations from project 1 helped me understand how institutional 
debris travelled across projects. In the following, I’ll describe in detail the process of 
generating the empirical material. 
 
Participant observations on the ex-ante project 
Since institutional work concerns mundane micro-organizational processes, 
participant observation was chosen in order to gain insight into the emerging 
processes of coordination. To avoid rationalised or normative narratives about 
coordination (Pettigrew, 1986) participant observation (Bryman, 2012) was used as 
the primary collection method for the ex-ante study and involved observations of the 
project team during formally organised meetings and informal interaction in the co-
located project office. These six months represented the entire detailed design phase 
and the transition to the building process. While six months hardly represented a 
historical or longitudinal analysis in relation to the duration of design-build projects, 
six months was considered long enough to provide insight to the process of 
coordination work in the project team, similar to Pettigrew’s (1986) proposed 
longitudinal studies. On an ad hoc basis I also observed inter-organizational project 
review meetings and contractor’s coordination meetings. Further, I observed a 
combined two weeks of informal interaction in the project office. This also included 
interacting over informal lunches with the team. I also did follow-up observations 
during the building phase to understand what problems and successes had developed 
since the initial observations during the design process and early building process. 
This helped me understand how meanings, norms and interactions developed and 
changed over the course of the project. In other words, it helped me avoid 
decontextualizing (e.g. not seeing the design phase in isolation, but rather in relation 
to the build phase) and deprocessualizing (e.g. not producing a temporal snapshot of 
the project) of the analysis (Pettigrew, 1986). Observations were audio recorded and 
photographed. I also wrote rich field notes as I observed and completed the notes in 
the evening following a day’s observations to prevent details fading from my memory 
over time. During the observations, I took care not to interrupt, interfere or add my 
opinions to whatever was being discussed. I wanted the events to ‘naturally’ evolve 
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(Silverman, 2013) as it allowed me to observe instances of institutional efforts 
unfolding in the process (Lawrence et al., 2009). 
 
Interviewing project team members, project 1 
In order to get a better understanding of the early project development and design 
process preceding my observations of project 1 I conducted 29 interviews during the 
spring of 2014. I also did follow-up interviews in August and September 2014 and 
August 2015 to understand how the project had developed since the initial round of 
interviews. While interviews do pose a risk of significant after-rationalization 
(Pettigrew, 1986) and for collective meanings to have formed a particular narrative 
(Zilber, 2002) about the project, they do on the other hand allow for the interviewee to 
have done a series of reflections about the project (Bryman, 2012). Also, contending 
that actors are indeed carriers of institutions (Zilber, 2002), then interviews present an 
opportunity to ask questions and receive answers that highlight what institutions 
particular actors adhere to and why. 
     The selection of interviewees was based on theoretical sampling (Bryman, 2012) 
followed by snowballing (Bryman, 2012). The interviewees included project and 
design managers representing the owner, engineering consultants, architects, 
contractor, as well as, BIM coordinators, contract managers, owner’s consultant, and 
contractor’s process managers. Only the owner’s client did not wish to participate. 
This group represented a relatively broad group and was intended to give insights into 
constrained and enabled coordination such as experienced by project team members 
representing different professions and organizational levels (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2009).           
     Firstly, interviews provided insight into what dominating discourses were reflected 
in subjective positions at the individual level (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). These 
discourses reflect the institutions that individuals adhere to at the organizational level 
and reflect institutional logics at the field level and societal level (Thornton et al., 
2012).  
     Greenwood et al. (2002) and Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), point to the 
importance of understanding how actors use rhetoric as a way of demonstrating 
adherence to particular institutions. According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009, 
p.27) language is a particular important means for legitimization of institutions as it 
enables ‘collective sedimentation of knowledge’. Thus, paying attention to the way 
linguistic, social, historical, politics and theoretical elements are woven together 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) is inherently part of interpretive research on 
institutions.  
     Therefore, interviewing on different levels provided a deeper understanding of 
actors’ values and interests that affected the negotiation of the institutional order of 
the project.  
     During each interview an event map was developed on an A3 roll of paper with the 
interviewee. The maps resembled Pettigrew’s (1986) proposed longitudinal study of 
events, albeit in retrospect, and became a detailed document containing what the 
interviewee perceived as important. The map itself facilitated the memory of the 
interviewee and helped me understand what had occurred in the process leading up to 
my observations. For the ex-ante study this allowed for a greater contextual 
understanding of the interactions I observed (Pettigrew et al, 2001). These interviews 
were typically two hours long and characterised as a combination of workshop, oral 
history interview (Bryman, 2012) and open-ended interview (Silverman, 2006).  
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During all these interviews I did my best to actively listen, curiously ask questions 
and not be judgemental. On the latter issue, for example, I did not explicitly disagree 
or agree with my interviewees, because I didn’t want to emphasise any sort of 
illegitimacy or legitimacy regarding their stories. This might have made them 
overemphasise descriptions of particular behaviours or make them modify their 
anecdotes (Kvale, 1996). This of course is difficult, especially when also trying to 
build trust and comfort in the interview situation. According to Silverman (2013) even 
the slightest nod (or lack thereof) or sound, such as a ‘hmm’ or ‘hmm hmm’ is a 
judgement of another person’s statement.  
     All interviews were audio recorded and fully transcribed in order to assist my 
memory in the upcoming analysis process and to more thoroughly examine people’s 
answers. 
 
Interviewing project team members, projects 2-6 
The same interview setup was used for the interviews conducted for projects 2-6. 
First, an interview with the contractor’s project manager was conducted to get an 
initial understanding of the project and project context. Subsequently, I interviewed 
the architect’s project manager, the engineer’s project manager, the owner’s project 
manager and the contractor’s design manager. These interviews represented a 
combination of semi-structured and open-ended interviews. The combination of 
interview styles allowed me to drill into events of particular interest, yet enabled the 
interviewee to give rich descriptions of events they found of particular interest. The 
interviews also enabled me to add events to the process map I had originally made 
with the project manager and highlight any potential discrepancies between 
narratives. The process event maps generated during these interviews covered the 
time from project conception to issues regarding facility management and end-user 
experiences. Two interviewees were unable to participate and some project members 
had participated on two of the five ex-post cases, which resulted in only 17 interviews 
instead of 25. In those cases, where project team members had been involved with 
more than one project, I only conducted one long interview where two or even three 
projects were discussed. I tried to keep the project team members focussed on 
elaborating one project at a time, however, discussing two projects in a row meant 
that project team members would often compare or contrast the two projects. As a 
result, projects were, perhaps unjustly, made to be either more similar or different 
than would have been the case, had I conducted separate interviews for each project.   
 
Collecting documents 
The interviews and observations were supported by the collection of documents. 
Documents for each project were retrieved from the contractor’s project database, 
from administrative staff in the contractor’s organization, the contractor’s intranet, 
public websites, field-related journals and from the interviewees. The documents 
consisted of e-mails, reports, contracts, articles, agreements, professional standards, 
photos, drawings, BIM-models, and meeting minutes. The documents were 
considered naturally occurring data (Silverman, 2013) and enabled an insight into the 
norm for project communication and how meanings were reproduced within and 
outside the project organization. In the context of institutional processes, documents 
were interpreted to be useful because actors actively construct the seeable and the 
sayable by specifying what will be documented and what will be ignored (Zilber, 
2008, p.158). 
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Informal ethnographic study of the design-build organization 
Although the dissertation does not present a separate analysis of the contractor’s 
organization, an unstructured analysis was conducted of the contractor’s organization 
and serves as a meta-analysis for the studied projects. The unstructured analysis used 
a combination of three research methods: hermeneutic ethnography (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2009), interviews and documents. The ethnographic method resembled 
auto-ethnographic research as the contractor’s head-quarters became my main work 
place throughout the research project and my understanding of the organization grew 
out of participating in regular VDC/BIM-department meetings, regularly 
communicating my research to the members of the organization outside of the VDC 
& BIM department, and interacting with colleagues on a daily basis.  
     More formally, I had six meetings with the CEO. The first meeting was a formal 
audio-recorded interview but gradually these meetings became less formal and 
resembled work meetings and conversation between two colleagues. These meetings 
provided insight into what institutional work was being done in the organization and 
what meanings were underpinning the institutional work. Also, conversations with the 
CEO allowed me to understand how current problems and successes at the project 
level and issues dominating the discourse in the field and wider society affected the 
institutional work of the contractor’s organization.  
     
Site visits to the completed & occupied buildings 
In order to understand project performance, I also visited each of the buildings and 
was either given a guided tour by those I interviewed or conducted an informal nose-
around. The site visits, in conjunction with the interviews, gave me an opportunity to 
understand how the constellation of institutions was reflected in the buildings. These 
site visits occurred before, during and after the interviews. 
 
Interpreting empirical material  
 
The empirical material was analysed through interpretation. The interpretive research 
approach emphasises intuition as a means to acquire insight and knowledge, and 
Alvesson and Sköldberg describe the process like this:  
 
‘This [knowledge] is achieved, not by laborious pondering, but rather at a 
stroke, whereby patterns in complex wholes are illuminated by a kind of 
mental flashlight, giving immediate and complete overview. Knowledge is then 
often experienced as self-evident.’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.91) 
 
The intuitive process was an on-going process occurring while conducting 
observations, interviewing, reading documents, writing up the analysis, reading the 
literature, and even while sleeping.  
     Similarly, the writing process was an integral part of the interpretation process. 
While insights did appear as glimpses during observations and interviews as well as 
when reading transcribed interviews and field notes, the writing process enabled me 
to connect (and disconnect) all these mental flashlights in multiple ways to try and 
create a coherent story, put these glimpses into a broader context, and find patterns 
that would reveal the institutional process of coordination. Apart from on-going 
writing of preliminary chapters of the dissertation, in January 2014 I wrote an article 
for the EGOS conference specifically concerning institutional logics in design-build 
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projects based on the ex-ante study of project 1 (Urup, 2014). Also, in the spring and 
summer of 2014 I wrote an article on coordination, inspired by both the ex-ante 
studies and the ex-post studies (Urup & Koch, 2014). 
     Intuition was the only explicit analysis method used. However, as I worked with 
the empirical material, I discovered, that the words ‘one’ [in Danish: man] was used 
by project team members when they were describing broader norms that one in 
general had to adhere to. Similarly, the phrases ‘after all’ or ‘of course’ [in Danish: 
jo] was used to describe phenomena or actions that were taken-for-granted. The 
following quote illustrates an example of the use of the phrase ‘after all’: 
 
‘Well, they wouldn’t do [what they had been asked to do] because I didn’t 
have the authority to say it. But I had the authority to ask the design manager 
to say it, because he is the one who has to say it, he is the manager of the 
detailed design, after all. He had to say it, but he couldn’t say it of course, 
because he didn’t have the authority over the guy he had to say it too, after 
all.’ [Contractor’s design manager.] 
 
The quote illustrates that the contractor’s design manager perceived a particular 
phenomena, in this case the formal organization hierarchy, to be an overarching 
structure determining legitimate communication patterns among project team 
members. For example, only a particular type of manager is able to and expected to 
say certain things illustrated by the use of ‘after all’ and ‘of course’. 
 
Understanding how institutional process affects coordination, Project 1 
For the specific purpose of gaining insight into how institutional processes 
respectively enable and constrain coordination, I interpreted my observations and 
interviews for Project 1. I found that the interpretation process was indeed one of 
mental flashlights and in order to capture these flashes I wrote down rich notes on my 
reflections within hours of conducting observations and completing interviews. 
     The interpretations for the analysis of project 1 did not require an additional 
structured analysis and appeared entirely intuitively. To begin with the analysis 
included insights on institutional work and institutional logics, however, in order to 
narrow down the scope of the analysis, I gradually refined the scope of institutional 
theory to only include institutional work. The theory on institutional work had 
provided me with three key themes (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.285), that guided 
my interpretations: episodes of constrained and enabled coordination; interaction and 
purposeful efforts aimed at changing or maintaining meanings, norms and rules; and, 
taken-for-granted meanings, norms and rules, (Lawrence et al., 2009). Specifically, I 
re-read transcribed interviews and field notes from observations and was interpreting 
how actors, when interacting in the project, simultaneously negotiating and justifying 
their perceptions and way of conducting everyday work. This provided insight into 
what meanings were being produced and how these meanings interacted and shaped 
the process of coordinating the project. 
     This was indeed a muddled process, in particular for two reasons: first, interpreting 
what actually constituted an institution was challenging; second, interpreting three 
different institutional phenomena at the same time (institutions, constellations of 
institutions and institutional work) was also challenging. 
     First, defining what constitutes an institution was challenging because it required 
catching stability in process (Pettigrew, 1986) and because different theoretical 
definitions of an institution lead to different results. Specifically, Scott’s (2008) 
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definition required that the institution had only one meaning, few norms, and 
potentially several regulations and would be able to reproduce itself over time. 
However, with such a deterministic definition, only the design-build project itself 
overall represented an institution. While the design-build project may indeed 
represent an institution, it was not conducive to understanding the process of 
coordination. Similarly, following a true institutional works definition of an 
institution (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) my focus would be attuned to established 
procedures and either meanings, norms or rules. With such an open definition of an 
institution, everything that I observed became an institution. At one point during the 
analysis process I had at least twenty different institutions representing multiple 
levels. For example, institutions included: the design-build norm of formally planning 
the design process according to the linear phase model; the normative understanding 
that late project changes are unavoidable; the societal understanding the buildings of 
the 21st century represent particular technological standards and architectural values; 
and the rule of sanctioning deadlines, just to mention a few. With such an 
encompassing definition of an institution, it became difficult to understand how they 
all related to each other and how they mutated over time. Also, and very importantly, 
it became difficult to understand how these institutions were specific to design-build 
project and not representative of projects in the construction field in general. 
     As a result, a meaning-oriented definition of an institution was the most fruitful in 
order to try and establish the taken-for-grantedness of shared understandings that 
were, after all, interpreted to be found in the empirical material to specifically concern 
design-build projects. The meaning-oriented definition of an institution allowed me to 
operate with a manageable number of institutions (eight) where the interpretation of 
the relationships among, and institutional work associated with, these eight 
institutions appeared intuitively right.  
     The second issue pertains to interpreting stability in process (Pettigrew, 1986). 
Other scholars concerned with institutional process, for example, Thornton et al. 
(2012) (e.g. blending of institutions), Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) (e.g. negative 
choice and deliberate ambiguity), and Goodrick and Reay (2011) (e.g. constellations 
of institutions) studied institutional process within the overarching structures of 
societal level logics. Other scholars, interested in the micro-institutional-process at the 
organizational level, for example Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013) analysed 
institutional work from an entirely processual perspective without clearly defining the 
stabilised elements of the two organizations they studied. For this research project, I 
have chosen to combine the methods of describing process (i.e. mutating 
constellations of institutions), micro-processes pertaining to the process of mutating 
constellations of institutions (i.e. institutional work), and the stabilised elements (i.e. 
institutions). The institutional process of the mutating constellation of institutions is 
analysed in order to understand how the process of coordination develops. Similarly, 
institutional work is analysed to understand why the constellation develops as it does, 
however, at the micro-level. Nevertheless, in accordance with Pettigrew’s (1986) 
point, that organizational change can best be identified and studied against a 
background of structure, I perceived it to be necessary to at least attempt to explain 
what it is that develops, what it is that relates, and what it is that is being worked on. 
First of all, when looking across all six projects, it was interpreted that stabilised 
shared meanings did develop, while the relationship between the institutions 
developed over the course of the project. Furthermore, defining individual institutions 
enabled me to better inform the processual analysis, inform the relationship between 
projects 1-6, and finally, to be able to develop a proposal for an integrated design-
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build concept. To the latter point, specifically, in the context of this being an 
industrial Ph.D., identifying the stabilised elements was fruitful in order to, for 
example, enable project managers and the contractor’s organization, to understand 
more specifically, what it is that potentially conflicts, blends or co-exists peacefully 
and what it is they have to work on. To elaborate, the processual analysis presented in 
this research project was found to fully engage project team members because it 
spoke directly to the frustrations that they deal with on a daily basis. However, the 
processual analysis also left project team members with the perception that evaluating 
every everyday situation as a potential opportunity for institutional work was an 
overwhelming expectation. In other words, the identification of institutions increased 
a practice-oriented application of this research project.  
 
Understanding constellations of institutions & project performance, Projects 
2-6 
For the purpose of understanding how constellations of institutions relate to project 
performance and compare across projects, I also interpreted the empirical material for 
projects 2-6 intuitively to begin with. However, while, in my experience, these flashes 
of light did produce immediate, complete and clear overview as described by 
Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) I found that I was struggling to maintain the clear 
overview once I had experienced numerous flashes across projects. In other words, as 
the material grew richer, combining these countless flashes in to a pattern-finding 
process of ‘generalising within [and across] cases’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, 
p.129) in order to produce a coherent and focussed analysis was difficult. Therefore, I 
used a structured analysis method to support my many ad hoc interpretations.  
     First, I interpreted what structures appeared in the projects and how they affected 
efforts towards coordinating the particular project. I repeated that process in reverse: 
identified episodes of constrained or enabled coordination, which highlighted what 
structures were being produced in the projects. However, this prevented me from 
understanding how the constellation of institutions developed over the course of the 
project and also resulted in an overwhelming amount of insight.  
     Then, instead, I returned to the event maps, which enabled me to understand how 
each constellation of institutions had developed from project conception to 
occupancy. However, this method also resulted in an overwhelming amount of detail 
that made it difficult to compare insights across projects.  
     In both attempts I nearly drowned in my empirical material. A truly inductive 
analysis approach was clearly useful for generating a deep understanding of particular 
dimensions of the cases, but prevented me from generating patterns across time and 
projects. As per the abductive method, and for fear of drowning a third time and never 
resurfacing, I returned to the literature. 
      My third review of the literature on institutional work inspired me to narrow down 
the scope of my analysis to focus on the mundane efforts of organizations and 
individuals in order to better understand the broader patterns of changing 
constellations of institutions that I was interpreting (Lawrence et al., 2009).       
     Also, early on I had developed an understanding of coordination as an institutional 
work process and the ex-post research design simply did not enable me to create 
insight into the coordination process in projects 2-6. Specifically, while interviewees 
would talk about how they coordinated, I interpreted their anecdotes to reflect 
normative perceptions of how project teams coordinate. For example, interviewees 
often perceived the project office to increase communication and make people more 
polite to each other. However, concrete examples of how it had actually enabled 
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either technical or social coordination were not found. As a result, the analysis on 
coordination processes gradually dissolved from projects 2-6 and the analysis became 
focussed on constellations of institutions as still lifes and project performance. 
     As a result, in the end, and after at least five iterations between the empirical and 
the theoretical material, I was able to refine and combine the event maps and the 
analysis of institutions to gradually create a characteristic or still life of the 
constellation of institutions of each project. These still lifes enabled me to find 
emerging patterns across all five projects and between design-build processes and 
project performance. 
 
Understanding and evaluating project performance, Projects 2-6 
The analysis of project performance for projects 2-6 was intended to be static and 
quantitative. However, as mentioned previously, project performance was interpreted 
to be a processual phenomenon as well as predominantly qualitative, more 
specifically, a fabricated combination of norms, perceptions, and values. As 
mentioned previously, my literature search on institutional theory and organizational 
performance provided no literature to start with. 
     As a result, for a long time I struggled to define project performance: whatever 
definition I developed it appeared to be a compromise unfitting for the empirical 
material.       
     For example, re-work on the building site is normatively perceived as an indicator 
of poor performance since it means that parties weren’t able to coordinate the design 
project or plan the building process efficiently. Also, any type of rework results in fee 
erosion for the involved parties and thus directly impacts each party’s final profit. 
However, projects 2-6 all illustrated that the project teams were able to adapt and 
deliver buildings that fulfilled project requirements despite having to do degrees of 
rework. In that respect, rework on site was an ambiguous performance criterion. 
     Similarly, at one point I had included the number of lawsuits as performance 
criteria too. While the presence of lawsuits is not normatively considered an indicator 
of low project performance, it does however indicate, that the project team was unable 
to resolve disagreements during the design or build process. However, the absence of 
arbitration cases may not either necessarily indicate the project teams ability to 
coordinate their work, but may also be a result of everyone being willing to accept fee 
erosion during the project, rather than start a lawsuit. Often, compiling material from 
a long and complex process in order to provide evidence of who is guilty of delaying 
the design process was described by interviewees as time consuming at best, and an 
impossible task at worst. Therefore, the number of lawsuits was also a most 
ambiguous performance criterion too. 
     As I conducted site visits to the projects, the buildings themselves also contributed 
to shaping my understanding of project performance. For example, the choice of 
materials was interpreted to reflect whether functionality, economy or aesthetics 
dominated or had been integrated. Similarly, for example, sophisticated water 
collection systems integrated into park facilities were interpreted to reflect integration 
amongst landscaping and sustainability.  
     In the end during one of the final iterations on the analysis of projects 2-6, I 
decided to discard the literature and the idea of categorising the ex-post projects into 
high and low performing. Partly due to the aforementioned limitations of the literature 
and partly due to the relatively clear manifestations of institutions in the final 
building, I defined project performance as an institutional concept instead (Lawrence 
et al., 2009). As a result, the method by which I defined project performance arguably 
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deviates from the systematic method that I have used otherwise. On the other hand, 
the institutional definition of project performance that this dissertation offers is indeed 
a result of abduction and can be considered a contribution too. 
 
Developing an integrated design-build 
management concept 
 
In addition to interpretively analysing and discussing existing design-build projects, 
this research project also aims to develop a new integrated design-build management 
concept. The IDBM concept offers a method by which actors can attempt to change 
their institutional environment at the organizational and field level. Theory on 
institutional work and processes (Lawrence et al., 2009; and others), would 
understand proposing methods purposefully aimed at enabling institutional change 
(such as the IDBM concept) a fitting addition to the analysis of current institutions in 
design-build projects. Similarly, Alvesson and Sköldberg’s reflexive hermeneutics is 
specifically concerned with critical theory, and thus, a central consideration to 
Alvesson and Sköldberg is how agents can contribute to organizational and societal 
change (Alvesson & Willmott, 2006). Alvesson and Willmott (2006) are primarily 
concerned with ‘(micro-)emancipatory transformation’, which, in the context of 
institutional theory, is a contradiction in terms. However, institutional work, is 
specifically concerned with, not emancipation, but at least reflective, purposeful, and 
savvy navigation of a particular institutional order. Similarly, the IDBM concept does 
not propose a method for enabling emancipation. However, it does propose increased 
awareness, reflectivity and purposeful shaping of the institutions and constellations of 
institutions enabling and constraining project coordination and performance.  
 
Suggesting new meanings, norms, rules & interaction 
The IDBM concept contains a number of suggestions for new meanings, norms (and 
rules) as well as institutional work to create, diffuse and maintain these new meanings 
and norms at the organizational and field level. The concept was created in two ways: 
by intuition where ideas appeared like glimpses of insight (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2009) through an on-going intuitive interpretation process; and by structured 
interpretation. Structured interpretation was conducted in four steps: first, findings 
from the analysis of projects 1-6 informed the concept; second, literature on 
collaborative project delivery and process methods informed the concept; third, 
feedback from project experts; and fourth, creating a synthesis between the three 
previous steps. 
     To elaborate, the first step of developing the concept was directly informed by the 
analysis of projects 1-6. The observations and interviews provided numerous 
examples of events and efforts that I interpreted to have enabled coordination of the 
projects. Then the underpinning meanings and norms of these event and efforts were 
interpreted as to what they were and how they related to the remaining constellation 
of institutions and then gradually adapted to the IDBM concept. Because project 1 
provided deep insight to coordination intensively during the detailed design phase and 
sporadically during the building phase, the IDBM concept primarily proposes changes 
to the design phase. 
     The second step, included conducting a selective literature study on collaborative 
project delivery methods, including: integrated project delivery (Ashcraft, 2006; 
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Lahdenperä, 2012); partnering (Lahdenperä, 2012); alliance model (Lahdenperä, 
2012) and design-build (e.g. Lähdenperä, 2001; Bygningsstyrelsen, 2012). The 
literature study also included collaborative process methods, including: TrimBuild 
(which is the contractor’s re-interpretation of the LEAN concept for collaborative 
building processes); target value design (Zimina et al., 2012); virtual design and 
construction (Kunz & Fischer, 2012); integrated design (Knudstrup, 2008); LEAN 
(Koskela et al., 1997; Green & May, 2005); and knot-working (Korpela & Kerosuo, 
2014). These methods were reviewed systematically in order to understand how they: 
interpret the relationship between structure and agency; interpret coordination as 
either a functional or relational phenomenon; and their ability to contribute to an 
integrating constellation of institutions. Also, the methods were reviewed in terms of 
their likelihood of becoming legitimised in the context of a Danish contractor, given 
that other companies and scholars have developed many of these methods in different 
contexts (i.e. other industries and geographical regions).  
     The third step included receiving reflective feedback on the concept from experts 
(e.g. experienced project team members, department directors at the contractor’s 
organization, a group of architects and an expert group from the contractor’s virtual 
design and construction [VDC] department) and was carried out in the form of 
workshops. The workshops were intended to illuminate resistance (e.g. institutional 
barriers) and opportunities for the concept that could help me refine the concept. Also, 
the implementation helped ensure the trustworthiness and authenticity of the concept.  
     The workshops were referred to as implementation and consisted of a series of 
workshops held in Q3 of 2015. An actual implementation on a real project would 
have taken years given the duration of the design-build projects, and therefore a 
workshop setting, representing a temporary testing environment, was selected. 
Workshops enabled larger groups of experts to engage in testing parts of the concept 
and enabled a collective reflective discussion. I both participated in, and observed, 
these discussions in order to facilitate the workshops and to interpret meanings, 
values, and perceptions either contradicting or supporting the IDBM concept.  
    A total of four workshops were conducted. Each workshop lasted 2,5 hours and 
involved participants testing systematic iteration and defining new project roles on 
three large current projects (townhouses, health-care and commercial).  
     The first workshop included members from the contractor’s VDC department 
alone and was intended as an internal practice-run to test the workshop setup as well 
as illuminate the relationship between the two proposed proto-institutions; VDC and 
the IDBM concept. 
    A second workshop was held with a mixed group of project members, representing 
project procurement, a BIM coordinator, the contractor’s self-perform civil works, the 
contractor’s self-perform carpentry, and the contractor’s design and engineering 
department. The group was intended to also include the contractor’s self-perform 
concrete, design managers, project managers, and the contractor’s tender department, 
however, last-minute cancellations reduced the number of participant significantly. 
This second workshop group was intended to illuminate how the IDBM concept 
would relate to each of the contractor’s departments and professional roles in a 
project. 
    A third workshop was held for the contractor’s project managers, design managers, 
contract managers and self-perform concrete manager in project 1. This workshop 
was intended to get this particular expert group to imagine implementing IDBM 
retrospectively and identify potential implications for the success of the building 
phase if project 1 had been conducted with the method of IDBM. 
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A fourth workshop was held for an expert group of 13 of the contractor’s design 
managers. This workshop was intended to get the project and design managers to 
model the use of IDBM in practice to highlight potential constraints and 
opportunities.  
     Also, albeit not a workshop, a presentation of the concept was made for a group of 
around 30 architects and provided feedback on the concept from experts outside the 
contractor’s organization. 
     The fourth step in developing the IDBM concept included carefully reviewing how 
the different parts of the concept that had been adapted from the analysis of projects 
1-6, the literature and expert feedback related to each other. In other words, if the 
different suggestions presented in the IDBM concept would create a constellation of 
institutions enabling coordination or not. 
 
Trustworthiness & authenticity 
 
Since notions such as truth and objectivity ontologically contradict reflective 
interpretation sensitive to ambiguity, context and change processes, a reconsideration 
of terminology for accessing the research is appropriate. 
     Alvesson and Sköldberg, (2009, p.98) propose the following methodological 
principles be applied to reflexive interpretive research:  
 
1. ‘coherence’ (e.g. the interpretation should be logically consistent);  
2. ‘comprehensiveness’ (e.g. regard for the whole of the work); 
3. ‘penetration’ (e.g. the underlying central problematic should be laid bare);  
4. ‘thoroughness’ (e.g. all the questions raised by the text should be answered);  
5. ‘appropriateness’ (e.g. the questions should be raised by the text, not by the 
interpreter);  
6. ‘contextuality’ (e.g. the text should be set into its historical-cultural context);  
7. ‘agreement 1’ (e.g. the interpretation should agree with what the author really 
says, without distortions);  
8. ‘agreement 2’ (e.g. the interpretation should agree with established 
interpretations of the text);  
9. ‘suggestiveness’ (e.g. the interpretation should be ‘fertile’ and stimulate the 
imagination);  
10. and ‘potential’ (e.g. the application of the interpretation can be further 
extended).  
 
Principles 1-5, 7 and 8 I interpret to fall under the term trustworthiness proposed by 
Bryman and Bell (2011, p.395) which builds on four criteria:  
 
1. ‘credibility’, replacing internal validity and meaning ensuring good research 
practice and confirmation of results with research subject;  
2. ‘transferability’, replacing external validity and meaning transferring results to 
other milieux;  
3. ‘dependability’, replacing reliability and meaning keeping a complete record 
of all phases;  
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4. and ‘confirmability’, replacing objectivity and meaning research not overtly 
allowing personal values to affect results (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p.395). 
      
The first criterion, credibility, is, although appropriate, somewhat broad; what 
constitutes ‘good research practice’? Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009, p.98) 
principles 1-5, 7 and 8 specifically represent examples of ‘good research practice’ in 
a hermeneutic context. 
     The second criterion, transferability, I interpret to have some overlap with 
Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) 10th principle potential and the ability to extend 
interpretation beyond the research topic at hand. However, transferability can be 
interpreted as relatively instrumental, while the ability to extend an interpretation, 
requires careful reflective efforts. Also, since the text itself, the specific empirical 
material, is the central element to the hermeneutic approach (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2009), the transferability to another milieu (Bryman & Bell, 2011), e.g. a different 
empirical context, is not of explicit importance. Therefore, transferability and 
potential can be combined into extendibility.  
     The third criterion, dependability, does intuitively also seem appropriate in a 
hermeneutic context too, although not included in Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) 
principles. 
    The fourth criterion, confirmability, is the furthest from Alvesson and Skölberg’s 
(2009) principles. As per the quadri-hermeneutic approach, interpretations are 
inherently subjective, affected by personal experience, social context, history, and 
values. Therefore, as a researcher, it is not a matter of ‘allowing’ personal value 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011, p.398-399). However, it is important to critically reflect upon 
how these values affect research results (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) and this can be 
interpreted as a way of not overtly allowing personal values.  
     Therefore, for this research project ‘trustworthy’ research is interpreted to adhere 
to the following criteria: 
 
1. ‘coherence’ (e.g. the interpretation should be logically consistent);  
2. ‘comprehensiveness’ (e.g. regard for the whole of the work); 
3. ‘penetration’ (e.g. the underlying central problematic should be laid bare);  
4. ‘thoroughness’ (e.g. all the questions raised by the text should be answered);  
5. ‘appropriateness’ (e.g. the questions should be raised by the text, not by the 
interpreter);  
6. ‘agreement 1’ (e.g. the interpretation should agree with what the author really 
says, without distortions);  
7. ‘agreement 2’ (e.g. the interpretation should agree with established 
interpretations of the text);  
8. and ‘extendibility’ (e.g. the application of the interpretation can be further 
extended into other research areas or milieu). 
 
Bryman and Bell (2011, p.398-399) also propose another aspect of assessing 
qualitative research called ‘authenticity’.  
     Authenticity, also builds on a number of criteria:  
 
1. ‘fairness’, meaning ensuring that research fairly represents different 
viewpoints among members;  
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2.  ‘ontological authenticity’, meaning research helping members gain a better 
understanding of their social milieu;  
3. ‘educative authenticity’, meaning helping members to better appreciate the 
perspectives of other members of their social setting;  
4. ‘catalyst authenticity’, meaning research acting as an impetus to members to 
engage in action to change their circumstances;  
5. ‘tactical authenticity’, meaning research empowering members to take the 
steps necessary for engaging in action. 
 
The five criteria relating to authenticity are not explicitly developed within the 
hermeneutic approach. However, because this research project constitutes an 
industrial Ph.D. project authenticity is interpreted to be relevant. In particularly, 
criteria 2-5, have been important. 
     The first criterion, fairness, has been fulfilled by interviewing a broad range of 
actors, but is, however, not considered important to reflexive hermeneutics. While 
Bryman and Bell’s (2011) notion of fairness is interpreted to imply a democratic 
ethic, the hermeneutic approach would be more concerned with letting the text guide 
whose viewpoints are most needed in order to enable the desired insight. Also, rather 
than ensuring fair representation, the hermeneutic researcher would be concerned with 
reflecting upon how the representation affects the empirical material. 
     On the other hand, ontological authenticity is related to Alvesson and Skoldberg’s 
(2009, p.98) principle of suggestiveness and ‘interpretations should be fertile’. The 
catalyst authenticity is similar to Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) principle of 
suggestiveness, in particular, the interpretations’ ability to ‘stimulate imagination’. 
The assumption here is of course, that members are motivated to imagine alternative 
meanings and ways of conducting their daily work, before they can engage in action 
or be empowered.  However, this line of thinking is related to purposeful action, 
interests, motivations and efforts towards creating, maintaining or changing 
institutions, which is the core focus of institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2009). 
Authenticity is also closely related to the ideas of theorizing institutional change 
(Greenwood et al., 2002). While the purpose here is not to conduct action research, it 
is important, however, to point to the refinement of Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) 
principle of suggestiveness that Bryman and Bell (2011) have inspired, in order to 
place the research in the context of an industrial Ph.D. project. 
     Also, throughout my research project I have openly discussed my research with 
employees at MTH, as well as the people I observed and interviewed. Also, I have 
presented and discussed my research at the quarterly reference group meetings, where 
fellow researchers, members of the funding boards, the CEO of the contractor’s 
organization and project managers have been present. I have also presented and 
discussed my research findings during one-on-one meetings with the CEO, 
department directors, and project, design, and contract managers. Last, but not least, 
the implementation workshops also served as ways of ensuring authenticity. 
Therefore, the research process has facilitated all four types of authenticity: 
ontological authenticity (e.g. helping members gain a better understanding of the 
institutional dynamics of the project organization); educative authenticity (e.g. 
helping members to better appreciate the perspectives of other members of the project 
organization); catalyst authenticity (e.g. motivating members to engage in (inter-
)action to change the constellation of institutions in the project organization); and, 
tactical authenticity (e.g. empowering members, in this case, by providing the 
intellectual insight into how and why to enable institutional work.     
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The researcher’s self-awareness 
Since all reflective research is a product of the researcher’s subjective interpretation 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) a consideration of my subjectiveness as a researcher 
and its influence on this research project is important. True to my research project, I 
will approach this from an institutional perspective, meaning I will focus on the 
norms and cultural-cognitive meanings I, for various reasons, interpret myself to 
adhere or object to. 
    Firstly, I hold a master’s degree in Civil Engineering in Architecture & Design 
from Aalborg University, Denmark. The programme is built on the concept of 
integrated design; the integration of the architectural and engineering disciplines 
throughout the design process. Although I’d claim not to be a religious proponent of 
anything in life, my educational background has shaped my way of understanding 
what constitutes a good design process. That not only guides me towards the 
solutions I have proposed in the IDBM concept, it also frames what I interpret to a 
poor design process when I observe a project organization in action.  
     Secondly, I worked six years as an architect and engineer for two different 
organizations in North America – one that primarily did design-bid-build projects and 
one that primarily did integrated project delivery and partnering projects. This has 
given me first hand experience on being part of design teams under different types of 
collaborative (and less collaborative) project delivery methods. Obviously, like 
anyone else would have had, I have had good and bad experiences with both. This 
meant that I had some preconceptions about particular project delivery methods when 
I started this research project. For example, I interpreted design-build projects to be 
less collaborative than integrated project delivery and, perhaps therefore, when 
conducting observations, focussed on constrained coordination rather than seeing 
when coordination was enabled. However, as I immersed myself in this particular 
research project, the theory and empirical data gradually became my point of 
reference instead of my previous professional experience. Last but not least, I have 
had good colleagues at MTH, who have continued to challenge me on the origin of 
my ideas (e.g. any sympathy expressed towards the architects), which has forced me 
to consciously reflect on how my professional background and previous experience 
might affect my research. 
     Thirdly, as an industrial Ph.D. student I have had to consider the interests of both 
the contractor’s organization and the university. In that sense, my research has been 
executed in a political arena (Bryman, 2012). To that end, I have spent around 1100 
hours in the contractor’s office over the course of the three years and have 
undoubtedly started to take certain meanings and mundane actions for granted. This 
might have prevented me from asking certain critical questions. More importantly, I 
have had to be conscious not to create an IDBM concept that, as a narrative, fits 
within the MTH context, but rather brings new perspective to the organization (Zilber, 
2009, p.221). For example, just over a year into my research, MTH established a 
VDC division, with the purpose of changing the IT tools, work processes and 
collaborative methods for the purpose of increasing project productivity. There were 
several overlaps in the work conducted by the VDC division and my research, for 
example, the proposal to organise work as design sprints. At times it was easy to get 
pulled in by the slipstream of the work of the VDC division, especially as it quickly 
grew in size and legitimacy, and feel that my own research was more right if it fitted 
within the VDC framework. Thanks to my supervisors, I was continuously reminded 
to stay true to the purpose of my own research: improve project coordination and 
project performance by interpreting them as institutional processes. 
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Last, but not least, the IDBM concept contains a recommendation to organise the 
design process in a series of design sprints referred to as ‘systematic iteration’. 
Although systematic iteration was inspired by the iterative design process suggested 
by integrated design, the use of an iterative abductive research method may have 
subconsciously inspired me. More specifically, in the process of justifying the use of 
an iterative abductive research method, I also supported the legitimacy of systematic 
iteration. In other words, have I developed a solution to a problem that is framed by 
the methodological narrative of abduction (Zilber, 2002).  
 
Critique of method  
 
Apart from the shortcomings already mentioned in the previous sections, there are a 
number of other critical points to address. I will begin with those points that are 
related to the overall research project and finish with points that are related to each of 
the project analyses respectively. 
 
The ontological framework for this research project has limited capacity to inform the 
relationship between institutions, agency and technology. Institutional theory, 
including institutional work, is rooted in a phenomenological ontology that ‘starts and 
end with individuals’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p.36). And while Lawrence et al. 
(2009) explicitly criticize the emphasis on heroic institutional entrepreneurs, 
institutional work is nevertheless based on ‘a growing awareness of institutions as 
products of human action and reaction’ (Lawrence et al., 2009, p.6) and that 
institutional work is ‘intended’ and ‘purposive’ (Lawrence et al., 2009, p.10-12). This 
means, that technology constitutes either dead objects that can be used by actors 
unilaterally or structures that can impose patterns, standardization and terminology 
onto human interaction. However, Melin and Axelsson (2005) showed that the 
introduction of AutoCAD in a small construction firm in Sweden not only provided 
structure, but also changed the social meaning of certain tasks. Similar, Raviola and 
Nörback (2013) showed that technology changed social meaning in an Italian 
newspaper agency. The empirical material gathered for this research project shows 
that the contractor’s organization is implementing BIM and VDC heavily across the 
organization. While the effects of BIM and VDC don’t show in the empirical material 
for ex-post projects 2-6, observations of project 1 showed how technology potentially 
interacted with the project and that the use of BIM and VDC is changing the 
meanings underpinning the projects. For example, if the modelling of detailed 
information in early design phases creates a shared understanding that a fully detailed 
and coordinated project is possible to deliver before the building phase begins. This is 
a change from current understandings where a fully detailed project before 
construction is considered a utopian dream. However, since IT is interpreted as 
structure alone, it is ontologically beyond institutional theory to say how IT may 
interact with human actors and change social meaning. This is a shortcoming of the 
theory of institutional work.  
 
The ex-ante study  
 
First, project 1 started before this research project and is not going to be completed 
within the timeframe for this research project either. While project 1 has already 
	60 
served its purpose by gaining insight into how processes of coordination, it would 
nevertheless be a more comprehensive analysis if I had been able to observe the entire 
design and building processes and the after-math of the project. Had I been able to 
collect an ex-ante account of how project team members negotiate and make efforts to 
finish the project and how the perception of project performance is constructed, I 
would have been able to further account for the relationship between process and 
project performance and further enriched my ex-post analysis of projects 2-6. 
 
Second, in relation to project 1, finding that particular point in time or in an 
organization (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013-A) where the everyday mundane work 
coming together in particular constellations of institutions can be studied in real time 
was also a critical methodological challenge. I decided to spend more time observing 
formally organised meetings than informal interaction in the project office. However, 
perhaps the meetings created a forum in which adherence to particular norms become 
more prevalent for project team members, because they formally represented a certain 
role or profession. In that respect, understanding how relational coordination 
mechanisms, such as multi-membership and perspective-taking enabled or 
constrained the coordination process, may have been more observable outside of 
meetings or had I chosen to shadow, for example, one of the project or designer 
managers (Silverman, 2013).  
     Similarly, as elaborated previously, defining a stabilised institution when 
observing a process in flight was challenging. When the perspectives encompassed 
under the term institutional theory span definitions ranging from the design-build 
project alone being an institution, to multiple norms, rules and meanings constituting 
institutions, the aggregation level of institutional theory is, in that sense, unclear and a 
short coming of the theory. 
 
Third, the analysis of project 1 and the IDBM concept are more concerned with the 
design process, than the building process. This can seem paradoxical, when the outset 
for this research project is design-build projects and the project is rooted in a 
contractor’s organization. However, the empirical material collected in project 1 
during the design process showed that project coordination was repeatedly being 
constrained as multiple institutions co-existed and that the project team had come to 
take these constraints entirely for granted. Thus, there was an interesting challenge 
alone in analysing and proposing changes for the design process.  
     Furthermore, the interviews from project 2-6 and follow-up interviews for project 
1 during the building process showed, that many of the issues encountered during the 
building process, were caused by poor coordination of the design process and project. 
This insight further justified the decision to focus the IDBM concept on the design 
process. 
 
The ex-post studies  
 
Projects 2-6 represent a perhaps too homogenous group to be able to claim that I have 
done a comprehensive study of design-build projects and that the findings are 
transferable. I argue that the insights gained from interpreting projects 2-6 can be 
extended to other design-build projects because the analysis of projects 2-6 showed 
that all five projects followed certain patterns, yet were not identical, in process and 
outcome. 
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Another critique concerns the type of results that are produced by the hermeneutic 
approach. The quadri-hermeneutic approach doesn’t aim to reduce, but rather 
embrace the complexity of a phenomenon. The strength of the interpretive method 
combined with institutional theory is that it has enabled me to describe complex 
constellations of institutions on design-build projects. Furthermore, the interpretive 
method enables complex explanations for why project coordination is either enabled 
or constrained and can perform either high or low, or both at the same time. However, 
increasingly complex explanations are equally complex to understand and 
communicate. Therefore, finding opportunities to comprehensively communicate my 
research to MTH was difficult, jeopardizing the ontological authenticity (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011). 
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State-of-the-art design-build projects 
 
The analysis of six design-build projects is presented in this chapter in two separate 
parts.  
     The first part concerns the analysis of project 1, the ex ante study of a detailed 
design phase transitioning into the building phase. The first analysis aims to 
understand what, how and why mutating constellations of institutions and institutional 
work enable and constrain the coordination process.  
     The second part concerns the analysis of projects 2-6, the ex post studies, and aims 
to understand how constellations of institutions during design and build phases are 
related to project performance.  
 
Part 1 
 
The first part concerns project 1, the ex ante study, and aims to understand what, how 
and why constellations of institutions and institutional work enable and constrain 
coordination.  
First, project 1 is described qualitatively. Second, the relatively stabilized institutions 
that were interpreted to have developed in the project are presented. Third, the 
constellation of these multiple institutions is presented as it developed over the course 
of the project. Fourth, an analysis of the efforts that were made to create, maintain or 
disrupt the institutions and/or constellation of institutions in project 1 is presented, 
also chronologically. Finally, the chapter ends with a summary. 
 
Description, project 1 
 
Project 1 concerns the design and build of a new headquarters for a large private 
client in Copenhagen, Denmark. Table 3 summarizes the key project characteristics 
for the project. 
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Table 3. The table summarizes the basic characteristics of project 1. 
 
During project conception, the client hired its own in-house property development 
company [the owner] to initiate and lead the project. The initial process of the project 
included setting up a project organization [from now on the project team] and 
conducting a building program analysis. For that purpose, the owner hired an owner’s 
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advisor consultant [in Danish: bygherrerådgiver] and carried out a series of meetings 
with the client and their user representatives. During the programming phase, the 
owner invited three architects to compete for the project, by having each architect 
develop a preliminary concept for the building. The owner also conducted 3-4 
interviews with the architects over a period of four months. During these interviews, 
the architects were able to gain a deeper insight to the client’s requirements, as well as 
demonstrate their ability to collaborate with the client, the owner and the engineers. 
The owner had hired a large local engineering consultancy prior to the architectural 
competition. The engineering consultant was hired to assist all three architects in the 
development of their project concepts. At the end of the four-month conceptual design 
phase a prominent architect won the project. 
     At this point in time, the project consisted of a number of spaces, including a large 
trading floor, data center, small offices, open office space, meeting rooms, kitchen, 
reception area, two large atria, underground parking, canteen and more. The building 
geometry consisted of two distorted squares tied together by a third large atrium that 
served as the building’s main entrance and foyer. The building is relatively complex 
with high requirements for indoor climate performance, high security levels, large 
open spans, interconnected atria and office space, limited repetition across the six 
storeys and a complex curtain-wall façade.  
Upon assigning the architect and as the basic design phase began, the owner invited 
three contractors to collaborate and bid on the project. At first, the contractors were 
given two weeks to prepare a preliminary target cost for the project. Then, similar to 
the process of hiring the architects, the owner interviewed the contractors on 
numerous occasions to evaluate if their understanding of how to collaborate in the 
project was aligned with that of the owner’s organization. One contractor was 
deselected for proposing a no-guaranteed-maximum-price model. The remaining two 
contractors had proposed to participate in the design process to assist keeping the 
project costs within the target cost and at the end of the basic design phase offer a 
fixed price for the building of the project. The two contractors each proposed a target 
cost that, according to the owner, were only 2 m Dkr. apart. In the end, the owner 
chose the contractor who had the lowest profit ratio on additional work to the 
contract, with whom they perceived to share an understanding of how to collaborate.  
     The contractor did not charge a fee for participating in the early design phase. 
However, a collaboration agreement was established in which the contractor was 
entitled to the design-build contract were they able to meet the target cost by the end 
of the basic design phase. 
 
Over the next eighteen months the architects headed the project team and developed a 
basic design project in collaboration with the engineers, the owner, the client 
representatives and the contractor. The project team consisted of: 
• The owner: two project managers. 
• The client: a project manager, four user representatives. 
• The architects: around 30 members of staff, headed by one project manager, 
one design manager and one project coordinator. 
• The engineers: around 20 members of staff, including a manager for each 
engineering discipline and a cross-disciplinary project manager. 
• The contractor: two senior project managers and two senior design managers.  
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Apart from the architects, engineers and contractor, the project team also included the 
client’s interior design consultant, the client’s project advisor consultant, and the 
contractor’s self-perform sub-contract managers.  
     Furthermore, on an ad hoc basis, the project team interacted with the city planning 
authorities, the city architect, the major, the local fire department, and the neighbors. 
 
The design process was divided into a number of sub-phases organized in what will 
be referred to as a linear phase model (Danske Ark, 2010): first a programming phase 
in which the owner and client defined preliminary project requirements and 
established project funding; then a conceptual design phase where the engineers and 
architects developed a conceptual architectural and engineering design proposal; then 
followed a basic design phase where the architects, engineers, owner and contractor 
further developed the conceptual design to a ‘preliminary design project’ (in Danish: 
forprojekt) intended to be 50% complete according to the consultant and collaboration 
agreement; and finally, a detailed design phase where the project team was intended 
to detail and coordinate the remaining project. At the end of the detailed design phase 
the project team was to hand in the ‘final design project’ (in Danish: hovedprojekt). 
Project team members described the basic design phase as a relatively smooth process 
with project team members collaborating and only minor conflicts of interest and 
conflicting ways of conducting work. During the basic design phase the contractor 
had engaged two project managers and one design manager in the project. Also, the 
contractor had engaged sub-contractor managers for the façade, structural building 
systems and interior finishes and the project team had engaged a façade supplier, due 
to the scale and complexity of the façade. Despite making efforts to engage multiple 
actors representing both design and construction expertise, by the end of the basic 
design process, the project team struggled to produce a preliminary design project 
sufficiently detailed for the contractor to offer a fixed project cost and as a result the 
design-build contract was postponed four months until the autumn 2013. In October 
2013, the owner and the contractor were able to negotiate a final project cost of 
around 870 mio. DKr. and a design-build contract was signed.  
 
When the project entered the detailed design phase the contractor formally hired the 
architect, who hired the engineering team, and took over the lead of the detailed 
design phase. The detailed design phase was kicked-off with a contractor’s project 
review and the contractor releasing a time schedule for the detailed design phase. The 
contractor also engaged an additional design manager and assigned an in-house BIM 
coordinator to the project. Around three months before the start up of the construction 
phase, the contractor also assigned numerous sub-contractor managers. 
 
At the end of 2013, half-way through the detailed design phase, the project team 
members expressed confidence in the project quality and their ability to hand in a 
final design project to the deadline in March 2014. The atmosphere was optimistic 
and relatively respectful among parties.  
     However, during the detailed design phase the pressure on the entire design team 
gradually grew, as the deadline for the hand-in of the final design project in March 
2014 was approaching. The project team members started referring to the process as a 
‘slippery eel’ that would escape ones fingers just as one thought one had a grip on it. 
During design meetings the contractor’s design manager would rhetorically 
emphasize the importance of meeting the deadline to the architects and engineers. 
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Figure 2. The figure illustrates which actors collaborated and when. Also, the figure 
illustrates the duration of each phase in relation to each other.  
They in turn, cried out for more guidance on what to work on and when. During this 
phase, the engineering project manager began repeating to the contractor on numerous 
occasions that he would not guarantee a fully coordinated and complete design project 
at the deadline, but that he would guarantee that something was released.  
     In the final two to three months of the detailed design phase the contractor also 
started initiating contracts with suppliers and sub-contractors, including their own 
self-perform contractors. To avoid internal competition among the contractor’s self-
perform departments an internal collaboration agreement was made, where fiscal 
profit and loss would be distributed according to a pre-agreed ratio. Also, an 
agreement was made with the concrete element supplier, that any savings resulting 
from product optimization would befall the supplier, as an incentive for them to 
decrease the initial cost.  
 
During the last months of the detailed design phase in the beginning of 2014 the 
design team was still working on the layout of the building. In particular, indoor 
climate, floor layout and façade configuration on the first and sixth floor presented a 
challenge to the project team.  
     Nevertheless, in the end, a design project was handed-off in time for the deadline 
at the end of the detailed design phase and the engineers avoided sanctions. Several 
parts of the design were not clarified and a new deadline for the remaining details was 
established for early summer 2014. When the design team was unable to deliver the 
remaining details to this deadline, the deadline was further postponed until August 
2014. 
 
Outside of project meetings, the contractor gradually started requesting access to 
project material in order to prepare for construction start up. The project material was 
passed on to the self-perform civil work and concrete teams, who reviewed the project 
material and deemed it of poor quality and not constructible. The self-perform 
contract managers proposed the construction start date was postponed. However, by 
April 1st construction began as originally scheduled. At the beginning of the building 
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process the contractor established a project office on site, however, the contractor’s 
design manager, the architects and engineers remained at the owner’s project office 
for another six months until they returned to be located at their own organizations 
respectively. During the building process the contractor’s two project managers 
transferred to different projects and organizations and a new, and only one, project 
manager was assigned the project instead. 
     Furthermore, the building process was divided into a number of phases: excavation 
and civil works were carried out, the construction of the structure (in Danish: råhus); 
the exterior finishes (in Danish: udvendig aptering); interior finishes (in Danish: 
indvendig aptering); and hand-off. Parallel to these phases ran commissioning and 
preparation of the hand-off manual. No phases were formally planned to proceed the 
hand-off of the final building. 
     The building process has generally occurred relatively smoothly according to the 
contractor’s project manager and design managers. The contractor’s process manager 
claims the building process has been ‘hectic’ and the contractor’s self-perform 
concrete manager says the building process has been characterized by ‘the usual lack 
of due diligence’. The contractor has been granted a 12 weeks extension to finalize the 
build and the project and design managers are confident that they can deliver the 
project within that timeframe or less. The concrete work contract has increased by 
over 20% from 100 mio. Dkr. to 121 mio. Dkr. within the first six months of the 
project.  
     An unidentified number of issues during the building process were caused by the 
lack of finished and accurate engineering design of, for example, the steel roof for the 
atrium. Once the building phase had begun the supplier of the steel roof deemed the 
original engineering design insufficient and the steel structure had to be re-designed. 
The result of the combined design errors was increased project costs and lost time and 
the contractor has sued the engineering and architect team for 30 mio. DKr.  
     One success story of the project is the façade, where the façade supplier installed 
the façade two months quicker than scheduled and to a very high quality. 
As of May 2016 the project has yet to be completed. The original deadline of October 
2016 has been postponed until the start of 2017. The project cost has increased from 
870 mio. Dkr. to over 1.1 bil. DKr. and the contractor’s division director 
acknowledges that their profit will be minimal at the end of the project. The detailed 
design work is still on-going. The glass partitions between meeting rooms and the 
atrium are too large to be able to fulfill the requirements for soundproofing and the 
contractor and owner continues to work a solution to solve this. Similarly, the 
engineering team is still unable to provide a solution that fulfills the requirements for 
smoke ventilation. The project teams current strategy is to negotiate with the planning 
authorities that certain ventilation requirements can be waived. The architects have 
expressed some concern with not being sufficiently involved in the project meetings 
during the latter part of the building phase, but have decided to resume participation 
during all of 2016. The project team members continue to collaborate in what is 
perceived by project team members as ‘business as usual‘. This business as usual is 
interpreted to constitute a peculiar mix of mutual respect, frustration and acceptance. 
The project team continues to meet on a weekly basis for project meetings. The 
project is, within the contractor’s organization, celebrated as a success and an 
exemplar use of BIM and early collaboration. 
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Key challenges 
 
The project description above shows that the main challenge facing the project 
organization is their lack of ability to coordinate their efforts in order to produce a 
coherent and detailed design project that integrates all the work elements in the 
project. On-going efforts to improve floor layouts, interior finishes, mechanical and 
electrical systems, and fulfilling the zoning bylaws and building codes illustrate that 
the project team struggled to find integrated solutions. Despite efforts that increased 
communication and collaboration between the parties, and despite introducing 
structural coordination mechanisms such as project phases, deadlines, project reviews 
and 3D modeling, the project team was unable to produce a fully coordinated design 
project at the end of the design process. In the short term, the result was acceleration 
of the concrete works (raw structure) and increases in work scope and therefore 
project costs (e.g. concrete foundation, concrete structures, and steel). While the 
project team continues to collaborate and the contractor continues to build to fulfill 
the project requirement, the lack of coordination has resulted in fee erosion for the 
contractor and potential fee erosion for the engineers.  
     The project description above also shows that the main strength of the project team 
was their ability to build the project seemingly smoothly, despite the lack of 
coordination of the design project.  
     At this point in time, we do not know how the overall building will perform once 
the building is occupied. However, most likely, the building process will progress 
without major disruptions, the parties will collaborate to agree a final hand-off date 
and quality, the building will mostly reflect integration by operating more-or-less as 
intended, be occupied immediately, or even before, the build is completed. 
 
Meanings, norms and rules in project 1 
 
As a basis for analysing how institutions relate and develop over the course of the 
project, the first section in the analysis of project 1 concerns identifying more-or-less 
stabilised structures. During project 1, a number of structures that were more-or-less 
taken for granted and considered normative design-build practice developed. Also, the 
project team, while not collectively discussing or explicitly defining coordination and 
the use of particular coordination mechanisms, made purposeful efforts to create 
proto-institutions (and enable interaction) that were perceived to facilitate 
coordination. While the efforts will be discussed later the structures, both taken-for-
granted ones and proto-institutions, will be presented in the following analysis.  
     Each structure was supported by a particular shared meaning, and potentially 
multiple norms and structures. 
     Overall, five themes were interpreted to have developed. These themes are: 
quality, collaboration, economy, efficiency, and coordination. For each theme one or 
two different institutions are interpreted to have developed, including: quality 
understood as phenomenology, functionality and aesthetics; collaboration as 
pragmatism and trust; collaboration as professionalism and loyalty; cost optimization; 
cost reduction; designing and building efficiently; leadership and management; and 
coordination. Multiple norms and rules underpin each institution, and in some cases 
the same norm or rule underpins more than one institution. As a result, each 
institution and how each institution is interpreted to be an institution, is briefly 
introduced, through examples of norms, meanings and rules. 
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Also, all the institutions that develop over the cause of the project are summarised at 
the end of this section.  
 
The institution of phenomenological quality, functionality & 
aesthetics 
 
The institution of phenomenological quality, functionality and aesthetics is interpreted 
to have been underpinned by a shared meaning that the building consists of space (or 
number of spaces) that humans will perceive, see, feel, and use in a particular way 
that can be designed. The underpinning norms of the institution include extending 
deadlines, accepting late changes, design developing from concept to detail, and early 
collaboration between engineer and architect. Apart from norms, the institution of 
quality was also underpinned by a number of rules, including, for example: the hand-
off manual, the collaboration agreement, the service specifications, and the consultant 
and design-build contract. All project team members were interpreted to adhere to the 
institution of quality. 
    In the following, examples of the meanings and norms are presented to illustrate 
how phenomenological quality, functionality and aesthetics represent an institution. 
 
Bending, extending and reinterpreting design and deadlines 
When the project approached the end of the detailed design phase and the deadline for 
handing off the main design project arrived the project team agreed that the project 
had not been coordinated and developed to the level of detail that they had previously 
intended. In particular, the engineering project manager began repeating during 
project and design meetings that he would no longer guarantee a fully coordinated 
project would be handed off to the deadline but that ‘something’ would be handed off. 
Because the contractor had maintained a sanction on the engineering work originally 
introduced by the owner, a main design project was indeed handed off. However, the 
project team had gradually been reinterpreting what was required to be contained in 
the main design project to correspond with what was actually handed off. As a result, 
the contractor accepted the design project; the engineers avoided sanctions; and, the 
project team developed a new deadline for the hand-off of the remaining design 
project three months later. This deadline was then further extended with two months 
and later the deadline more or less dissolved although the project team continued to 
work on the project. Extension of deadlines is interpreted to have been a result of 
pursuing on-going collaboration among the organizations to enable each profession to 
represent their particular area of expertise or quality in the project once the contractor 
started constructing the building.  
Also, the engineers choose to compromise freezing the project at the formally agreed 
deadline and risked their professional integrity in order to not jeopardize project 
quality. This is illustrated in the following quote: 
 
‘…on January the 13th we said ‘alright, now we’ll use this [BIM model]’. 
Then, last week we imported the latest model and simply gave up. We cannot 
keep working on a completely out-dated model. …you can decide to get 
irritated or perhaps this is just the future, all these continuous changes that we 
have to accept. The thing is, as consultants, we worry that we miss something 
and are held responsible for it…’ [Engineer, project manager.] 
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The reinterpretation of project content and bending of project freezes enabled the 
consultants to finish their work to a point where the contractor was comfortable (e.g. 
avoiding design responsibility and ensuring quality) constructing the building. 
 
Battling for quality 
Apart from bending the rules to enable quality, quality is further interpreted to be an 
institution because the architects were willing to battle for the continued existence, if 
not dominance, of quality. Below, a quote from an interview with the architect’s 
project coordinator illustrates how important quality was to them: 
‘Right now, we are caught in between what [the owner] expects us to draw 
and what they have actually purchased [from the contractor]. That is one of 
the battles we are taking right now. Also, we think we are seeing, that certain 
contractor solutions are being chosen due to economic considerations, 
because it is cheaper. Then, as we gradually review it [the particular solution] 
we find that there are some disadvantages to it and we end up in the same 
place as we were to begin with, right… if only we had been allowed to be part 
of that process, we might have been saved several of these battles and round 
about work.’ [Architect’s project coordinator]. 
Quality is interpreted to be an institutionalised meaning because the architects were 
willing to ‘battle’ to improve the quality of a particular design solution. In this case, 
the battles resulted in rework and prolonging of the design process, in other words, 
compromise of the institution of efficiency, yet the architects were willing to battle 
for the pursuit of improved quality once the contractor and owner had altered the 
project to reduce project costs. 
 
The institutions of collaboration 
 
In the project team the notion collaboration was used to describe people working 
together, not necessarily towards the same goal, but, very broadly, communicating in 
good tone. However, distinct meanings of collaboration were interpreted to have 
developed. 
     The institutions of collaboration were interpreted to have developed into two 
distinct institutions: collaboration as pragmatism and trust; and collaboration as 
professionalism and loyalty. 
     The institution of collaboration as pragmatism and trust is interpreted to have been 
underpinned by a shared meaning of personal interaction and be associated with the 
normative conduct of early collaboration, and normative understandings of multi-
membership, mutual adjustment, access to knowledge and skills, affection and mutual 
respect, and re-interpreting project content. The establishing of a target cost, project 
office and collaboration agreement are interpreted as initiatives that were intended to 
be relatively instrumental although predominantly associated with moral obligation. 
     The institution of collaboration as professionalism and loyalty was interpreted to 
be underpinned by a shared understanding of the importance of adhering to formal 
structure. This meaning was underpinned by the norm of conducting work in multiple 
parallel processes, conducting meetings, and the understanding that working 
independently and respect of formal organizational hierarchy was important. Further, 
shifts in organizational leadership, the linear phase model, and formal consultant 
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agreements were interpreted to underpin this particular institution of collaboration. 
Also underpinning the institution of collaboration was the understanding that there 
were distinct professional responsibilities and stereotypes (i.e. each profession 
represents a particular area of expertise, set of values and characteristics). Collective 
narratives and jokes, segregated professional roles and formally segregated 
responsibilities are interpreted to have underpinned the understanding of distinct 
professions.  
     In the following examples of the institutions are presented to illustrate how they 
each represent an institution. 
 
Pragmatism & trust vs. Professionalism & loyalty 
The owner and contractor had agreed that the contractor should be involved in the 
project during the basic design phase, which was perceived by the project team as 
early collaboration. The owner explained the purpose of engaging the contractor in 
the basic design phase in the quote below: 
 
‘I talked to several contractors, actually mostly with MT Højgaard, about how 
to do these things [putting together a project] to ensure that communication 
was effective from the start. …So therefore it was… ….a very conscious choice 
to base it on dialogue and over an extended period of time. …I have then since 
wondered why MT Højgaard haven’t entered the scene more. … I thought, 
wow! – now I’m really getting a great opportunity to get the contractor to 
challenge those bloody consultants!’ [An owner’s representative.] 
In the quote above, the owner is not explicit about how they want the contractor to 
challenge the consultants. Rather, the quote illustrates that the owner is interested in 
the contractor taking an active role in the development of the project and challenging 
the consultants more broadly. Also, the owner and contractor agreed to develop the 
project based on a target cost, which was explicitly intended to enable the contractor 
to not strictly focus on project costs. Therefore, the owner is interpreted to have 
wanted a dynamic interplay between the different professions (and the institutions 
they were perceived to embody) represented in the project in order to optimize the 
project holistically.  
     The owner seemed to understand collaboration as predominantly an interactional 
phenomenon. For example, based on an understanding that interaction would lead to 
collaboration, the owner expected the contractor to be pragmatic and be able to shift 
focus from project cost to quality. Also, the owner established a joint project office 
for the architects, engineers and contractor at the owner’s own head office. The 
project office was, according to the owner, intended to increase informal personal 
interaction, which was perceived to make project team members ‘more polite’ and 
less likely to argue over project work. This was perceived as the essence of 
collaboration. However, in particular, the owner’s representative would explicitly call 
out to criticize the work and cry down the concerns of other project teams members 
during project and design meetings.  
     Similarly, in the broad perception of collaboration there were multiple variants. 
The architect’s design manager perceived collaboration as a matter of being pro-
active in terms of collecting information and addressing design problems. He 
specifically referred to the engineering team as ‘reactive’ and ‘a heavy dance partner’ 
when asked what characterised collaboration in the project team. In other words, the 
architect expected the engineers to interact and engage in the design process and 
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deviate from their perception of a value-chain and the professional norm to focus on 
finalising detailed design work. Also, the architects were interpreted to be pragmatic 
about organizational responsibilities when trying to collaborate. For example, the 
architects initiated the collaboration with the façade supplier and proposed numerous 
solutions for cooling systems in a particular part of the building during project 
meetings. 
     Within the contractor’s organization collaboration was interpreted both as an 
individual psychological phenomenon (e.g. being kind, trusting, empathetic, and 
having the right profile for the project team) and a structural phenomenon primarily 
concerning being loyal to formal organization structures. For example, the 
contractor’s project manager was furious with the architects for continuously 
introducing project changes during the detailed design phase and expressed dismay 
with their ‘disrespectful’ attitude and ’lack of loyalty’.  
     Similarly, the engineer’s project managers adhered to an understanding that 
collaboration involved each organization acting according to their particular 
normative professional role and responsibility. At the same time, the engineers 
developed the understanding that pragmatism was necessary in order to maintain 
collaboration and make the project progress. This was illustrated by the previous 
quote, when the engineers accepted changing the model during the detailed design 
phase. 
 
As mentioned, supporting the institution of collaboration as loyalty, respect and 
professionalism was an understanding of normative professional distinction and 
stereotyping. Apart from developing understandings of how to collaborate the project 
team also developed an understanding of whom the others in the project team were. 
     At some indefinable point in time during the basic design phase the contractor 
began cultivating a narrative about the architects as being poorly disciplined, 
technically incompetent, uncompromising in their pursuit of improving the aesthetics 
of the building. The precursors for this stemmed from a recent previous project 
collaboration where the quality of the main design project had been exceptionally 
poor and the project challenging to build. As a result, the contractor’s staff developed 
the understanding that architects in general were of a particularly sensitive nature and 
unable to plan and execute a design process. Despite the architect’s steady work and 
calls for a more proactive engineering team, the contractor developed a narrative 
about the architects as being, in summary, the bad guys.  
     On the contrary, the contractor generally had good faith in the engineering team 
and cultivated a narrative about the engineers as being reasonable, rational, 
competent, and victims of late changes imposed by the client and architect. The 
contractor’s team of managers was not particularly fond of the engineer’s project 
manager, who they perceived to be particularly defensive in all matters, nevertheless, 
they trusted the engineers would meet the deadline and provide a design project of 
reasonable quality. Because the contractor and engineers shared a similar 
understanding of what constituted an efficient process and a high quality project (e.g. 
freezing the project in order for the engineers to finalize the technical details and for 
the contractor to fix the project cost) there was inherent sympathy, trust and mutual 
respect between the contractor and engineering team. It wasn’t until the end of the 
detailed design phase, when the engineering project was released to the contractor’s 
self-perform sub-contractors and the client expressed frustration with the poor indoor 
climate, that the contractor changed their rhetoric about the engineers. Suddenly and 
instead, the contractor began to blame the engineers for having underestimated the 
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complexity of the project and not being sufficiently competent to handle the job.  
     Similarly, during the detailed design phase newcomers to the contractor’s project 
team were observed to quickly adapt and join in on these narratives and jokes, which 
were interpreted as a way of becoming socially accepted. Also, the otherwise 
relatively decoupled project team members of the building organization were 
observed to develop the same narratives and jokes during the early building phases.  
     Not only the contractor developed these jokes and narratives. Without going into 
detail, the engineers were interpreted to develop similar narratives as the contractor, 
while the architects were interpreted to develop narratives about the contractor as 
particularly opinionated and willing to compromise quality for the sake of reducing 
project costs. 
     In summary, lack of empathy among professional groups developed as a mutual 
norm. 
 
The institutions of collaboration understood as professionalism, loyalty and respect, 
was also supported by the normative understanding and formal agreements that each 
organization was responsible for a particular area of professional expertise. According 
to the contractor’s design manager the architects were responsible for the aesthetics of 
the building, while they perceived themselves as responsible for ‘optimizing the 
project’ (interpreted to mean getting the owner the most building for the money 
invested). The architect’s design manager perceived the architects as the stewards of 
project quality including, aesthetics, functionality, phenomenonology, sustainability, 
cost and constructability. 
     Characteristically, each organization perceived their legal responsibility to be 
rather narrow, while they perceived their interest in the project’s overall success much 
more encompassing. Furthermore, and paradoxically, they also perceived the interests 
of the other organizations to be rather narrow.  
     For example, the project team developed the understanding that explicit decision-
making was the client’s responsibility alone. To elaborate, during the basic design 
phase, in the spring of 2013, the architects had asked the client to clarify their last 
requirements in order for the design team to finalize the design project for the 
upcoming project freeze that summer. At this point, the client started attending project 
meetings on a weekly basis instead of the bi-weekly basis that they had until then.      
However, the client had difficulties finalizing their requirements. The client’s 
organization was large and the client’s representatives claimed to not always be 
authorized to make the decisions she perceived she was being asked to make by the 
project team. The architect’s design manager claimed the client’s organization was 
inexperienced and immature to handle the complexity of the project. The contractor 
pointed out that the client only received incoherent and sporadic information from the 
architects and engineers. The architects, contractors and engineers agreed that the 
result of the lack of owner’s decisions was that the project team struggled to finish the 
preliminary design project and offer a fixed project cost, and that the detailed design 
phase and design-build contract was postponed until the autumn of 2013.  
     In summary, there were multiple perceptions of why the client was unable to make 
decisions. The architects explicitly understood that the owner was responsible for 
decision making. Despite the contractor understanding decision-making as a 
collective and interactive process by suggesting that the architects and engineers had 
failed to deliver the necessary information to form a basis for a decision, the 
contractor still understood it to be the client’s responsibility. 
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The institutions of economy 
 
Two distinct institutions of economy are interpreted to have developed; cost 
optimisation, and cost reductions. 
     The institution of cost optimisation is interpreted to have had the shared meaning 
of reducing project cost without compromising project quality. This meaning is 
interpreted to have been underpinned by the conducts of early involvement of the 
general and sub-contractors and suppliers, and the establishing of a target cost. 
     The institution of cost reduction is interpreted to have been underpinned by a 
shared meaning of pursuing short-term economic gains. Also, late involvement of 
suppliers and sub-contractors and intertwined project cost, profit and contingencies 
are interpreted to be underpinning normative conduct. The normative understanding 
to avoid risk and responsibility and the rules of for example, sanctioned deadlines and 
deliverables are interpreted to underpin the meaning of pursuing short-term economic 
gains. 
     In the following the two institutions are presented separately. 
 
Cost optimisation through project integration 
The institution of cost optimization was illustrated by a previous quote, where the 
owner’s representative had hoped and expected the contractor to challenge the 
consultants. A concrete example of cost optimization includes the façade system. To 
elaborate, the project team involved a façade supplier during the basic design phase, 
which was perceived as early involvement. According to the architect, the purpose of 
involving the façade supplier during the basic design phase, was to get accurate 
information on product and construction details, explore realistic design opportunities, 
get accurate pricing and be able to see the façade at the production facility before it 
was installed on site. In other words, early involvement is interpreted to have been 
initiated in order to integrate at least quality, functionality and cost of the façade 
design. 
Since cost optimization through project integration was not supported by rules or 
normative conduct, but rather was perceived to be experimental and a deviation from 
the norm of late involvement, cost optimization is interpreted to have been a proto-
institution. 
Cost reductions by pursuing short-term economic gains 
The institution of short-term gains refers to, in particular, the owner and contractor 
pursuing short term gains regardless of the long term costs or effects. In project 1 
there were several examples of actors pursuing short-term gains, however, it is also 
interpreted to be a fading institution as no one spoke openly about or justified their 
actions by referring to wanting to pursue short-term economic gains. 
     The project developed multiple norms to pursue short-term economic gains. One 
example included, the engineers being hired without competition. The owner’s 
representative justified the hiring of the engineering consultancy by referring to them 
as a large and renowned organization whom he perceived had the competencies to do 
the work. The architect’s design manager also mentioned that the engineering 
consultant was a client of the owner, because the engineering consultant’s 
headquarters was a property leased from the owner. In that respect, the architects 
perceived the engineers to have been hired on a political basis rather than a 
competence basis. Although the owner’s representative denied this when interviewed, 
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the architects referred to the collaboration as a ‘forced marital arrangement’ and the 
architects claimed the engineers were slowing down the design process by not 
providing the necessary technical inputs when required. 
     Second, norms included the project team negotiating the target cost. During the 
conceptual design phase the contractor presented their target cost of 732 mio. DKr. To 
avoid making the contractor’s project managers focus on project cost alone, the 
architect recommended the target cost be increased with 100mio. DKr. Despite this 
recommendation and the owner claiming to have perceived the target cost as a relative 
number subject to change, the owner negotiated the target cost down to 703 mio. Dkr. 
around the time of starting the basic design phase.  
     In addition, the owner did not sign a design-build contract with the contractor until 
the beginning of the detailed design phase and the contractor was only guaranteed the 
contract if they were able to meet the target cost at the end of the basic design phase. 
In other words, despite having been made aware that their actions could jeopardize 
collaboration and quality, the owner pursued short-term economic gains after all. 
 
Similarly, and third, avoiding risk and responsibility is interpreted to have been a 
taken-for-granted norm in the project that supported the understanding that reducing 
potential economic costs was important. For example, the owner wanted to avoid, or 
at least, reduce their risk by using a design-build project delivery method to begin 
with. The following quote illustrates the early involvement of the contractor was 
perceived as a way of passing responsibility from the owner to the contractor: 
 
‘The main argument for choosing design-build project delivery is that, given 
the project team and the project at hand, they [the owner] want to be able to 
place the responsibility [for the project and project team] somewhere. And that 
has been placed with the contractor MT Højgaard, and now they have the 
responsibility for the building. They are also responsible for the consultants 
[architects and engineers] and they are responsible for all the sub-contractors. 
It wouldn’t be like that if a different delivery method had been chosen. Then 
the owner would be responsible for many of these actors, and that is why they 
wanted to park [the responsibility]…’ [Owner’s advisor consultant 
representative.] 
 
The quote illustrates that there was an understanding that the project contained a 
certain risk and that the risk could be allocated to a particular organization in the 
project team. On the other hand, despite the owner adhering to the understanding that 
the risk of the project was allocated with the contractor the owner was actively 
engaged even in design meetings, which by the contractor’s design manager was 
perceived as out of the ordinary, but acceptable. 
 
Not only the owner wanted to avoid responsibility. Despite the contractor formally 
having the responsibility for delivering the project once the design-build contract was 
signed, the contractor withdrew from the design meetings during the basic design 
phase to avoid design responsibility. To elaborate, the architects were hired as the 
formal leader of the project, however, the contractor’s design manager expressed lack 
of faith in the architects’ ability to lead the project: the contractor perceived the basic 
design process to be too unstructured with too many uncertainties left unresolved. 
Therefore, explicitly to avoid being held responsible for potential design error later 
on, the contractor’s design manager withdrew from the design meetings and described 
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their efforts as ‘gathering ammunition’ for when the anticipated conflict between the 
contractor and the consultants (architects and engineers) would arise. The architect, 
engineers and the owner left the contractor’s withdrawal uncontested and thus the 
contractor’s withdrawal is interpreted to have been perceived as legitimate. 
 
A last example of the institution of reducing economic cost concerns the norm of 
engaging suppliers and sub-contractors late in the detailed design phase or not until 
the building phase. While the architects initiated inviting the façade supplier to the 
project during the basic design phase and the contractor agreed to this, the contractor 
did not engage other sub-contractors or suppliers until the end of the detailed design 
phase. As illustrated previously, the owner had hoped the contractor would actively 
challenge the design. On the other hand, the contractor hired the concrete element 
supplier and asked them to do the optimization of that particular building system. In 
other words, the contractor was not able to challenge the design without accurate 
product and manufacturing information provided by the sub-contractors and suppliers. 
However, the contractor tendered the individual building systems, including the 
concrete elements, to a number of sub-contractors and suppliers in order to get 
competitive pricing. Because the suppliers and sub-contractor’s offers were only valid 
a certain period of time the contractor waited as long as possible to engage the sub-
contractors and suppliers. 
 
The institutions of efficiency 
 
Within the theme of efficiency one institution is interpreted to have developed: 
designing and building efficiently. 
     The institution of designing and building efficiently is interpreted to have a shared 
meaning of sense of progress. The understanding that creating the right solution the 
first time was important and right supported this. Sequential involvement of actors, 
shifts in organizational structure and the norm for planning project freezes are 
interpreted to be underpinning norms. Similarly, the linear phase model and the 
collaboration agreement underpin the institution of designing efficiently. 
     Also, efficiency was supported by the understanding that urgency and 
determination to build was important and right. The normative conduct of 
overlapping the design and building processes, and the understandings that exercising 
adaptive capacity and avoiding doing rework are necessary underpin the urgency and 
determination to build. Furthermore, sanctioned deadlines and the hand-off manual 
are interpreted to be rules that underpin the urgency and determination to build. 
In the following the two understandings supporting the institutions of efficiency are 
presented. 
 
Creating the right solution the first time 
During project conception and early design phase the project team established a plan 
for the design process to follow the linear phase model: early design phase ending 
with deciding on the winning architectural proposal; basic design phase ending with 
the preliminary project and the freezing of the structural building systems; and the 
detailed phase ending with the main design project. The linear phase model is 
interpreted to be a taken-for-granted norm. For example, the interview extract below 
illustrates that the owner had difficulties explaining why they had decided to use the 
	76 
linear phase model and why I interpret the linear project phase model to be an 
institutionalized norm developed in project 1: 
 
Interviewer: ‘…[you have chosen] a traditional phase model, but who has 
considered if that model is useful for this project?’ 
Owner’s representative: ‘Well, that’s like…, it’s self-evident.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Ok, could you please explain because I don’t know enough to 
understand exactly why that is?’ 
Owner’s representative: ‘Well, that is a sort of natural course, that one…   
…has to go through these phases in order to get to the final…, that you then 
have to build. Well, completely naturally we have these phases with 
programming and competition and regarding the project, the architects 
project and so on. And then, well… you get to, having the detailed design in 
place and…. Finally, you end up with, having a basis for production, right… 
that is sort of… I think it would be untraditional, if one didn’t follow this…  … 
It wouldn’t be… perhaps so fortunate, because then… ….then it would be 
something different to what one is used to doing, right?’ 
The owner’s representative refers to the linear phase model as the ‘natural’ way of 
progressing a design process, thus making the linear phase model a taken-for-granted 
structure supporting the understanding that a project develops from architectural 
concept to detailed project.  
 
While the linear phase model was formally implemented due to professional norm the 
linear model also outlined a particular value-chain which was perceived to be the 
most efficient way of working. In particular, the engineer’s representatives developed 
an understanding that doing work more than once was a waste and considered 
inefficient. This was particularly clear during observations of project meetings during 
the detailed design phase. During the transition from basic to detailed design phase 
mechanical engineers had been assigned to the project, which, according to the 
architect was much too late and a significant underestimation of the complexity of the 
project on the engineers’ part. Nevertheless, during project and design meetings the 
mechanical engineer repeatedly justified the lack of progress of the mechanical design 
with not having a finished architectural design to base his work on. The architects in 
return blamed the clients for not having made the necessary decisions. Furthermore, 
the engineers perceived their work to be at the tail end of the architects’ work. In 
other words, the project team adhered to a particular perceived value-chain that is 
interpreted to have been as follows: first, the architect was expected to produce an 
idea, then the owner and client were to decide if they wanted that idea or not, then the 
contractor would provide a price, the contractor and client would then make a final 
decision, and subsequently the engineers would finalize their design.  
     The value-chain was supported by the project team, who according to the 
architect’s design manager had agreed to freeze the project at certain points during the 
design process. The project freezes were intended to facilitate an efficient workflow 
and technical coordination by locking certain parts of the project in order to enable 
the engineers to develop the detailed design and the contractor to develop a fixed 
project cost. The quote below illustrates how the contractor’s project manager 
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perceived the project freezes to enable a more efficient and stabilized workflow for 
the consultants and the contractor: 
 
‘….well, in order to not waste the consultant’s time and ask them to redesign,   
...I would have liked that we had agreed to finalize the main project for the 
structural part of the building before we started excavating. Then, we could 
have postponed the remaining parts and instead focused on closing the deals 
concerning the structural parts of the building and then get some time 
afterwards to complete the interior and exterior finishes.’ [Contractor’s 
project manager]. 
 
The quote illustrates that the contractor’s project manager perceived finalising 
different parts of the building in sequence to be more efficient. Implicitly, the project 
team’s current working methods of finalising multiple parts of the building 
simultaneously during the six month long detailed design phase was perceived to 
result in resources wasted on redesign. 
     In summary, the linear phase model, the value-chain, and project freezes are 
interpreted to be norms perceived as a time and cost control mechanism to enable an 
efficient workflow understood as not wasting time re-doing design work.  
 
Urgency and determination to build 
Not only the design process was perceived as having to be efficient, so was the 
building process. Doing things right the first time was also, without going into detail, 
a major concern within the contractor’s building team. In addition to creating the right 
solution the first time the project team also associated efficiency with a certain 
urgency to begin the build and determination to continue progressing the build once 
started. As shall be elaborated in detail later, the contractor’s self-perform sub-
contract managers had openly complained about the level of technical coordination of 
the main design project and proposed that the construction start be postponed. 
However, the sub-contract managers worked with the design material at hand and 
began construction as originally scheduled. The understanding that adapting to the 
level of coordination of the design project by, and figuring out missing details as work 
began was interpreted to be perceived as part of the sub-contract managers’ 
professional identity. For example, the sub-contractor manager took pride in being 
able to complete the civil works despite the lack of coordinated design project and 
referred to it as ‘business as usual’. Also, the adaptation was perceived to be required 
because there was a perceived urgency to build. During a site visit the owner 
explained that he couldn’t quite understand why the design process had to be so long 
and why the construction process could not have started sooner. Furthermore, the 
design and project managers were interpreted to have developed the understanding 
that the project team would, regardless of how much time given, never be able to 
produce a fully coordinated project. Thus adapting to the current level of coordination 
would be more efficient (i.e. adaption would produce more-or-less immediate and 
tangible effects) than awaiting a fully coordinated project and the only way to get 
started to meet the final project hand-off deadline and avoid sanctions. 
     In that respect, the capacity to adapt was interpreted to be a result of and further 
supporting that avoiding fiscal sanctions for being late with handing off the final 
building creates urgency within the contractor’s organization to begin the build.  
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The institution of leadership & management 
 
The institution of leadership and management is interpreted to have had a shared 
orthodox meaning of being a matter of distributing ‘carrot and stick’ appropriately. 
The shared meaning is interpreted to be underpinned by the normative understanding 
that carrot, and in particular, stick is managed through formal structure, e.g. legal 
contracts, waive sanctions, and appropriately distributing risk and reward.  
 
Leadership as appropriately distributing risk and reward  
While assigning leadership and management positions to the members of the project 
team was interpreted to be a deeply taken-for-granted phenomenon beyond the 
design-build project, the contractor in particular was interpreted to have understood 
leadership as a matter of managing formal structure. 
     For example, while the organizations in the project team were aware of the 
technical complexity of the project, they underestimated the social complexity (i.e. 
multiple meanings, norms and rules) that developed during the detailed design phase. 
The contractor’s design manager repeatedly stated that the project team was not a 
‘kindergarten’ and that the other project members ought to know what to work on and 
when. While the contractor had a clear understanding of what they expected the 
architects, engineers and owner to do, they also expected the architects, engineers and 
owners to automatically share that understanding and be able to translate that into 
specific work activities in the order that would lead to a coordinated main design 
project structured by the building process. The kindergarten metaphor was used in a 
degrading way and used to associate the other project members with children unable 
to help themselves. More importantly, not being able to automatically figure out what 
to do next was used to support the understanding that the architects and engineers 
were unprofessional. The contractor’s design manager argued that the architects and 
engineers had been hired to do a professional piece of work, and thus the kindergarten 
metaphor was used to justify that it was not the contractor’s responsibility to manage 
or lead the activities and work process of the architects and engineers. As long as the 
contractor repeated and maintained the date of the final deadline, the contractor 
insisted the architects and engineers ought to be professional enough to figure out for 
themselves what to do to get there. During one design meeting the architects and 
engineers explicitly asked for a detailed schedule for the detailed design phase. While 
the contractor had produced an overall schedule for the detailed design work, this was 
not updated, further detailed, referred to, or visualised during design meetings. 
Instead, the design managers would respond with ‘you [the engineers] just need to 
focus on finishing the structural design.’     
     In summary, the understanding of leadership being a matter of carrot and stick and 
that professional norm would lead actors to automatically figure out what to work on 
and when, prevented the contractor from conducting perspective-taking, multi-
membership and enabling sufficient communication to guide the project organization 
towards a coordinated design project. 
 
In addition, while the deadline for the preliminary design project was not sanctioned, 
the owner had originally sanctioned the deadline for the main design project in order 
to put pressure on the engineers to meet the deadline. The interviews show that this 
was done apparently without much reflection and by adhering to a professional norm. 
However, the contractor had worked with the architect on a previous project that had 
performed exceptionally poorly and was highly aware that the architect’s design 
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project might be lacking technical coordination. Therefore, to encourage the architects 
to share their project with the contractor in order to increase preparation for 
construction the contractor had waived the sanctions against the architects in case of 
late hand-in of the final design project. In other words, the contractor had the 
perception that the sanctions (or lack of sanctions) could be used instrumentally to 
encourage a particular type of interaction (i.e. sharing the design project across 
organizations). 
     The instrumental use of fiscal mechanisms was often referred to as a matter of 
appropriately distributing stick and carrot. This was perceived not only to be 
legitimate, but by some the essence of the leadership dilemma and project members 
would openly discuss this type of leadership both inside and outside of meetings. 
 
The institution of coordination 
 
Coordination as a technical phenomenon  
According to the contractor’s design manager the main constraint to coordination 
during the detailed design phase was that the architects and engineers simply didn’t 
‘understand’ the importance of a fully detailed and technically coordinated design 
project in time for construction. In particular in the contractor’s organization there 
was an understanding that the design manager’s responsibility was ensuring the 
constructability of the main design project. Therefore, during design and project 
meetings, the design managers would take on a more technical role and provide 
technical advice on specific design solutions in terms of their functionality, cost and 
maintenance requirements. Perhaps because the contractors cultivated the narrative of 
the architects being concerned with aesthetics only, the contractor’s design managers 
had developed the understanding that their primary responsibility was to guard the 
functionality and cost of the design solutions. Also, the contractor’s design manager 
(and project managers) was originally trained as an engineer and, as a contractor, had 
expertise on how to build buildings. This is interpreted to have made them more 
inclined to focus on the technical coordination of the design project as opposed to, for 
example, coordinating the social structures and interactions. Also, during the detailed 
design phase the contractor, despite being formally the leader of the project, had the 
understanding that respecting the work flow of the architects and engineers was 
important and that it was unprofessional and patronizing of the contractor to micro-
manage the work of the architects and engineers. In addition, the contractor’s design 
managers were involved in the contract negotiations with the sub-contractors and 
suppliers in collaboration with the project managers. All this, combined with a great 
sense of loyalty to their organization (the contractor) made the contractor’s design 
managers perceive themselves as the bridge between the design organization and the 
contractor’s build organization. As a result, the contractor’s design manager and 
project managers did not perceive their responsibility to concern coordination of the 
social work elements of the entire project.  
 
Summary of institutions 
 
The analysis of institutions showed that five themes and eight relatively distinct 
institutions were interpreted to have developed in project 1. Table 4 summarises the 
institutions and the meanings, norms and rules that underpin each institution. 
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Theme Institution Shared meaning 
Normative 
understanding & 
conduct 
Rules 
Q
ua
lit
y 
Phenomenological 
quality, functionality & 
aesthetics (WE) 
The perception, 
look, usability 
and materiality 
of spaces. 
Extending deadlines. 
Accepting late project 
changes. 
Design develops from 
concept to detail. 
Engineers and architects 
collaboration from 
project conception. 
 
Hand-off 
manual. 
Collaboration 
agreement. 
 
 
 
C
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
n 
Collaboration as 
pragmatism & trust 
(WE). 
Personal 
interaction. 
Multi-membership. 
Mutual adjustment. 
Early collaboration. 
Access to 
knowledge/skills. 
Affection & mutual 
respect. 
Reinterpreting project 
content. 
Target cost. 
Collaboration 
agreement. 
Project office. 
Collaboration as 
professionalism, loyalty 
& respect (WE). 
Adhering to 
formal 
structure. 
 
Multiple concurrent 
work processes. 
Meetings. 
Independent work. 
Respecting formal 
organizational 
hierarchies.  
Each profession 
represents a particular 
expertise, set of values 
and characteristics. 
Narratives & jokes. 
Lack of mutual 
empathy. 
Segregated roles and 
responsibilities.  
 
Organizational 
shifts. 
Consultant 
agreements. 
Linear phase 
model. Separate 
contracts and 
legal 
responsibilities. 
Ec
on
om
y 
Cost optimisation (P) Reducing 
project cost 
without 
compromising 
project quality. 
Early involvement of 
contractor, sub-
contractors and 
suppliers. 
Target cost. 
Theme Institution Shared meaning 
Normative 
understanding & 
conduct 
Rules 
Ec
on
om
y 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
Cost reduction (WE) Pursuit of short-
term and/or 
opportunistic 
economic gains. 
 
Late involvement of 
suppliers & sub-
contractors. 
Avoiding risk and 
responsibility. 
Urgency & 
determination to build. 
Intertwined project cost, 
profit and 
contingencies. 
 
Sanctioned 
deadlines. 
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Table 4. Institutions and underpinning meanings, norms and rules, interpreted to 
have developed in project 1 over the course of the entire design and build processes. 
[P, proto-institution. WE, well-established institution. TG, taken-for-granted 
institution.] 
 
In the following sections, the relationship between these multiple meanings, norms 
and rules and how they developed over the course of the design and build processes 
will be analysed in order to understand the process of coordinating the project. 
 
 
The constellation of institutions in project 1 
 
The analysis of institutions in project 1 illustrated that multiple institutions developed 
in the project. These multiple institutions co-existed in different types of relationship 
that mutated over the course of the project.       
     In the following these relationships and how they are interpreted to have mutation 
are presented. Due to the project concept and early design phases being analysed ex-
post these analyses will be brief, while the ex-ante study of the end of the basic 
design, entire detailed design and early building phases will be analysed in depth. The 
analysis is structured chronologically to illustrate what relationships between the 
multiple institutions developed in each phase of the project. 
Project conception  
 
Before the design process began, the owner and client were able to integrate their 
interests: building the client’s new headquarters was a shared goal and made the 
parties mutually dependent on each other. At this point, while the constellation 
consisted of relatively few actors (and thus norms and rules) the owner and owner’s 
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
Designing & building 
efficiently (WE). 
Create the right 
solution the 
first time. 
Sequential involvement 
(i.e. Value-chain). 
Shifts in organizational 
structure. 
Project freeze. 
 
Linear phase 
model.  
Collaboration 
agreement. 
Urgency & 
determination 
to progress 
work. 
 
Adaptive capacity. 
Overlap between design 
and building processes.  
Avoiding doing rework. 
BIM. 
 
Sanctioned 
deadlines. 
Hand-off 
manual. 
ICT-agreement. 
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
Leadership & 
Management (TG). 
Leadership as a 
matter of 
‘carrot & stick’. 
Waive sanctions. 
Appropriately 
distributing risk and 
reward. 
Incentives & 
sanctions. 
Linear phase 
model. 
Coordination (TG). Coordination as 
a technical 
discipline. 
 
Ensuring 
constructability of 
design project. 
Preliminary design 
project. 
Main design project. 
BIM. 
 
Consultant 
agreements. 
Linear phase 
model.  
ICT-agreement. 
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advisor consultant wanted to enable quality through collaboration while also wanting 
to place the responsibility (perceived very broadly) to be placed with the contractor as 
illustrated by the quote previously. To increase the duration of collaboration, the 
engineers were hired by the owner to facilitate the three different architectural teams 
in developing their design proposals for the initial competition.  
     In summary, the institutions of quality, collaboration as pragmatism and trust, and 
collaboration as professional distinction are interpreted to have peacefully co-existed. 
 
Early design phase 
 
Peaceful co-existence: Good collaboration 
Over a period of four months, the early design phase, the four organizations in the 
project team (owner, client, engineer and architect) collaboration in what was 
interpreted to be relatively peaceful co-existence: there are no accounts of conflicts, 
competition or ambiguity in the empirical material (although this is partly likely to be 
a result of after-rationalization and fading of memory. At the end of the four-month 
long early design phase the constellation was disrupted with the introduction of the 
contractor and the institutions of cost optimization: the architects and engineers 
explained they suddenly had to scramble to produce a minimum of a coherent design 
material, that the contractor would be able use as a basis for developing a target cost. 
While the project team developed a relatively peaceful constellation of institutions at 
this point the empirical material shows, that precursors for institutional fragmentation 
developed already during the early design phase. Fragmentation (i.e. institutions 
increasingly requiring diverging action to be fulfilled) is interpreted to have occurred 
both gradually and occasionally. Gradual fragmentation of institutions occurred when, 
for example, the project team agreed to divide the project into standardized sub-phase 
(i.e. organizing the design process to follow the linear phase model) with adhering 
deadlines and deliverables. As will be discussed shortly, the phase model unfolded, or 
at least supported, a number of understandings that caused institutions to fragment.  
     Occasional fragmentation occurred for example, when the owner negotiated a 
reduction of the target cost for the purpose of reducing the project cost. To elaborate, 
during the conceptual design phase the contractor proposed that the project developed 
on the basis of a target cost. The owner agreed to this and the two parties shared the 
understanding that the target cost was a relative figure that may change over the 
course of the design process. However, once the contractor had presented their target 
cost of 732 mio. DKr., the owner negotiated the target cost down to 703 mio. DKr. 
According to the owner, this was done because the scope of work included in the 
contractor’s bid could be reduced (e.g. a double floor system was replaced with a 
traditional single concrete slab floor). When interviewed, the owner claimed to fully 
expect the scope and cost of the project to increase during the design process. The 
contractor, on the other hand, interpreted the target cost as a tight framework. Since 
the contractor did not receive a fee for participating in the basic or detailed design 
phase, the contractor perceived that their only way to secure business was to meet the 
target cost by the end of the design process in order to win the design-build contract. 
Therefore, the contractor guarded the target cost carefully. When the owner decided 
to negotiate a reduction of the target cost, despite defying the architect’s 
recommendations, this only further increased the contractor’s focus on guarding the 
target cost, thus shifting their focus away from optimizing the project to meet the 
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owner’s requirements.  
     In addition, the owner did not sign a design-build contract with the contractor until 
the end of the basic design phase and the contractor was only guaranteed the contract 
if they were able to meet the target cost. In that respect, pursuing short-term gains by 
creating incentive to keep project costs under control constrained coordination of the 
project long-term. 
     These events or actions are interpreted to be part of a gradual process of 
fragmentation, however, they are interpreted to represent relatively condensed periods 
of time and thus represent episodes that can be interpreted as instances of occasional 
fragmentation fueling the gradual fragmentation. 
 
In negotiating the target cost, the owner adhered to the institution of pursuing short-
term economic gains and professional norm, which facilitated the diversion of the 
contractor’s focus from participating in creating an integrated project to guarding of 
the target cost. 
     Perhaps, because the negotiation of the target cost and the contractor guarding the 
target cost were perceived by the contractor and owner as normative conduct, they did 
not recognize the fragmenting effects of their efforts or listen to the architect’s 
recommendations to increase the target cost. Instead, when interviewed the contractor 
and owner’s representatives perceived the basic design phase to have been 
characterized by ‘good collaboration’. 
 
Basic design phase 
 
Fragmentation disguised as peaceful co-existence: Organizations starting to 
develop different meanings and adhering to different norms 
Subsequently, during the basic design phase, the constellation of institutions gradually 
fragmented as the remaining organizations in the project team also began increasingly 
to maintain particular institutions. To elaborate: the architects continued to develop 
the design project guided by their perception of quality, the engineers were, according 
to the architect, adhering to the perception of a value-chain which made the engineers 
reactive and await the architectural design to be completed so they could finalize the 
structural, mechanical and electrical solutions; the contractor also adhered to the 
normative understandings of the value-chain, focused on avoiding risk and decided to 
withdraw from design meetings; and, the contractor increasingly started guarding the 
target cost. For example, according to the design manager, the architects were 
struggling to produce a coherent design project and the contractor’s design manager 
wanted no part in it to avoid being held responsible if and when the design project 
was deemed incomplete at the time of hand-in (and would result in rework and delays 
on site). Therefore, at some point during the basic design phase, the contractor’s 
design manager decided to withdraw from the design meetings lead by the architects. 
Instead, the contractor considered it their foremost responsibility to ensure that 
information about the development of the target cost was communicated in a clear and 
timely manner to the owner. The communication was considered important in order to 
negotiate additional costs with the owner and avoid the contractor’s fee eroding.     
     Because the fragmentation of institutions did not result in any perceivable conflicts 
between the project team members during the design phase, the constellation was 
perceived as peaceful co-existence between institutions during the basic design phase 
disguising the gradual fragmentation. 
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However, as illustrated in a previously quote, the owner hired the contractor to 
participate in the basic design phase and hoped the contractor would challenge the 
design and introduce cost effective solutions.  
     However, when the contractor was invited to participate in the basic design phase, 
they had a clear understanding that they were entering the architect’s domain. For 
example, the self-perform concrete contractor was invited to participate in a number 
of design meetings during the basic design phase. However, while the early 
collaboration could have enabled early communication and access to accurate 
information, the contractor did not perceive it legitimate to actively engage in the 
design process. This is illustrated by the quote below: 
 
‘There were a lot of design meetings where I participated… it was right from 
the start we were sitting at the architect’s head office, downtown, and I was 
wondering…. …I think, the constellation itself on these big design-build 
projects… …this thing where we participate for a period of time during the 
collaboration phase, where the engineers and architects mostly relate to the 
owner, right. We [the contractor] have such a strange role, we are a kind of 
lay representative… we can’t really enter and… ….get mad and say ‘why…’ 
…well, I just sometimes wonder why we would participate is these design 
meetings, five meetings in a row, and nothing happened and you had meeting 
minutes and a lot of things and… ‘any action on this item?, no, well, move on 
to the next item’ and…. I just thought, it makes no sense to participate in these 
meetings because nothing happens and I wonder why even join in on that type 
of collaboration [design-build]. Perhaps I haven’t seen the light but having 
the engineers and architect answer to the owner during this period [the basic 
design phase] and then we hire them and the poorer the owner has managed 
the process, the poorer the quality of the project we take on and I don’t 
understand why we do this.’ (Sub-contractor manager, p.4-5). 
In order words, the owner had intended the basic design phase to be characterized by 
purposeful competition among institutions followed by integration between the 
different institutions, however, fragmentation disguised as peaceful co-existence 
occurred instead.  
Occasional integration: Being able to create building solutions that fulfill all 
institutions 
Occasional integration occurred for example, when the project team engaged the 
façade supplier early on. The engagement of the façade supplier enabled each of the 
project team members to pursue a particular institution to the fullest: the architect 
pursued a façade of high material quality with a complex geometry and a particular 
tint and reflection of the glass; the engineers pursued ensuring that the façade would 
be able to withstand the wind pressures as well as support the required thermal indoor 
climate; the contractor wanted most accurate pricing with as little contingencies as 
possible and a professional installer; and the owner wanted a façade that would turn 
their building into an architectural landmark to attract future clients. Also, the early 
involvement of the façade supplier enabled site visits to the production site that 
further supported the gradual development of a shared understanding of what qualities 
the façade was able to embody. The gradually developing understanding of the façade 
system and the growing respect for the façade supplier is also interpreted to have 
made the owner accept an increased cost of the façade of over 60% without conflict or 
reducing their overall satisfaction with the project. Because the project team made 
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efforts towards creating a new constellation of institutions by disregarding the value-
chain and the pursuit of late purchases, but rather enabled early engagement of the 
supplier and multi-disciplinary design work, the project team was able to pursue and 
satisfy multiple and different institutions through common efforts.  
     Importantly, the constellation was not integrated due to a broad compromise 
among the parties. The constellation is interpreted to have been integrated because 
each institution maintained its distinct meaning (e.g. did not blend or merge with 
other institutions), yet common efforts were able to satisfy all the institutions 
represented. 
 
Despite occasional integration of institutions occurring during the basic design phase, 
the basic design phase was perceived by project team members to be characterized as 
good collaboration before the awaited battle. The precursors for the battle emerged at 
the end of the basic design phase when the project approached the deadline for project 
freeze. At the end of the basic design phase signs of the fragmentation began to 
emerge as disruptions to the project started occurring. For example, the client was 
unable to make the final decisions, the engineers unable to provide recommendation 
on best-for-project solutions, and the project cost was increasing by around 100 mio. 
DKr.  
 
Detailed design phase 
 
The detailed design phase is interpreted to represent the most complex constellation 
of institutions during project 1. During the detailed design phase the most numbers of 
actors with different understandings, goals and interests participated and the project 
team was under time pressure to produce the main design project. The main design 
project is interpreted to represent the culmination of the constellation of institutions. 
In other words, the project team would have had to coordinate all their efforts in order 
for the project team to produce a completed design project that satisfied all the 
institutions represented in the project. 
 
Conflict I: The design process becomes a ‘gothic knot’ 
By the end of the basic design phase the project shifted from having been led by the 
architects to being led by the contractor. At this point in time, the contractor expected 
the entire organization to shift its efforts towards a different shared goal (i.e. 
preparing design material for construction purposes) and that the activities in the 
design process would be structured by the construction process (i.e. what gets 
installed and produced first is also what gets designed first). In institutional terms, the 
contractor wanted and expected the institution of efficiency (i.e. efficient building 
process) to dominate the constellation.  
     The following field notes from a project meeting during the detailed design phase 
illustrates the competition between the institutions of efficiency and quality: 
The architect’s representative presents the drawings. The architect’s 
representative says that one of the proposals requires that some of the 
concrete columns be shifted. The contractor’s design manager’s eyes open 
wide! The contractor’s design manager puts a hand on his chest and asks for 
a defibrillator. People laugh. The architect’s representative seems serious but 
doesn’t seem to understand the implication of changing the columns. The 
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owner’s representative says they would like the meeting room alongside the 
façade. The contractor’s design manager points out related issues regarding 
fire and escape routes. He asks if placing the meeting rooms along the façade 
means shifting more columns and beams. The architect’s representative says 
that some of the columns would have to be shifted. The contractor’s design 
manager says the concrete project is frozen. The owner’s representative says 
it surely can’t make that much difference to shift a few columns. The client’s 
representative says they have chosen the floor layout where the meeting rooms 
are located along the façade and that she wants the decision noted in the 
meeting minutes. The contractor’s representatives say nothing. [Project 
meeting, February 20th, 2014, end of detailed design phase, project 1]. 
In addition to the vignette, the façade can be used as an example to illustrate how the 
contractor maintained the understanding that the project was locked by the time the 
detailed design phase began. The contractor’s design manager was keen to avoid 
changes to the façade during the detailed design phase in order to avoid increased 
costs as well as to avoid ‘coming across as a complete fool’ to the façade supplier.  
     While the contractor expected the building process to structure the design process, 
this didn’t happen. While the architects and engineers may rhetorically have agreed to 
work towards the goal of producing a fully coordinated main design project, the 
architects continued to propose improvements to the layout of the building that would 
improve the flow. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the engineers openly stated that 
they wouldn’t guarantee a fully coordinated project at the end of the detailed design 
phase.       
     Furthermore, at the beginning of the detailed design phase the architects and 
engineers had only handed-in a preliminary design project that was formally planned 
to be around 50% complete. The 50% complete mark corresponded with the 
normative linear phase model; the project team’s shared understanding of what 
constituted the preliminary design project; and, what had been stated in the service 
specifications and collaboration agreement. Therefore, in order for the architects and 
engineers to complete the main design project to the quality the owner had required, 
they needed and had to be able to continue pursuing architectural quality integrated 
with the engineering disciplines, for example, mechanical design. Therefore, the 
architects and engineers, while expecting the contractor to dominate the project, 
needed an integrating constellation of institutions to work towards satisfying the 
institutions that they, the architect and engineer, adhered to respectively, (e.g. 
continuously improve functionality, aesthetic concepts, structural design, floor 
layouts, indoor climate etc.). In other words, the architects and engineers were 
dependent on integration among institutions in order to satisfy the institutions that the 
architect and engineer were respectively perceived to normatively represent in the 
project. 
 
The competing understandings are interpreted to represent a conflict because 
satisfying the understanding that changes are legitimate and the understanding that 
changes are not legitimate at the same time wasn’t possible. In other words, the 
fragmentation of institutions during the basic design phase postponed project 
integration until the detailed design phase and unintended turned competing 
institutions into conflicting institutions. 
     As a result, the detailed design phase was characterized as competition that 
developed into an unsettled conflict between on the one hand, the need to integrate 
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multiple institutions to maintain the institution of quality and on the other hand, 
structuring the design process according to the construction process to pursue an 
efficient building process.  
While peaceful co-existence and fragmentation characterized the basic design phase, a 
conflict among institutions arose during the detailed design phase. The gradual 
fragmentation of institutions during the basic design phase resulted in lack of 
coordination during the basic design phase and increased the urgency to integrate 
institutions during the detailed design phase. Because fragmentation was disguised as 
peaceful co-existence, the project team effectively postponed integration of all the 
institutions in the project. As a result, integration became even more required and 
urgent during the detailed design phase. As a result, when the project entered the 
detailed design phase, the constellation of institutions changed more or less instantly 
from peaceful co-existence to conflict and competition.  
 
The unsettled conflict between integrating all the institutions in the project and 
making a particular institution (i.e. efficiency of the build) dominate, caused the 
detailed design process to drag-on, stall and re-circuit respectively. The process 
became what one sub-contract manager referred to as a ‘gothic knot’ – a process with 
no beginning or end.  
     The following vignette from a project meeting illustrates that multiple institutions 
imposed conflicting demands on the project and formed a ‘gothic knot’: 
 
The owner’s advisor representative lists a number of points from the meeting 
agenda. He says there are major problems with the meeting rooms placed 
along the façade and that the project team would like to recommend to the 
clients, that the meeting rooms are moved 1 meter away from the façade into 
the building. The client’s project manager asks if the meeting rooms will be 
made longer. The owner’s advisor representative says ‘no’, the meeting rooms 
are just shifted further in. The client’s project manager suggests that a drywall 
is built between the meeting rooms and the façade – a proposal the engineers 
made at a previous meeting and had rejected. The group starts laughing and 
points at the engineer’s representative. Someone pulls out a drawing and 
points out, that this proposal was originally the interior designers’ proposal 6 
month earlier. The client’s project manager asks if it will ever be possible to 
have meeting rooms along the façade. The architect’s design manager says it 
is possible only if cooling is installed. The room falls silent. The client’s 
project manager says it is going to be bloody difficult to present to the client’s 
peers, that they can’t use the space along the façade. The owner’s 
representative asks if it can be drawn up in a larger format… the client’s 
representatives cuts him off because they also think it looks ridiculous with 
that 1 meter space. The client’s representative continues to add arguments for 
why shifting the meeting rooms is not a good solution. One of the client’s 
representative suggest that they install cooling, but the owner’s representative 
points out, that it will cost time and money. The engineer’s project manager 
stresses that cooling is technically possible, but that it definitely will cost time 
and money. The client’s project manager says they have to involve their 
organization in order to make a solution. The owner’s advisor representative 
makes a quick closing remark and moves on to the next item on the agenda. 
[Project meeting, detailed design phase, project 1] 
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The vignette illustrates that the project team was unable to decide on the location of 
the meeting rooms because the particular solution they were discussing (meeting 
rooms located 1 meter from the façade) didn’t satisfy all the institutions represented in 
the project. The proposed solution resulted in the required indoor temperatures and 
thus fulfilled functionality, however, the proposal ‘looks weird’ and didn’t fulfill the 
institution of quality understood as aesthetics. Similarly, moving the meeting rooms to 
the façade would have compromised the indoor temperatures. Additional mechanical 
cooling could have compensated for the higher indoor temperatures, but would have 
increased project costs and thus didn’t satisfy the understanding that project cost 
savings should be pursued. Since none of the project team members called any of the 
institutions into questions (e.g. by crying down any of the suggestions), the project 
team members are interpreted to have accepted the importance of all the institutions. 
Since the project team was unable to satisfy all institutions, the client wanted to 
involve upper management to, implicitly, decide on the institutional order on this 
particular part of the building. As a result, and short of finding a solution, the project 
team could only postpone the issue of locating the meeting rooms. 
     While project members were able to perceive the inefficiency of the process, they 
developed simplified normative explanations for the inefficiency: the architects were 
frustrated with the lack of time to complete the project and lack of access to suppliers; 
the engineers were frustrated with the lack of owner’s decisions and unfinished 
architectural design; and, the contractor was frustrated with the architects for 
continuously modifying design solutions. The contractor’s design and project 
managers described the other project members as disloyal, disrespectful and 
incompetent or simply, as one of the contractor’s design manager put, it ‘not 
understanding how the process was supposed to be’. 
     However, the engineers did understand the contractor’s need to structure the 
detailed design phase according to the building process. During one design meeting 
when the contractor’s design manager’s rhetoric towards the architects and engineers 
had been particularly firm and insisting on meeting the deadline for the main design 
project, the engineer’s project manager exclaimed ‘We get it! The problem is, the 
project keeps changing!’ On the other hand, the architects, while perhaps 
understanding the contractor’s reasoning, continued to battle for improved project 
quality, as illustrated by a previous quote, even if it meant changing the project.  
 
Conflict II: access to information vs. competitive purchases 
Apart from being unable to develop a shared understanding of how to structure the 
design process during the detailed design phase, the project team developed another 
conflict between, on the one hand, gaining access to information in order to finish the 
detailed design work, and on the other hand, pursuing competitive purchases from 
sub-contractors and suppliers. 
The understandings of pursuing short-term gains, value-chain and the phase model are 
interpreted to have supported the understanding that detailed design and construction 
planning was not supposed to occur until the detailed design phase transitioned into 
the building phase. While the architects initiated inviting the façade supplier to the 
project during the basic design phase and the contractor agreed to collaborate, the 
contractor did not engage other sub-constructors or suppliers until the end of the 
detailed design phase just in time for construction. In other words, the contractor did 
not adhere to the understanding that the sub-contractors and suppliers were able to 
facilitate design development and coordination of the project. However, one 
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exception includes the contractor engaging the concrete element supplier during the 
detailed design phase and asking them to do the optimization of that particular 
building system. In other words, the contractor understood that they were not 
competent to challenge the design without accurate product and manufacturing 
information provided by the sub-contractors and suppliers. Despite this insight, the 
contractor adhered to the norm of tendering the individual building systems, including 
the concrete elements, to a number of sub-contractors and suppliers in order to get 
competitive pricing. Because the suppliers and sub-contractor’s offers were only valid 
for a limited period of time due to market fluctuations and the contractor pursuing as 
accurate a price as possible with a minimum of contingencies, the contractor waited 
as long as possible to engage the sub-contractors and suppliers. In other words, there 
was a conflict between the understanding that increasing quality required gaining 
access to supplier and sub-contractor information early on in the design phase and the 
understanding and norm for pursuing of short-term economic purchases.  
 
Temporary blending: inherent sympathy among organizations 
Alongside the conflicting and competing institutions, institutions also temporarily 
merged or blended. As described previously, as professional narratives developed, the 
contractor and engineer shared the understanding that freezing the project was 
essential to the contractor in order to provide a final project cost and to the engineer in 
order to finish the engineering design. Similarly, around the time the contractor 
developed the narrative of the architects as the bad guys, a normative sympathy 
among the engineers and contractor was interpreted to have developed (i.e. the 
engineers being the good guys). The perception of the engineers as the good guys 
lulled the contractor to trust that the engineers would deliver coordinated design work 
in time for construction. Nevertheless, and despite project team members referring to 
the project as a ‘slippery eel’ that would escape their hands as soon as they felt they 
got hold of it, the lack of coordination of the engineers’ main design project was 
interpreted to be a surprise to the project team. The following vignette illustrates the 
build up to the surprise (adapted and modified from Urup & Koch (2014)):  
 
During a project meeting in January 2014, the engineer claimed to have 
worked throughout the design process on the indoor climate of the building 
but had struggled to come up with an adequate ventilation solution for many 
of the areas in the building because there were so many uncertainties, 
including floor layouts. Over the following weeks alternative cooling systems, 
new façade configurations, and window blinds were introduced. It was also 
suggested to the client that the meeting rooms were moved away from the 
façades. Another week would pass before the client would return with what 
everyone else expected to be a decision as to where the meetings room were to 
be located. Instead the client showed up empty-handed and started the 
discussion about potential solutions to the indoor climate all over again. This 
issue was repeated on several occasions. Finally in February 2014, the 
owner’s advisor asked the engineers to present the results of the latest indoor 
climate simulations. During the presentation it became clear that the indoor 
climate was unable to fulfill code recommendations, which was unacceptable 
to the client. The following week, during a project meeting, the client 
expressed critical concern with the poor indoor climate. The engineers 
responded by saying that they had written a formal notice in October 2013, 
raising concerns with the indoor climate themselves. From the lack of 
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response and quiet mumbling around the table, it appeared nobody had paid 
much attention to this notice at the time. At the meeting another long 
discussion about potential solutions to the indoor climate took place. The 
contractor expressed concern with alternative cooling methods due to cost, 
but had hesitated to say so because they were in the process of compiling a 
formal letter listing all the issues that may cause cost overruns. The owner 
didn’t say much. The client expressed great frustration and disappointment 
with how the entire team had let the indoor climate slide. No one else said 
much.  
     Finally, by early March 2014, when the entire detailed design project was 
due to be completed within three weeks it became clear to everyone that it 
wasn’t going to be. The concrete structures, the façades, the layout of the floor 
plans, the water and sewer design; none of it was completed or coordinated. 
Interestingly, the collective reaction in the project team was interpreted to be 
one of great surprise, shock and disappointment with the engineering team. 
Suddenly, the contractor’s project manager started referring to the engineers 
as incompetent and having underestimated the complexity of the project.  
 
The vignette illustrates that the engineers adhered to formal communication methods 
(i.e. writing a notice), formal organizational hierarchies and the value-chain by 
passively awaiting the remaining project team members to use the information 
contained in the notice and make a decision upon which the engineer could base their 
work. While the project team members understood that they should have read the 
notice (given the lack of explicit response), the team members were interpreted to 
have ignore the notice due to: lack of respect of the engineers; because the project 
team had underestimated the complexity of the task of designing the building; the 
project team understood the project to be continuously changing; and, the contractor 
having faith in the engineers’ ability to resolve the indoor climate issue regardless of 
the other design changes. 
     Furthermore, but concerning the structural design, the contractor had maintained 
the sanctions against the engineers in the case of late final design project hand-in. 
This was contrary to the contractor waiving the sanctions against the architects in 
regards to a late hand-in of the main design project. The sanctions against the 
engineers were interpreted to have been maintained without much reflection, because 
the contractor generally had good faith in the engineering team and trusted the 
engineers would meet the deadline and provide a design project of sufficient quality 
to be built. However, the sanction on the engineers meant that they increasingly 
focused on protecting their own work in order to meet the deadline rather than sharing 
their work in order to improve the overall project. For example, the engineers did not, 
despite having contractually agreed to, upload their BIM model every two weeks for 
fear of the contractor requiring changes that would jeopardize meeting their deadline. 
This conflicted with the contractor’s wish to thoroughly review the project in order to 
prepare for construction, however, the contractor did not perceive the problem or 
challenge the engineers not uploading their BIM model. In other words, the normative 
sympathy between the contractor and the engineers is interpreted to have created a 
blind spot that prevented the project team from critically accessing if the project was 
being coordinated and progressing.    
 
Fragmentation: diverging understanding of deadlines and deliverables  
The project team did not only experience conflict arising from different normative 
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understandings of how to structure the detailed design phase, conflict also arose from 
gradually fragmenting understandings of what the main design project deadline and 
the deliverables entailed. While, as previously mentioned, the project team developed 
the understanding that extending the deadline for the main design project was 
necessary to continue collaboration, increase project quality and allocate design 
responsibility, there was not a shared understanding that it was legitimate and right. 
     To elaborate, along with the linear phase model came two major deadlines: the 
hand-in of the preliminary design project at the end of the basic design phase; and the 
hand-in of the main design project at the end of the detailed design phase.  
     With the deadlines came different understandings of what was supposed to be 
handed-in. According to the architect’s design manager the design was supposed to be 
50% complete for the preliminary design project at the end of the basic design phase. 
However, the project team had no method and made no efforts to quantify the 
progress of the design project. Instead, at the transition from basic to detailed design 
phase, the contractor conducted a project review in order to determine what areas 
needed the most work in time for construction. In other words, the norm to adapt to 
circumstances and collaborate dominated over adhering to formal structure, which 
was interpreted to have caused no ambiguity in the project team.  
     However, the formal structure became, to some actors, increasingly important 
during the detailed design phase where the contractor’s self-perform contract 
managers were not expecting, but requesting, a design project sufficiently coordinated 
and detailed for construction. However, according to the contractor’s design manager 
and self-perform contract managers they had never received a fully coordinated 
project and therefore they didn’t expect a fully constructible design project. For 
example, the contractor’s design manager explicitly expected and accepted that the 
main design project would be lacking coordination and expressed sympathy towards 
the architects and engineers due to the on-going changes they had to integrate in the 
project.  
     Similarly, towards the end of the detailed design phase the engineer’s project 
manager began regularly stating, without apology, that he would not guarantee a 
‘comprehensive’ main project in time for the deadline, but that he would guarantee 
that something was released. This did not seem to provoke or concern one of the 
contractor’s design managers. When interviewed, he explained that he was expecting 
the design project to be unfinished and expressed faith in the construction team being 
able to proceed as planned with the project in its current state. He emphasized the 
importance of respecting the design process of the architect and engineer and 
understood the design phase to extend into the building phase to an unspecified point 
in time. The other contractor’s design manager, on the other hand, was furious. He 
explained that the contractor had hired the consultants to deliver a fully coordinated 
and constructible design project and that a late hand-in and uncoordinated design 
project was unacceptable. He repeatedly referred to the architect and engineer’s lack 
of professionalism by not respecting or understanding that they were hired by the 
contractor to produce a design project ready for construction.  
     In other words, there was a conflict between, on the one hand, the understanding, 
that handing in a not fully coordinated main project was acceptable, and on the other 
hand, that the main design project should indeed be a fully coordinated and detailed 
project ready for construction.  
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Early Building phase 
 
Decoupling and gradual domination: The build begins and progresses 
regardless 
Towards the end of the detailed design phase, two-three months before construction 
began, the contractor began negotiating with and hiring the respective sub-contractors 
and suppliers. During this period the contractor’s project managers also began 
conducting internal project coordination meetings. Despite the increasing awareness 
that the main design project was not going to be as completed or coordinated as the 
project team had formally agreed, the contractor’s building team gradually started 
preparing themselves for the construction process to begin. The contractor’s site 
manager began blocking off the nearby bike paths, fencing the site, and building 
access roads for the delivery trucks. The project managers brought in the trailers for 
the onsite project office and had the trailers re-decorated with new paint and flooring. 
The project manager in charge of the organization began gradually assigning sub-
contractor managers to the project and they spent the last three months leading up to 
the construction phase reviewing the project for orientation purposes. The project 
manager also assigned two process managers that began producing a detailed 
construction schedule. In the weeks leading up to construction start the one process 
manager started conducting work meetings with the self-perform sub-contract 
managers. Several of the self-perform sub-contractor managers complained over the 
poor level of detail of the design project they had received in the weeks leading up to 
the release of the main design project and explicitly suggested to the project manager 
that the construction start date be postponed until the designers had produced a more 
detailed main design project. During a so called ‘start-up meeting’ one sub-contractor 
exclaimed ‘then they [the consultant] will learn once and for all.’ During interviews, 
the sub-contractors also independently agreed, that the quality of the design project 
was, after all, better than most projects. However, the civil work contractor explained 
how components in the sewer project had yet to be sized preventing him from 
ordering the materials needed. Also, the sewer project had not been coordinated with 
the structural project and in several places the sewer pipes collided incorrectly with 
the foundation. Nevertheless, the coordination and process meetings continued and 
the contractor’s process manager delegated tasks and responsibilities to the 
contractor’s project team members. 
     It was never clearly stated that the construction process couldn’t be postponed, yet 
the construction process began as planned on April 1st, 2014. Despite the poor quality 
of the sewer project that the engineers had produced, the civil works began. The civil 
sub-contract manager arranged ad hoc meetings with the engineers and asked that a 
particular engineer, whom he knew from previous projects, reviewed and helped size 
the project.  
 
Once the building process began it didn’t stall. There were sporadic delays along the 
way and the process manager referred to the building process as ‘rather chaotic’. He 
also explained that overall the build progressed according to the schedule, which was 
reviewed and modified continuously. Even when the roof for the atrium had to be re-
engineered, the contractor put their legal department in charge of dealing with the 
lawsuit against the architects and engineers. As a result, the lawsuit was a process 
parallel to that of the construction process. While the building process was affected by 
the delays that resulted from having to re-engineer the steel members for the roof, the 
contractor’s design team and the architects and engineers were able to continue to 
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collaborate in order to finalize the remaining design project.  
     The efforts made towards isolating the particular conflict, extract it from the 
project and deal with it in parallel to the construction process, the determination to 
begin and progress the build regardless of the state of the design project, and the 
decoupling between the project team and the contractor’s building team, are 
interpreted to be the main mechanisms that enabled the building process to progress. 
And, as a result, the build gradually came to dominate the constellation of institutions. 
 
Once the building phase began the understanding to progress the build regardless 
became sufficiently established or legitimate to be able to dominate the constellation 
of institutions. Once the construction phase began the other organizations were 
interpreted to have accepted and adapted to the domination of the build.   
     For example, the architects gradually withdrew from participating in the project 
and design meetings during the building phase, as they perceived themselves to be 
without influence any longer. Similarly to when the contractor withdrew from the 
design meetings during the basic design phase, the architect’s withdrawal was left 
uncontested by the remaining organizations. The contractor was interpreted to, at first, 
have developed the understanding that this was a relief to the contractor since no 
more new ideas would be introduced to the project and the contractor would be able 
to act increasingly autonomously (e.g. purchase materials that they perceived to be of 
satisfactory quality and cost, without having to negotiate with the architects).     
     However, it was not a complete domination because the contractor did make some 
efforts to include the architects and engineers in project and design meetings, in order 
to continuously ensure the quality of the project and avoid legal responsibility for the 
design project. 
     For example, the contractor’s design manager continued to expect and pay the 
architects and engineers to actively participate in resolving design issues. Or, as in the 
case of the smoke ventilation, the continued collaboration between the contractor and 
the engineer enabled the project team to apply for dispensation with the permitting 
authorities, when they were unable to design a solution that fulfilled the building code 
requirements. And, equally important, by including the architects and engineers the 
contractor maintained legitimacy with the owner for allowing the representation of the 
remaining institutions that the owner perceived to be of value. Maintaining legitimacy 
with the owner was important to the contractor, because the contractor needed to 
negotiate extra costs and extension of the building schedule with the owner. Apart 
from the 100 mio. Dkr. that the project cost had increased by during the design 
process, the building further increased by another 100 mio. Dkr. during the building 
process. To avoid fee erosion the contractor was dependent on maintaining a good 
relationship with the owner in order to ease the negotiation as to who was responsible 
for the increased project cost. Similarly, the contractor had to negotiate to extend the 
schedule by 6-8 weeks on top of the 3 months that the building schedule had already 
been extended.  
     Also, one year before scheduled completion of the build the architect’s design 
manager resumed participation in the project meetings. This was partly encouraged by 
the owner and contractor, who wanted to continue to collaborate to resolve minor 
design issues, and partly because the architect wanted more influence. The architect’s 
design manager later expressed regret with having withdrawn previously. In other 
words, the architect regretted becoming subordinate to the domination of the build 
and resumed participation, not to challenge the build, but at least to be able to 
influence the build. 
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Partial integration: fulfilling most, but not all, project requirements 
Apart from domination and integration among multiple institutions some institutions 
remained fragmented during the building phase. An example of this is the how the 
contractor and engineering team continued to try and resolve the ventilation for the 
atrium throughout the detailed design phase. However, due to the lack of ability to 
integrate the mechanical design with the architectural and structural design, the 
engineers and contractors continued to try and resolve the mechanical design during 
the building phase and less than one year from project completion. While all other 
institutions became more or less integrated during the building phase, this particular 
area of the project remained fragmented. Short of being able to develop a solution that 
fulfilled code requirements, the project team began negotiating with the permitting 
authorities, if the requirement for smoke ventilation could be either altered or waived. 
In the end, the result may be the exclusion of a particular design solution (i.e. if the 
planning authorities waive the requirement for the smoke ventilation). 
 
Pre-cursors for project performance 
 
While the building has not been completed by the time this dissertation is written, 
early indicators of how the constellation of institutions manifest itself in the final 
building are starting to emerge. For example, once the building phase began, the 
façade was delivered and installed by the façade supplier in 4 months rather than 6 
months, to a very high quality and to the contract price. In other words, early 
collaboration between architect, sub-contractor, contractor, owner and engineers 
enabled an integration of institutions that manifested itself in the finished product: the 
façade is a high quality landmark fulfilling the owner’s requirement and the 
architect’s vision; the façade was installed without delays, re-work or cost overruns 
and thus satisfying the institutions of building efficiently and cost optimization; and 
last, but not least, only time will tell if the façade is able to create, combined with the 
mechanical systems, the indoor climate that the engineers strived for and the client 
required. 
 
Summary of constellations of institutions 
 
Project 1 is characterized by a constellation of institutions that gradually increase in 
complexity (i.e. multiple meanings, norms and rules requiring negotiation) over the 
course of the basic design phase and gradually decrease in complexity over the course 
of the building phase. The detailed design and early building phase are considered the 
most complex constellations of institutions where the largest number of actors 
adhering to multiple meanings, norms and rules interact. 
 
The constellation of institutions gradually mutated over the course of the project. 
During the project conception and programming the constellation is interpreted to 
have been integrated. The early design phase was interpreted to be characterized by 
peaceful co-existence, however, over the course of the basic design phase the 
constellation of institutions gradually and occasionally fragmented although the 
fragmentation was perceived by project team members as peaceful co-existence.  
During the basic design phase there were also episodes of occasional integration.  
Once the detailed design phase began the constellation of institutions was 
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Figure 3. The figure summarizes the development of institutions as well as the 
constellation of institutions over the course of project 1.  
characterized by conflict and competition among institutions. In particular, 
competition and conflict arose between the understanding to structure the design 
process according to the building process and the understanding that integration of 
institutions was required in order to increase project quality. Integration among 
institutions also occurred given that a relatively coordinated design project was 
developed after all. Temporary blending also occurred during the detailed design 
phase and resulted in temporary coordination, but resulted in sudden conflict when, 
for example, the mechanical engineering design was unable to fulfill thermal indoor 
climate requirements. During the building process the constellation of institutions 
gradually became dominated by the norm of the build, while remaining institutions 
became relatively subordinate. 
 
Over the course of the project the institutions in the constellation integrated 
(gradually, partially and occasionally), fragmented (gradually and occasionally), co-
existed peacefully, blended, competed, conflicted and dominated. 
     While conflict, peaceful co-existence, blending, competition and domination were 
defined theoretically in a previous chapter, integration is defined inductively and 
fragmentation is introduced and defined inductively. 
     Integration of a constellation of institutions is defined as multiple and distinct 
institutions all being satisfied through common action and effort. Importantly, 
integration doesn’t include blending of meanings, norms and rules. Rather, occasional 
integration resulted in the project team ensuring critical evaluation of work and 
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satisfaction of the different institutions in the constellation. Contrary, gradual 
integration posed the risk of institutions blending and the project team members not 
sufficiently critically assessing project work, threatening the coordination process. 
     Fragmentation of a constellation of institutions is defined as multiple and distinct 
institutions requiring increasingly divergent efforts to be satisfied, however, without 
conflict or competition. While fragmentation was perceived as peaceful co-existence 
fragmentation constrained the project teams ability to bring together the different 
work elements and thus coordinate the project. However, fragmentation also enabled 
the project team members to pursue a particular institution to allow for developing 
design ideas that satisfy a particular institution to the fullest. 
 
The analysis of project 1 showed that it is the lack of integration of institutions during 
the basic design phase that creates urgency for integration of institutions during the 
detailed design phase. However, during the detailed design phase the need for 
integration in order to increase project quality compete and eventually conflict with 
structuring the design process according to the building process to increase efficiency 
of the build. It is the lack of integration of institutions during the basic design phase 
and competition among institutions during the detailed design phase that constrains 
the project teams ability to produce a fully coordinated main design project. In the 
long run, the result of the lack of integration among institutions was redesign of the 
steel roof, lack of ability to fulfill smoke ventilation code requirements and potentially 
indoor thermal comfort requirements. 
     Integration among institutions during the design process and the decoupling and 
gradual domination of the build enabled the project team to construct a building that 
is interpreted to be on course to integrate multiple institutions, as illustrated for 
example, by the successful design, delivery and install of the façade system. The 
relatively ‘smooth’ construction process indicates that integration not only has 
occurred, but has characterized the project. In order to understand how mundane on-
going integration has occurred, as well as how for example, conflicts and 
fragmentation, occurred, the following section presents an analysis of institutional 
work interpreted to have been conducted in project 1. 
 
 
Interactions and efforts made towards coordinating 
project 1 
 
As mentioned previously, the project team, made more-or-less purposeful efforts to 
implement structures and enable interaction that were perceived to facilitate either 
integration or the domination of particular institutions. 
     The empirical material also showed that the organizations in the project team made 
purposeful efforts towards making the project teamwork towards certain goals. The 
following sections present an analysis of how the project team carried out (or didn’t 
carry out) institutional work to create, change or maintain institutions and 
constellations of institutions in order to enable project coordination. The following 
analysis also discusses the intended and unintended consequences of the institutional 
work. 
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The conception of the project  
 
In order to understand why the constellation of institutions developed as it did in 
project 1 the first step is to understand how the particular constellation of institutions 
for project 1 was initiated before and during project conception.  
First of all, the constellation was partly a result of normative conduct and taken-for-
granted assumptions about what was right in a design-build context. In the case of 
project 1, the owner and client initiated the project together. In determining the 
project setup, the owner, a professional property developer adhered to the taken-for-
granted norm of conducting an early programming phase and by planning the process 
according to the phases of early design, basic design, detailed design, building, and 
hand-off (standardized by the Danish Association of Architects).  
     Similarly, the owner invited three architects to participate in a competition early 
on. This is interpreted to be a normative practice that maintained the understanding 
that the architect was the key actor in shaping the project and that architectural quality 
was a priority. This legitimized the domination of the architect and the institutions 
that the architects were perceived to represent (e.g. phenomenological quality, 
functionality, and aesthetics). Furthermore, the owner sanctioned both the architects 
and engineers if they didn’t meet the respective project deadlines. This was also 
interpreted to be a normative conduct guiding the understanding that providing 
sufficient stick would keep the project on schedule.  
 
Secondly, other completed or on-going projects served as inspiration for institutional 
creation or as warnings of institutional disruption. The interviews and observations 
show that efforts were made with distinct references to at least five of the contractor’s 
previously completed or on-going projects. These projects were either used to 
illustrate what was considered best practice or worst practice in order to legitimize 
current efforts in project 1. For example, project 5 (presented in the next chapter) was 
often used as a reference on worst-practice. Specifically, in project 5 the contractor’s 
organization had not been sufficiently focused on keeping track of the gradually 
increasing project scope with the result that the contractor and owner were unable to 
negotiate and agree on the final project cost. As a result, two project managers had 
been assigned to project 1 – one who was responsible for managing the organization 
and one responsible for managing the development of the target cost relative to the 
project scope. Also, project 5 guided the owner’s understanding of what constituted 
design-build best practice as illuminated by the quote below: 
 
‘We were truly inspired by the process [in project 5] because we followed the 
entire project very, very closely, and considered if we should invest in it. And 
looking at the way the contractor handed-off that project, we said, ‘we will 
never do that!’. And that is how this project was born.’ [Owner’s 
representative]. 
 
Similarly, the architects, engineers and owner’s representatives would refer to 
completed building projects (such as iconic building around the world and buildings 
the project team members had visited, designed, built, worked or lived in themselves) 
when trying, for example to solve the indoor climate solutions. In other words, other 
projects served as institutional debris that project members drew on in order to justify 
and make dominant the understanding they adhered to. 
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Early design phase 
 
During the programming and conceptual design phase the owner and owner’s advisor 
consultant initiated several efforts towards disrupting the normative design-build 
process for the purpose of gaining access to accurate information and optimizing the 
cost and quality of the build. For example, the owner invited the contractor to 
participate in the basic design phase and also hired the engineers before even 
assigning the architects. Also, the owner established a joint project office where 
project team members could informally interact and have easy access to each other’s 
expertise. While these efforts seemed to be reflective and purposefully aimed at 
increasing interaction and the quality of the project, the owner also decided to divide 
the process into a number of phases that design-build projects normatively follow: 
programming, conceptual design, basic design and detailed design.  
     Once the architects and engineers had produced a conceptual design proposal, the 
owner and contractor were interpreted to have tried to create a new constellation by 
inviting the contractor to join the project team at the end of the early design phase. To 
ensure that the project cost and quality was optimized in conjunction, the owner and 
contractor set in motion institutional work that would ensure that actors adhered to a 
shared understanding of the project and made efforts towards a shared goal and thus 
enabled an integrated constellation of institutions: the early interviews and target cost 
are examples of this as mentioned previously. However, despite the owner’s 
awareness to make efforts to enable integration, the owner also adhered to some 
taken-for-granted norms (e.g. the linear phase model, negotiating a reduction of the 
target cost and sanctioning the hand-in of the design project and final building).  
     The efforts were interpreted to be more or less fragmented because they 
represented a combination of taken-for-granted project conduct and what was 
perceived by project team members, not necessarily as novel, but somewhat 
experimental. As described previously, the experiments were based on overcoming 
the problems experienced on previous projects. In other words, purposeful and 
reflective efforts towards creating a new institution in project 1 were not based on a 
holistic analysis of the constellation of institutions as it would develop over the course 
of the project, and therefore the efforts appeared as fragmented. 
     While no perceivable consequences of combining taken-for-granted structures and 
reflective experiments are interpreted to have arisen during the early design phase, 
mutations to the constellation of institutions started emerging during the basic design 
phase. 
 
 
Basic design phase 
 
During the basic design phase, the owner, architect and contractor carried out 
institutional work, for example, the architect suggested to the owner that the target 
cost be increased by 100 mio. DKr. and thereby intended to allow the contractor to 
focus on the quality of the project instead of attending to financial administration. 
Despite the owner dismissing the architect’s proposition, the architect’s efforts were 
interpreted to represent an attempt at coordinating understandings through 
perspective-taking. Also, during the basic design phase the owner and contractor were 
interpreted to have conducted institutional work when agreeing to letting the 
contractor participate in the basic design phase and disrupting the design-build norm 
of only the architect and engineers engaging in the basic design phase. These efforts 
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are interpreted to represent a successful increase of communication and shared 
understanding of the purpose of the project. 
 
Taken-for-granted institutional maintenance and gradual fragmentation 
Despite the owner’s intension to create integration among institutions during the basic 
design phase, the organizations were interpreted to mainly be concerned with 
maintaining the respective institutions they adhered to. While the organizations 
intended to maintain individual institutions they were not interpreted to have intended 
to constrain project coordination. In other words, maintaining individual institutions 
was not perceived by project team members to disrupt the integration of the 
constellation of institutions.  
     There were several reasons for that. For example, when negotiating the target cost, 
the owner, while otherwise intending to create an integrating constellation of 
institutions, diverted the contractor’s focus from contributing to creating an integrated 
project to guarding of the institution of cost reduction (i.e. guarding the target cost to 
be sure to get the design-build contract and later avoid fee erosion). 
     Furthermore, the constellation of institutions during the basic design phase was 
new in the sense that there was no norm for the contractor to participate in the basic 
design phase. While the architect, engineer and owner had a norm for collaboration 
during the basic design phase, the contractor did not. Therefore, the project team was 
interpreted to have had no taken-for-granted understanding of what early contractor 
participation might entail. The new constellation could have resulted in the 
organizations collectively reflecting and trying to purposefully create a new and 
particular institution. However, this did not happen. Instead, it was left up to the 
individual organizations to interpret and define new meaning, normative conduct and 
rules with the new collaboration form. The architects interpreted the early 
collaboration as an opportunity for multi-membership and access to cost and product 
information. This was similarly to the owner’s understanding. As a result the 
architects initiated for example, the engagement of the façade supplier. In other 
words, their interpretation and new meaning was to integrate the contractor’s 
competencies in the basic design phase.  
     While the contractor accepted to participate in the design meetings they, however, 
developed a different understanding of what participation in the basic design phase 
meant compared to at least the architect’s and owner’s understanding. The 
contractor’s design manager didn’t perceive it as valuable to actively engage in design 
meetings for as long as the architects were formally leading the process and as a 
result, withdrew from design meetings.  
     Instead, the contractor considered it their foremost responsibility to guard the 
target cost. The contractor’s project team, at this point, consisted of very senior 
project and design managers. While this in itself does not automatically lead to 
institutional maintenance, the point is, they had a well-established understanding of 
what the contractor’s role was during the detailed design phase, not the basic design 
phase. The contractor enacted institutional maintenance during the basic design phase 
in anticipation of the conflict that arose during the detailed design phase (i.e. delays to 
the main design project, lack of decisions, and late changes). Furthermore, since they 
did not consider the architects competent to lead the design process, they thought it 
legitimate to adhere to the institution of avoiding risk and only participate in project 
meetings. 
 
During the basic design phase, no collective awareness that leading the project was a 
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matter of leading many organizations developed. Nor was collective awareness or 
articulation of how the project team might maintain an integrated constellation 
interpreted to have occurred. As a result, the contactor and engineers increasingly 
maintained taken-for-granted institutions and reproduced existing patterns of 
interaction. Thus, the basic design phase became equivalent to a prolonged 
introductory phase for the contractor: a great opportunity to get familiarised with the 
project’s goals and the other participants. The consequence was an unintended 
fragmentation of the constellation of institutions. Therefore, unintended, the project 
team postponed integration until the detailed design phase and thus created increasing 
urgency and need for integration during the detailed design phase. While the owner 
had made efforts during the basic design phase to create an integrated design process, 
the basic design phase, became a mix of attempted change and unintended 
maintenance.  
 
Institutional integration initiated, but not maintained 
The gradually increasing institutional maintenance is also interpreted to be a result of 
the owner expecting the integrated constellation to automatically mutate itself towards 
integration as long as the initial efforts towards creating an integrating constellation of 
institutions were made. In other words, the owner’s representatives, when 
interviewed, were interpreted to not have reflected or foreseen that efforts had to be 
made towards maintaining integration of the constellation of institutions. Adhering to 
professional norm, the owner had appointed the architects to lead the project during 
the basic design phase and thereby sparked the shared understanding that the 
institutions represented by the architect were to dominate the basic design phase. The 
empirical material shows no indications that for example, formal organisational 
hierarchies were renegotiated; that the collaboration agreement was ever discussed or 
re-evaluated once signed; or that time and space was allocated to discuss and evaluate 
collaboration in the project team. Rather, tension arising from poor collaboration and 
conflicting understandings was perceived as an uncomfortable topic that project team 
members deliberately avoided. Therefore, unintended, taken-for-granted professional 
norms resulted in fragmentation due to lack of on-going maintenance of the integrated 
constellations of institutions.  
 
Detailed design phase 
Contractor’s efforts to dominate 
At the transition from basic design to detailed design the project team went from a 
new uncontested constellation of institutions to a well known one. Since the design-
build norm was interpreted to be for the contractor to lead the detailed design phase 
an array of understandings and norms suddenly guided the project team.  
     In the same way that the contractor had previously understood, accepted and 
enacted, and thereby also maintained, that the architect’s meaning of quality 
dominated, the contractor expected that the institutions they normatively represented 
(cost optimisation and the build) were to dominate the detailed design phase. The 
following quote illustrates this perception: 
 
‘I think we have neglected one thing. Back when we were awarded the 
contract and officially took over the detailed design management 
responsibility, we should have turned the whole thing around and made a new 
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structure and said: ‘Dear friends, now we are in charge. And in our world we 
manage the project in a different way’. Then we need to manage that the 
architects show up, have rehearsed, show up on time, bring along the correct 
material, and we know what they bring along, and that those things are 
presented and that something has been released in advance and that’s how we 
take charge of that process. That way we would be in charge of the design-
build delivery and present things in the order we need it in order to get the 
project approved [by the city’s permitting authorities]. …I think [the process] 
slid into the same organizational pattern that had been created by the owner 
prior to [the contractor] joining the project. …we were part of that for a long 
period of time. …well, we had to be a bit defensive, because we didn’t have a 
contract. The architects, engineers and owner’s advisor had a contract. We 
didn’t, we had only given a target cost and were working on creating a 
contract. But we were not in charge… the organizational chart…. You’re not 
in charge until you have signed a contract.’ [Contractor’s design manager]. 
 
The quote also illustrates a sense of failure: that something else should have been 
done to avoid the current situation characterised by delays and lack of coordination. 
As mentioned previously, the detailed design phase was characterised as a conflict 
between integration and domination and no collective, reflective and purposeful 
efforts were interpreted to have been made to resolve the conflict.  
     However, one attempt to resolve the conflict and integrate the constellation of 
institutions was the contractor hosting a joint BIM review. During the detailed design 
phase the contractor assigned a BIM-coordinator to the project. The BIM 
coordinator’s responsibility was perceived to include: coordination of the three 
different models; ensuring the constructability to the design project; and to ensure that 
the quality of the BIM model was adequate as per the ICT-agreement (Information 
and Communications Technology Agreement). As an extension of existing project 
reviews and design meetings, the contractor’s BIM coordinator and design manager 
conducted a BIM review session with the architect and engineers’ BIM coordinators. 
Prior to the meeting the contractor’s BIM coordinator ran a collision control based on 
a merged 3D model consisting of the individual models from each design discipline. 
The BIM coordinator then selected the most important collisions and used them as 
illustrations during the BIM review session.  
     Throughout the BIM review session, the contractor’s BIM coordinator and design 
manager used the list of collisions to emphasise how poor the quality of the design 
team’s BIM work was. In return, the architect’s BIM coordinator pointed out that the 
contractor’s time schedule was outdated and that the architects and engineers needed 
guidance from the contractor’s design managers on specifically what to work on and 
in which order, in order to meet the deadline for the final design project. In other 
words, the architects and engineers were expecting the contractor’s design managers 
to lead a collective design process. 
     The BIM review session was characterised by an atmosphere of degrading 
criticism, blame and mutual disappointment. The initiative to conduct a BIM review 
was an opportunity to bring the different project organizations together by creating a 
shared understanding of the goal with the model, the design process and the project. 
However, the BIM review ended up constraining coordination because the review was 
used to maintain and segregate individual institutions.  
 
Another on-going attempt at resolving the conflict was the contractor’s design 
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manager who gradually became increasingly firm in the rhetoric towards the architect 
and engineers in an attempt to make the other organizations understand, accept and 
adhere to the institution of building efficiently. He did so by stressing the importance 
of making the building process structure the detailed design process and the need for 
loyalty and respect towards the formal organizational hierarchy, the deadlines and the 
project freezes.  
     The contractor’s two design managers each perceived that they had only one tool 
each to try and settle the conflict: one emphasised the importance of collaborating by 
accepting the conflicts in the design process empathising with the work processes of 
the architects and engineers, and accepting that the detailed design process would 
drag on; the other emphasised the importance of rhetorically and continuously 
reminding the architects and engineers that they were contractually hired by the 
contractor and thus, from his viewpoint, obliged to adhere to the interests of the 
contractor’s organization.  
 
Mundane & Collective efforts towards integration: Satisfying multiple 
institutions through common effort  
While the conflicts, competition, fragmentation and occasional integration often were 
more perceivable during the empirical observations, the observations and interviews 
illustrate that on-going integration also occurred during the detailed design phase. 
     One example of on-going integration concerns the issuing of the building permit 
for the project. To elaborate, during the design process, the city’s master plan for the 
area was under development and the project was a landmark for the local area. 
Originally, during project conception, when the owner started negotiating with the 
city to purchase the land for the project, the city was involved in deciding on the 
winning proposal from the architects’ competition in the early design phase. 
Nevertheless, during the detailed design phase the city wouldn’t approve the design. 
According to the architects the city had changed their requirements. According to the 
contractor, the architects hadn’t respected the requirements laid out in the master plan. 
The building permit for project 1 depended on the parties reaching an agreement, and 
as result the master plan and the building developed in mutual negotiation during the 
basic design phase. 
     The owner and the architect headed the negotiations with the city jointly. The 
contractor’s design manager deliberately decided to not get involved in the 
negotiation meetings with the city during the basic design phase to avoid being held 
responsible for problems related to the city issuing the building permit.  
     However, the contractor’s project manager was continuously communicating with 
the city’s permitting authorities in order to ensure that the building permit would be 
issued and the building process could progress as scheduled. The following quote 
illustrates the on-going and mundane efforts made towards coordinating the project: 
 
‘The city’s permitting authorities receives seven copies of the building 
application… [one for each of the departments that need to approve the permit 
application]. It is the Centre of Building that is responsible for gathering all 
the approvals and issuing the main building permit. At the Centre of Building, 
there is a particular person, whom I have been continuously communicating 
with to ensure, that nothing is lagging in their system.’  
[Contractor’s project manager] 
 
However, not only the contractor’s project manager made efforts to coordinate the 
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design work and the expectations and procedures of the city permitting authorities. 
The following field notes from a project meeting illustrate that while some actors 
adhered to formal structure, other actors, for example the city, were perceived to 
typically compromise formal regulations and procedures to coordinate the project: 
 
The engineer’s project manager says that the client needs to decide what type 
of security system they want on each door. It is a matter of fire safety. The 
engineers’ project manager refers to a notice, where the engineers’ 
recommendation is clearly stated. The owner’s representative asks if it has 
been passed on to the client. The engineer’s project manager says nothing gets 
sent directly to the client and that everything has to pass through the owner’s 
advisor. The owner’s advisor asks if there are other things pertaining to the 
permitting authorities. Someone says that the requirement to hand-in 
structural calculations before the issuing of the building permit cannot be met. 
Someone says everybody knows this, including the city’s permitting agency. 
The engineers’ project manager says that the permitting authorities can 
decide to enforce certain requirements that will stall the design and building 
process. ‘But that is exactly why the city won’t enforce the requirements’, says 
the contractor’s design manager. [Project meeting during detailed design 
phase]. 
 
Despite the implied adaptive capacity of the city, the ongoing negotiations with the 
city resulted in uncertainty about the geometry of the building and the opening in the 
façade and the project team was unable to freeze the design. In other words, the lack 
of coordination between the city, owner and architect constrained the efficiency of the 
building process and the possibility to optimize project cost and quality. 
     During the detailed design phase, as the building process approached, the 
contractor’s design manager decided to get involved and started participating in the 
meetings with the city, owner and the architect in an attempt to negotiate a 
compromise and enable the issuing of a building permit. In the end, a building permit 
was issued a few weeks before the construction start date. 
 
Maintenance when change is expected: Leadership confusion & paralysis 
The project organization had developed norms that had become taken-for-granted 
during the basic design phase that they carried over to the detailed design phase. For 
example, the project team continued to conduct the same meetings, on the same 
weekday, the project team was still located at the joint project office, and perhaps 
most noteworthy, the owner’s advisor continued to run the meetings. In other words, 
while the transition from basic design to detailed design marked an organisational 
change, normative conduct changed relatively little. However, there was a joint 
expectation within the project team, that the contractor would somehow initiate or 
exercise leadership. The following quote illustrates the confusion concerning 
leadership: 
 
‘But we also have to remember that MT Højgaard are actually also design 
manager. I’m not entirely sure what it is, they are design manager of, well, 
which… …what is their area of responsibility and what is the responsibility of 
the owner’s advisor consultant, because right now, it appears to me that there 
is joint design management, which is impossible in my opinion. You can only 
have one design manager, you cannot share such a responsibility.’ [Project 
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manager, structural engineering]. 
 
During the transition from detailed design to building process, there was no formal 
shift in leadership, nor was a clear establishing of leadership perceivable. And, 
because the architects and engineers expected the contractor to lead the project during 
the detailed design phase, they too did not conduct institutional leadership to change 
the constellation of institutions. As a result, institutional management became even 
more prevailing during the detailed design phase than it had been previously.  
 
Similarly, the contractor had assigned two project managers to the project interpreted 
to represent the institutions the contractor perceived to be most important: 
collaboration and cost. Specifically, one project manager was understood to be 
responsible for managing the contractor’s organization (including for example 
assigning and coordinating sub-contract managers, administrative staff and more); 
and the other project manager was understood to be responsible for managing the 
project cost (including updating project costs and tracking extra project costs). In 
other words, the contractor considered their project managers to be responsible for 
managing the contractor’s organization only. The contractor’s project managers did 
not perceive their responsibility to concern coordinating the social elements of the 
project, including critically reflecting on the meanings, norms and rules that they 
themselves, and other project team members, adhered to.  
  
Also, conflicting understandings of what the shared goal for the project team was 
supposed to be created ambiguity for the contractor’s project and design managers: on 
the one hand, continuous changes to the project was accepted because there was a 
taken-for-granted perception that late changes were simply unavoidable and because 
they increased the scope of the work and therefore increased their contract sum; on 
the other hand, there was a perception that the project had to be frozen in order to 
prepare for as efficient a building process as possible. The lack of shared 
understanding among the contractor’s project and design managers constrained the 
contractor from making unified efforts towards changing the constellation of 
institutions.  
 
The building phase 
 
When the project entered the building phase the constellation of institutions changed 
and the contractor and the institution of building efficiently became legitimately 
dominant, as described previously. The empirical material indicates, that no 
purposeful or dramatic action was involved in this change rather the change was 
interpreted to be a taken-for-granted change that all the project members expected, 
understood and enacted. As described previously, the contractor, despite the design 
process being a ‘slippery eel’ started preparing for the build as scheduled and 
conducted adaptive capacity by working with the design material available to them.  
     On the one hand, the contractor made an effort to create a coupling between the 
design process and the building process by continuing the collaboration with the 
architects and engineers throughout the building process. On the other hand, the 
beginning of the building phase also meant the contractor building up a new 
organization: the seven project, design, sub-contractor managers and BIM coordinator 
that had participated during the detailed design phase, now increased to around 40 
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people, excluding the workmen, in a matter of weeks. The members of the new 
contractor organization hadn’t interacted with the design team during the design 
process. This decoupling allowed the contractor’s building team members to approach 
the project with, not purposeful determinism, but rather taken-for-granted expectation 
to start the build, relatively unaffected by the conflicts that had dominated the project 
organization during the detailed design phase. More specifically, the contractor’s 
building team picked up the design project in its current state, and rather than 
lingering over the reasons why it hadn’t been completed, went along with it and try to 
figure out how to build it. This was interpreted as reproduction of the norm. The 
owner, architect, engineer and city’s architect, who approved the project in time for 
construction, were also interpreted to accept the dominance of the build once the 
project approached the building phase.  
     However, as mentioned previously, the build did not replace the remaining 
institutions. For example, the contractor encouraged the architect to resume 
participation. Also, the contractor continued to rhetorically push the architects and 
engineers to finish their work. However, during the building phase references were 
made to the expenses associated with ‘stalling the cranes’ and delaying work crews 
and suppliers if the architects and engineers did not finish in time. Also, the sub-
contract managers would pressure the design team for what they most urgently 
needed to be able to carry out either closing the sub-contracts, enable the suppliers to 
begin production or enable work on site to progress.  
     The urgency that the materialization of the physical structure imposed on the 
project team members and the contractors’ ability to adapt their work processes to 
compensate for the lack of coordination of the design project enabled the building 
process to progress. The references made to the materialization of the structure and 
the purposeful efforts to continue collaboration are both interpreted to represent 
mundane efforts that ensured domination of the build and the existence of the 
institution of quality. 
     The domination of the institution of the build was interpreted to be a result of 
purposeful mundane efforts made towards making sure the project would meet the 
deadline and a taken-for-granted expectation by all project team members that they 
understood, accepted and enacted.  
 
Summary of institutional work in project 1 
 
In the early design and basic design phase institutional work aimed at creating a new 
constellation of institutions was conducted, but during the basic and detailed design 
phase, the organizations in the project team primarily exercised institutional 
maintenance. In particular, institutional maintenance was fuelled by: the early 
involvement of the contractor which disrupted the normative pattern of interaction 
and contractor’s lack of ability to adapt their understanding of their role in the new 
collaboration; ambiguity caused by different understandings of when and if design 
project coordination was important and right; diverging understandings of whether 
collaboration was a structural and interactive phenomenon; lack of communication; 
senior project managers and design mangers with taken-for-granted assumptions 
about project conduct; lack of mutual respect and lack of perspective-taking; 
adherence to segregating juridical regulations (e.g. the contractor’s design managers 
avoiding taking on design responsibility for fear of liability); and the understanding 
that leadership was a matter of distributing risk and reward appropriately rather than 
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how to coordinate social understandings, norms and rules. 
     Even opportunities that could have assisted in creating an integrated constellation 
of institutions, such as the BIM review, turned into an occasion for institutional 
maintenance resulting in further fragmentation of the institutions. 
     The lack of collective awareness, reflection, discussions and efforts to change the 
constellation of institutionalised norms, rules and meanings that each organization 
adhered to was a significant constraint on the project team’s ability to integrate the 
different institutions in the (design) project.  
 
Some purposeful efforts are interpreted to indeed have enabled coordination. In the 
case of for example the façade, successful multi-membership, purposive pursuing of 
integration and disrupting the understanding of a value-chain and pursing short-term 
economic gains enabled the design and installation of a façade that fulfilled multiple 
institutions. 
     The most important point concerning the project team’s efforts towards designing 
the façade is, that the organizations were able to maintain the meanings of multiple 
different institutions of phenomenological quality, aesthetics, functionality, cost 
optimisation, and efficiency of design and build process by creating new ways of 
interacting (e.g. early collaboration, multi-membership, and site-visits). 
 
Summary part 1 
 
The analysis of project 1 consisted of three levels of analysis that gradually built on 
each other: the outline of relatively stabilised meanings (and underpinning norms and 
rules) that developed in project 1; an analysis of the mutating relationships between 
these multiple institutions; and, an insight into the efforts that were made towards 
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions and/or the constellation of 
institutions. 
 
Institutions 
A number of structures that were more-or-less taken for granted and considered 
normative design-build practice are interpreted to have developed in project 1. Each 
structure was underpinned by a particular shared meaning, and potentially multiple 
norms and structures. Over the course of the project, eight institutions were 
interpreted to have developed and include: quality understood as phenomenology, 
functionality and aesthetics; collaboration as pragmatism and trust; collaboration as 
professionalism and loyalty; cost optimization; cost reduction; designing and building 
efficiently; leadership and management; and coordination.  
 
Constellation of institutions 
Building on the insights from the analysis of institutions, the second analysis showed 
that the relationships between these multiple institutions changed over the course of 
the project. In the early design phase an integrated constellation of institutions was 
intended (and possibly established), while the basic design phase was characterised by 
occasional integration and increasing institutional fragmentation perceived as 
peaceful co-existence. Integration of a constellation of institutions is defined as 
institutions remaining independent but all satisfied through common effort, while 
fragmentation refers to institutions drifting apart so that diverging efforts are required 
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to satisfy each institution. During the detailed design phase, the constellation of 
institutions was characterised by competition and conflict between; on the one hand, 
the need to continuously integrate institutions in order for the institutions represented 
by the architects and engineers (i.e. quality, functionality, and aesthetics) to be 
maintained in the project; and, on the other hand, the need to let the building process 
dominate and structure the design process in order for the contractor to increase the 
efficiency of the building process. The unsettled conflict was the main constraint on 
the project team’s ability to coordinate the project.  
     To elaborate, when the constellation of institutions was integrated, the design 
and/or build process progressed and the final product (e.g. the façade) satisfied 
(potentially) all the institutions in the project team. When institutions were integrated 
over a long period of time or perceived as being identical or mutually supportive, the 
design process progressed, however, it constrained the project members ability to 
critically assess each others work (ex. the contractor not assessing the work of the 
engineers) and the result was a design project of poor quality and rework and delays 
on site. Similarly, partial integration occurred when the project team was able to 
coordinate some of the institutions, while others remained un-integrated. As a result 
and despite integration between some institutions, the overall constellation remained 
fragmented, because not all institutions were able to integrate. The result was delays 
to the design and build processes and potentially the exclusion of a particular design 
solution (i.e. if the planning authorities waive the requirement for the smoke 
ventilation). 
     When institutions peacefully co-existed the design process progressed, however, 
peaceful co-existence disguised the increasing fragmentation and therefore created 
urgency for integration during the detailed design phase, indirectly fuelling the 
institutional conflict between integration and domination during the detailed design 
phase. When institutions competed and conflicted, as in the detailed design phase, the 
process dragged-on, stalled and re-circuited.  
 
During the building process the institution of the build gradually came to dominate 
the constellation of institutions and other institutions became subordinate and enabled 
the building process to progress. In the transition between detailed design phase and 
building phase, the decoupling of the design organization and the contractor’s 
building organization enabled the change in the constellation of institutions. While the 
contractor’s construction team had to exercise adaptive capacity in order to work with 
the uncompleted design material, gradually the build forced the remaining institutions 
to compromise or adapt. 
     While adaptive capacity may have enabled the project to progress, even the 
building process was not entirely stable as disruptions continued to occur partly due to 
the lack of coordination that had been developed during the design process (and partly 
due to lack of coordination during the building process). 
 
Institutional work 
The analysis of institutional work showed that the owner and architect exercised 
institutional work aimed at creating an integrated constellation of institutions during 
the early phases. However, institutional maintenance by the owner, architect, 
engineers and contractor gradually fragmented the constellation of institutions. 
During the detailed design phase, the organizations in the project team primarily 
exercised institutional maintenance. The empirical material shows that only a few 
attempts were made to change the constellation of institutions and that these were 
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made with the aim to make a particular institution dominate, not to integrate multiple 
institutions. No collective efforts were made to analyse, reflect upon or change the 
constellation of institutions after the early design phase.  
     While the early efforts towards creating a particular constellation of institutions 
were driven by the owner, by the time engineers and architects joined, the 
constellation had reached a level of complexity that enabled the constellation to 
mutate more or less without purposeful efforts. In other words, by the time the 
architects and engineers joined the project, during the basic design phase, the project 
team was interpreted to already have started to produce certain meanings, norms and 
rules that would guide (if not entirely predict) the course of the project. Once the 
constellation was initiated it started mutating according to more-or-less taken-for-
granted patterns during the design and build processes. Therefore, the lack of on-
going institutional work aimed at creating and subsequently maintaining an integrated 
constellation of institutions was a significant constraint on the project team’s ability to 
coordinate the project. 
     The most important enabler for project coordination was interpreted to be the 
project team members’ ability to: deviate from normative understandings of how to 
collaborate (i.e. the value-chain and segregated responsibilities) and formal structures 
intended to improve efficiency alone (i.e. the linear phase model); exercise multi-
membership; take the perspective of other organizations, while still being the 
stewards of a particular or multiple institutions. 
 
In summary, the constellation of institutions gradually mutated over the course of the 
project and project coordination was a result of institutional debris from previous 
projects; taken-for-granted understandings of what constituted a design-build project, 
normative understandings of roles, responsibilities, collaboration, coordination and 
leadership; and reflective efforts aimed at creating, disrupting, and/or making 
dominant existing institutions.  
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Part 2 
 
Analysis part 1 was aimed at understanding the relationships between multiple 
institutions and efforts made towards changing or maintaining the institutions and 
relationships between multiple institutions to understand the process or project 
coordination. The second part of the analysis concerns understanding how 
institutional processes affect project performance. A project’s performance is not 
defined as a snapshot in time, for example at the hand-off date, but rather interpreted 
as a project phase around the time of project hand-off and subsequent occupancy 
where the constellation of institutions temporarily stabilizes.  
First, the projects 2-6 are briefly and qualitatively described. Second, the analysis of 
what institutions and constellations of institutions developed on each project is 
presented. Third, each project’s performance is analyzed and discussed. Finally, a 
summary of projects 2-6 is presented. 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to present the full analysis of the 
institutional process of all the six projects in detail. Therefore, for each section of the 
analysis project 5 is emphasized to illustrate key points, while the remaining projects 
are summarized. The last section regarding project performance, however, includes a 
full discussion of each project’s performance. 
 
Descriptions, projects 2-6  
 
Projects 2-6 are briefly described in the two graphics below. Table 5 summaries 
quantitatively the main project characteristics. Figure 4, illustrates the timeline for 
each project in order to show the overlap between collaborating actors relative to the 
design and build phases. 
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Project 2 Office 32,000 850 1100 2011 
Project 3 Office 33,000 856 858 2011 
Project 4 Residential 23,000 206 238 2014 
Project 5 Office 20,000 698 841 2013 
Project 6 Office 5,000 66 72 2012 
Table 5. The table summarizes the basic characteristics of projects 2-6. 
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Figure 4. Summary of project timelines and timing and duration of actor involvement. 
27
Analysis/PC     ED/BD DD              B          COM/HO             FM
    PC         D  DD       B      COM/HO       FM
   24                9    3+3/1+5     26/29/32       -   24+          -    
-            6    1+5      22/24        -    -            -    
Owner 
Architect
Engineer 1
Engineer 2 
Contractor
Sub-contractors
Owner 
Architect
Engineer 1
Contractor
Sub-contractors
Residents
Project 3
Project 4
Duration, months
Duration, months
PC                ED/BD          DD               B              HO/COM        FM
PC          ED/BD       DD               B         COM/HO            FM
PD         BD       DD               B         COM/HO            FM
 -                       12        6+6/12          24/30/24       9  -               -
 -                12          6+3           24/26          -     -               -
 -             -           -               24              -     -                -
Owner 
Architect
Engineer 
Contractor
Sub-contractors
Owner 
Architect
Engineer 
Contractor
Sub-contractors
Owner 
Architect
Engineer 
Contractor
Sub-contractors
Project 2
Project 5
Project 6
Duration, months
Duration, months
Duration, months
Fulltime participation either by contract or necessity
Part-time or occational participation
Peripheral connection, no direct participation
PD, Project development - ED, Early design - BD, Basic design - DD, Detailed design - 
B, Build - COM, Commissioning - HO, Hand-off - FM, Facility management
	 111 
Project 2 concerns the design and build of a large office building for a public client 
and was characterized as a ‘typical’ design-build project by project members. The 
project was planned as an extension and replica of an existing building on site, that 
the architect and contractor had designed and built three years earlier. During the 
basic design phase the architect and engineer prepared a preliminary design project. 
Then, a two-month long negotiation period occurred, and eventually a design-build 
contract cost of 913 mio. kr. was established. The contractor entered the project team 
and hired the owner’s architect and engineering consultants for the detailed design 
phase. Over a period of six months the project team designed the project. However, 
due to underestimation of the complexity of the technical details, the detailed design 
phase was extended and the building phase postponed for another six months in order 
to coordinate the design project for construction. According to the architect, the 
detailed design work was on-going until the very end of the building phase. During 
the detailed design phase the project scope increased and the project cost increased by 
24% and in order to reduce project costs the project team made a formal agreement to 
purchase materials overseas and share the savings at a pre-agreed ratio or receive a 
bonus. Due to the increased scope of work, the project was extended with six months. 
However, the building phase was described as ‘uneventful’ by the contractor who was 
able to accelerate the building process and hand-off the project six months prior to the 
negotiated deadline. In the end, the contractor celebrated the project as a success, 
while the architect was frustrated and ambiguous with process and project. Both the 
owner and contractor agreed the process had been successful. However, after project 
hand-off, the owner expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the building 
materials and said ‘it looks bad’.  
 
Project 3 concerns the design and build of an office building for a private client and 
by project members described as a ‘sort of partnering project’. The project was 
originally initiated as a development project between the contractor and the owner. 
The contractor had purchased the site on which the owner wanted to locate their new 
head office. The owner conducted two years of analyses to define their project 
requirements. During this process, the owner selected a prominent architectural 
consultant based on previous collaboration and without competition. Together the 
owner and architect developed a basic design project which included a complex 
geometry and three atria. The building was also intended to meet low energy class 2 
as per the Danish building regulations. Three contractors were invited to bid on the 
project and in the end MTH was selected based on their shared perception of the 
collaborative design-build model that the owner envisioned. To enable the contractor 
to focus on project quality as well as cost the owner guaranteed the contractor a profit 
ratio of 0-9%. Furthermore, the project team operated with open-books (i.e. the 
contractor disclosing detailed project costs to the project team). Once the project had 
been awarded to the contractor a negotiation round was carried out in which the 
project target cost was reduced with almost 11%.  
     Once the target cost had been agreed the detailed design phase began and the 
contractor hired the owner’s architect and the contractor’s own in-house engineering 
consultants to prepare the main design project. No other engineering firm had been 
involved up until the detailed design phase began. During the detailed design phase 
many late uncoordinated cost reduction were made and on-going changes constrained 
the engineer’s ability to produce a coordinated main design project. As a result the 
design-build contract was delayed with four months, however, the contractor began 
the building process as originally planned without a signed design-build contract. The 
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detailed design phase was described as chaotic, with many late changes and urgency 
to complete design in time for construction. The building process, on the other hand, 
was described as smooth and collaborative. The project was scheduled for completion 
in September 2011, but due to a cloud burst in July 2011 the building interior suffered 
extensive water damage. As a result, a new completion date of December 2011 was 
negotiated. In December 2011 the owner was able to occupy the building while the 
contractor was still finishing the building. Once the building was occupied it turned 
out the mechanical system didn’t have the capacity to heat the building sufficiently 
and couldn’t meet the original energy performance target. Two years after project 
hand-off the contractor, mechanical and electrical sub-contractors and owner’s facility 
management were still in the process of trying to understand and solve the problems 
pertaining to the indoor climate. 
 
Project 4 concerns the design and build of a large apartment building for a private 
investor. The project was developed in collaboration with a prominent architect 
consultant who had won the projects by competition. Once the architect and owner 
had developed the basic design for the building a number of contractors were invited 
to bid on the project. MT Højgaard won the project and hired the owner’s consultants 
for the detailed design phase. While completing another building that was part of the 
same development, the contractor had gradually developed an understanding of the 
architect and engineering team and the project during the design process. The 
contractor did not establish a joint project office, and the architects were not hired for 
project inspections or invited to participate in project meetings during the building 
phase. The contractor’s project manager considered the design project to be of poor 
quality but nevertheless began construction as scheduled. The architects and engineers 
continued detailed design work during the building phase. The collaboration between 
in particular the architect and contractor was poor and characterized by verbal fights 
and deep frustration. During the building process rework was required on for 
example, steel beams, concrete slabs, balcony floors and interior paint. Furthermore, 
the façade sub-contractor went bankrupt during the project and the architect expressed 
deep frustration with the reduced quality of the materials the contractor purchased. In 
the end, the contractor’s profit ratio was 0%. Once the building was occupied it turned 
out, that the in-floor heating system was insufficient to cover heating demands and 
residents were dissatisfied with the poor quality of the interior finishes.  
 
Project 5 concerns the design and build of a large office building for a large private 
client and is characterized by a rough and problematic process and many conflicts 
among project participants. The project consisted of two office buildings: a four 
storey round building and a three storey trapezium shaped building, connected by an 
underground tunnel and sophisticated landscaping. By competition, the owner had 
awarded the project to a prominent architectural consultant and a large engineering 
consultant. Together the three had conducted a programming, early and basic design 
phase and in April 2011 contractors were invited to bid on the project. The bidding 
material consisted of a basic design project and a list of 3500 items that the 
consultants had estimated was included in the project. The contractor was given ten 
days to prepare a bid. This was the beginning of what one of the project managers 
referred to as ‘the avalanche of problems’. The contractor was awarded the project 
during the summer of 2011 and had intended to take over the owner’s consultants and 
start detailed design immediately after. However, due to a delay of the building 
process on another project, the contractor’s project and design management team did 
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not take over the owner’s consultants and start detailed design work until October 
2011. The detailed design was due to be handed-in in December 2011 and the owner 
had sanctioned late hand-in of the design project. The project team delivered a design 
project to the deadline but it was of very poor quality and detailed design work 
continued throughout the building process. Once the building process began the 
contractor established a project office on site, yet communication and collaboration 
among parties was poor. 
     During the early building process the owner and architect were adding scope to the 
project and the contractor and owner were unable to agree on project costs. This 
disagreement over payment of increased project costs and continuous design changes 
infused the project with conflict, yet the contractor was able to continue the building 
process. The building process was characterized by on-going negotiations between the 
parties, repeated rework on site and on site ad-hoc design development. At project 
hand-off the contractor was able to deliver a finished and coordinated building, while 
change orders for over 100 mio. Dkr. remained unsettled. In the aftermath of the 
project, the contractor and owner settled an agreement to cover just the project cost 
and the contractor sued the architectural consultant for numerous errors in the design 
project. However, the building is interpreted to have fulfilled project requirements and 
the building reflects integration of phenomenological quality, owner’s values, 
sustainability, landscaping, aesthetics and functionality. 
 
Project 6 concerns the design and build of a small office building for a private client. 
The project was an extension to an existing building on site and described as a repeat 
of the previous project. The architectural consultant and contractor in project 6 had 
also built the previous buildings on site. The basic design project had been developed 
by the architect alone and included a three storey rectangular building with both open 
and closed office space and standard materials and building solutions. 
     The contractor was awarded the contract and hired the owner’s consultants for the 
detailed design phase. In order to reduce design fees the contractor and architect 
agreed on a reduced scope for the main design project. It was referred to as ‘half a 
main design project’. In order to reduce project cost, the building layout was changed 
to open office space exclusively, automatic exterior solar shading was reduced to 
interior curtains, and features such as interior green walls were eliminated.   
Once the excavating of the building began it was discovered that the building was 
incorrectly located on the site plan and that excavating would protrude past the public 
pavement. The building was shifted back to stay just clear of the property easement. 
During the building process the contractor and owner conducted project meetings 
without the architects and no joint project office was established. In the end, the 
project was handed-off to the original deadline and the contractor made a satisfactory 
profit. The architect accepted the compromises made to the architectural quality and 
the owner and contractor agreed that there were no errors or deficiencies at project 
hand-off. Within a year of completion the building has had few minor warranty issues 
and the interior has been entirely rebuilt by the owner’s tenant.
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Institutions developed in projects 2-6  
 
From the interviews, it is interpreted that a number of institutions developed in 
projects 2-6. These institutions are presented below, using project 5 to illustrate 
extracts from the analysis that has been conducted for all five projects. It is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to present the full analysis of all five projects here, 
instead, the findings will be summarised across all five projects at the end of the 
section. 
 
Institutions in project 5 
 
Project 5 is interpreted to have developed the following institutions: cost reduction 
(i.e. pursuit of short-term economic gains); phenomenological quality, functionality 
and aesthetics; efficiency to build (i.e. urgency and determination to build); 
collaboration as professionalism, loyalty and respect (i.e. distinct professional roles, 
segregated goals and responsibilities, the linear phase model, and shifts in 
organizational leadership); and, collaboration as pragmatism and trust. 
 
The following quote describing the detailed design phase illustrates multiple 
institutions: 
 
‘….actually, I think the owner thought [not including the contractor in the 
design meetings] was to their advantage, because if they were able to add 
scope to the project without us noticing, it was free. And I have no doubt that 
is what they thought… and the owner wasn’t ready to finalise the project when 
we got the project [during the detailed design phase]. The owner was still 
developing their requirements. However, we had been given the job to finish 
the project from its current state and not develop it much further. But the 
owner was still developing and they would do that without us, so we wouldn’t 
be there to point out the extras and claim more time and money and so on. 
And the architects didn’t care, they just wanted to draw something that was 
better.’ [Contractor’s design manager]. 
 
First, the contractor’s design manager expressed the understanding that someone (in 
this case the owner) would attempt to incorporate solutions into the project that they 
would not have to pay for. This is interpreted to illustrate a taken-for-granted 
assumption, that project team members will pursue short-term economic gains, 
despite compromising trust, collaboration and coordination. 
     Secondly, the quote illustrates that the contractor perceived the purpose of the 
detailed design phase to be producing a coordinated main design project, by adhering 
to the norm of the linear phase model. To that, the contractor’s design manager 
expressed frustration with how the architects continued improving the design in order 
to pursue quality, aesthetics and functionality. 
     Third, the quote also illustrates that the contractor’s project manager had the 
perception that the project team had segregated interests and responsibilities. 
Specifically, the owner was developing ‘their’ requirements, the architects ‘just 
wanted… …something better’ and the contractor has been hired to finish the design 
and build the building and ‘not develop it [the project] much further’. 
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Furthermore, despite the delayed engagement of the contractor and the reduced time 
that the project team had to detail the main design project, the contractor began 
construction work as scheduled. Also, during the building phase disputes over 
additional project costs arose. Nevertheless, the contractor continued the build until 
the owner was able to occupy and manage the building. These two examples indicate 
that the urgency and determination to build was also developed in project 5. 
     The contractor’s proposal to establish a project office, waive the sanctions for the 
late hand-in of the main design project, the continued expectation that the owner and 
contractor would be able to settle the financial disputes, the continued building 
process and the owner’s final agreement to cover a portion of the additional project 
costs, illustrate that the understanding of collaboration as pragmatism and interaction 
was developed in the project team. 
 
Institutions in project 2-6 
 
Similar to project 5, multiple institutions developed in projects 2, 3, 4, and 6. Table 6 
summarises the institutions that developed in projects 2-6 respectively. 
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s &
 fu
nc
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na
lit
y Architect & 
engineer 
dominate 
preliminary 
design process. 
Architect, 
engineers 
and owner 
develop 
preliminary 
design 
proposal. 
Architect 
and owner 
develop 
preliminary 
design 
proposal. 
Architect, 
engineers 
and owner 
develop 
preliminary 
design 
proposal. 
Architect, 
engineers 
and owner 
develop 
preliminary 
design 
proposal. 
Architect 
and owner 
develop 
preliminary 
design 
proposal. 
Architect & 
engineer 
continue 
collaboration 
with contractor 
during the build. 
On-going 
collaboration 
among 
contractor 
and architect 
to develop 
design 
solutions. 
Decrease in 
collaboration 
during 
building 
phase, but 
on-going 
inspections. 
Continued 
collaboration 
during 
occupancy 
to resolve 
indoor 
climate. 
On-going 
collaboratio
n between 
contractor 
and owner. 
Ad hoc 
collabora-
tion between 
contractor 
and architect 
to solve 
problems. 
On-going 
collabora-
tion among 
contractor, 
architect 
and 
engineer to 
develop 
design 
solutions. 
Collaborati
on stops 
once the 
build 
begins. 
Su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y Green design. 
Public use of 
private space. 
LEED 
certification 
- Low energy 
consumption
.  
- Low energy 
consump-
tion, on-site 
water 
collection 
& 
treatment. 
Park area 
open to the 
public. 
- 
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t Compromise & 
interaction 
Architect 
compromise. 
Postpone-
ment of 
build. Joint 
project 
office to 
enable 
interaction. 
Mutual trust 
and respect 
among 
project 
managers. 
Build begins 
before 
contract is 
negotiated. 
Not 
developed. 
Architect 
and owner 
pragmatic 
about 
formal 
structure 
and 
deadlines. 
Contractor 
continues 
build 
despite 
conflicts 
and lack of 
payment. 
Architect 
and 
contractor 
informally 
agree to 
develop 
half a main 
project. 
Architect 
accepts 
compro-
mises to 
quality 
once build 
begins. 
Pr
of
es
si
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is
m
, l
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al
ty
 &
 re
sp
ec
t Adherence to 
formal structure. 
Segregated 
responsibilities. 
Value-chain. 
Contractor 
negotiate 
cost and 
time. 
Segregated 
responsibi-
lities. Value-
chain 
developed. 
Contractor 
dominated 
the detailed 
design phase 
and build. 
Joint 
responsibi-
lity 
underpinned 
by 
guaranteed 
profit to the 
contractor. 
Value-chain 
developed. 
Contractor 
act more-or-
less autono-
mously 
during 
building 
phase. 
Segregated 
responsibi-
lities. 
Value-chain 
developed. 
Contractor 
dominated 
the building 
phase. 
Contractor 
frustrated 
with 
architect 
and owner 
for lack of 
adherence 
to formal 
structure. 
Segregated 
responsibi-
lities. 
Value-chain 
developed. 
Segregated 
responsibi-
lities. 
Value-
chain 
developed. 
E
co
no
m
y 
C
os
t o
pt
im
iz
at
io
n Reducing 
project cost 
without 
compromising 
quality. 
- Reduced 
project cost 
by 11% 
while 
phenomeno-
logical 
quality and 
aesthetics 
was 
maintained 
Not 
developed. 
- - 
C
os
t r
ed
uc
tio
n Pursuit of short-
term economic 
gains. 
Formal 
incentives to 
pursue cheap 
purchases.  
Number of 
heat 
exchangers 
reduced 
which 
compromi-
sed indoor 
climate. 
Products 
and sub-
trades 
purchased 
based on 
lowest price. 
- Closed 
offices 
converted 
into open 
office 
space. 
Green walls 
eliminated.  
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y 
D
es
ig
ni
ng
 &
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
ef
fic
ie
nt
ly
 Urgency & 
determination of 
the build. 
No urgency 
developed. 
Acceleration 
of building 
phase to 
catch up 6 
months. 
Build began 
despite lack 
of 
coordinated 
main design 
project and 
no design-
build 
contract. 
Determina-
tion to build 
despite 
accelerated 
building 
process 
resulting in 
many errors 
and 
deficiencies 
at hand-off. 
Build 
begins 
despite 
delayed 
collabora-
tion during 
design 
phase. 
Build 
progresses 
despite on-
site design 
develop-
ment and 
lack of 
payment. 
Build 
begins and 
finishes as 
scheduled. 
Analytical 
approach to 
design, planning 
and decision-
making. 
- Extensive 
preliminary 
user 
analysis. 
Quantitative 
analysis 
methods 
used as basis 
for decision-
making. 
Design 
process 
organized 
around 
themes. 
- Not 
developed. 
- 
Linear phase 
model. Value-
chain. 
Formally 
agreed, but 
compromi-
sed. 
Formally 
agreed, but 
compromi-
sed. 
Formally 
agreed, but 
compromi-
sed. 
Formally 
agreed, but 
compromi-
sed. 
Formally 
agreed and 
maintained. 
 
Table 6. Institutions developed in projects 2-6 and examples illustrating how each 
project adhered to the respective institutions.  
 
Table 6 illustrates that a number of relatively stable meanings and norms developed in 
projects 2-6 and that many are reoccurring across projects (including project 1), for 
example the pursuit of short-term economic gains, collaboration, urgency and 
determination to build, distinct professional roles and responsibilities, 
phenomenological quality and aesthetics and functionality, leadership as managing 
formal structure and collaboration as pragmatism and trust. On the other hand, some 
meanings and norms only occurred on few projects, for example, the pursuit of long-
term gains. 
     In the following section the relationship among these institutions and how they 
develop over the course of the project will be elaborated.  
 
Constellations of institutions in project 2-6 
 
In projects 2-6 a number of institutions developed and mutated in different 
constellations of institutions. These constellations of institutions are presented below, 
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using project 5 to illustrate extracts from the analysis that has been conducted for all 
five projects. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to present the full analysis of 
all five projects here, instead, the findings will be summarised across all five projects 
at the end of the section. 
 
Constellation of institutions in project 5 
 
Project programming, early design phase and basic design phase 
During the early and basic design phases the owner, architect and engineer are 
interpreted to have developed a constellation of peaceful co-existence between 
institutions of phenomenological quality, aesthetics and functionality, collaboration as 
interaction, and sustainability. There are no anecdotes reporting conflicts among the 
parties. At the end of the basic design phase, the owner was expecting to tender the 
project as per professional norm. However, according to the contractor’s design 
manager the owner and architect were unable to manage the design process and as a 
result, the project team was unable to produce a coordinated preliminary design 
project at the end of the basic design phase. As a result, the project was tendered 
based on a project description and a list of 3500 items included in the project, instead 
of a comprehensive 3D model or set of drawings as per professional norm. The 
contractor’s project team referred to this as tender based on a ‘Basic Design +’ and 
claimed that the list of items was used by the owner as an instrument to accurately 
compare bids from different contractors to pursue the lowest project cost. However, 
the lack of project detail meant that many design solutions and details were to be 
developed during the detailed design phase with the assistance of the contractor. 
Therefore, the basic design + bid represented the first major disruption of the 
constellation of institutions: on the one hand, the owner interpreted the bid given for 
the 3500 items to be a fixed price for the entire project; on the other hand, the 
contractor interpreted the bid to include only the 3500 items and any changes or 
additions to the list would result in request for changes with potential additional costs. 
The divergent understandings of what was and wasn’t included in the project resulted 
in an on-going conflict and negotiations between the owner and contractor. 
 
Detailed design phase 
Another consequence of the 3500 item list-bid was that the contractor was unable to 
get an overview and understanding of the project, because they couldn’t see how the 
items on the list were interrelated, as would have been possible with a set of drawings 
or a 3D model. Determined to finish and hand-off different project, the contractor had 
delayed and compromised collaboration in project 5 during the detailed design. As a 
result, urgency to understand the project increased once they did enter the project. As 
a result of the delayed participation of the contractor, the project team only had three 
months to coordinate the project before the build was due to start.  
      To the contractor, gaining access to the design project was critical, in order to 
optimise the project and prepare their organization for the building process. However, 
the owner had, in the pursuit of short-term economic gains and design efficiency, 
sanctioned the late hand-in of the main design project. As a result, the architects 
wanted to avoid project changes that would jeopardize the main design project 
deadline and therefore were reluctant to share the design project with the contractor. 
The architect and contractor were unable to create a shared understanding of the 
	 119 
purpose of the detailed design phase, nor were the sanctions waived and the architects 
given, for example, fiscal incentives to share their design with the contractor.  
     Furthermore, all organizations were trying to pass on design responsibility and 
therefore, the basic design+ project resulted in on-going negotiation as to who was 
responsible for decisions made before the contractor entered the project organization. 
The disagreements over design responsibility shifted the project team’s focus and 
efforts away from collaborating and coordinating the project. 
 
Adhering to the institution of collaboration based on trust and interaction, the 
contractor proposed working with open books and waiving the sanctions on the 
design project. However, according to the contractor, the owner dismissed both 
proposals. These efforts indicate that the contractor was trying to create an integrated 
constellation of institutions, although it was perceived by the owner as an attempt to 
dominate. 
     Instead, during the detailed design phase, distrust gradually developed among the 
project team members. This resulted in each organization increasingly maintaining 
particular institutions during the build, which caused gradual fragmentation of the 
constellation of institutions. 
 
Building phase 
While increasing maintenance of institutions during the building phase resulted in the 
constellation of institutions fragmenting, efforts aimed at integration did occur. For 
example, the contractor proposed conducting a project review phase during the early 
building phase, which was accepted by owner. Not only did the owner and architect 
agree to the review, the contractor’s design manager perceived that the owner had 
‘respected the process’ and not introduced new ideas or made changes to the project 
after the project review. 
 
Despite the successful project review and integration of the institutions of quality and 
efficiency, the constellation was only partially integrated. First of all, according to the 
contractor’s design manager, the architects continued proposing improvements to the 
project in the pursuit of quality. Also, other institutions in the constellation, the 
pursuit of short-term economic gains and the urgency and determination to build, 
developed into conflict and competition. 
     To elaborate, the distrust and poor collaboration during the detailed design phase 
resulted in the hand-in of a poorly coordinated design project, albeit in time for the 
deadline. As a result, design work was carried out simultaneously to building work on 
site as an interactive collaboration between the workmen and the architects, thus 
compromising the contractor’s wish to optimise and plan the building process 
efficiently.  
     Furthermore, the owner and the contractor’s conflicting understandings of what 
was and wasn’t included in the project resulted in continuous disruption of the 
project: the contractor had to continuously accelerate, stall and redo work on site to 
enable the progression of the build. Also, the owner wouldn’t approve any change 
orders resulting in on-going negotiations. Specifically, project costs increased by 21% 
over the course of the building phase with the cost of the concrete contract increasing 
by 61% alone. Also, six month into the building phase the owner had approved less 
than 0.5% of the requests for changes that the contractor had issued and more than 
100 mio. Dkr. were outstanding between the two parties. 
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Furthermore, the quote below illustrates how conflicting understandings and norms 
constrained the project team’s ability to build efficiently:  
 
‘…well a normal day was just full on, morning until evening, you had no time 
at all to sit down and think and plan. …it was [all  about] the handling of 
problems and challenges … there wasn’t always energy for planning and 
management, and we didn’t even know what bloody well to plan, because we 
didn’t always know when we were supposed to complete the project, and what 
we were supposed to bloody build, because [the owner] hadn’t ordered it, and 
they hadn’t paid for it!’ [Contractor’s Project Manager] 
 
During the building phase the contractor had expected the institution of the build to 
dominate the constellation of institutions. This was illustrated by the contractor’s 
project and design managers expressing great frustration with the other project team 
member’s lack of willingness to compromise and lack of understanding and respect 
towards the contractor. Furthermore, the contractor continued the building process 
despite not receiving payment for owner approved changes, fully expecting to be able 
to reach a settlement with the owner at some point.  
     However, the owner continued to challenge the institution of the build by refusing 
to sign off on changes and additional purchases, and questioning the contractor’s 
integrity. Similarly, the contractor continued negotiating with the owner in order to 
cover the cost of the project. In other words, both the owner and contractor competed 
in the pursuit for economic gains. The conflict between collaboration, quality, and 
mutual pursuit of economic gains resulted in the building process being characterised 
by political negotiation that constrained trust, respect, open communication and 
integration among institutions. According to the contractor’s project manager the 
project team weren’t able to openly discuss design and building solutions and 
complained that there had been no time or mental resources to do actual planning 
work. As a result the building phase was characterised as a continuous unsettled 
competition between the institutions of the efficiency of the build, quality and short-
term economic gains. Also, conflict arose from the mutual pursuit of economic gains 
by the owner and contractor. Similarly, stopping the build in order to settle the 
conflict and allowing the build to dominate would have compromised the urgency and 
determination to build and potentially increased project costs even further. 
 
Hand-off, commissioning & occupancy 
Considering the number of conflicts that characterised the detailed design and build 
phases, it almost seems impossible that the project team managed to hand-off a 
completed building at the end of the building process only two months behind the 
original schedule. The empirical material shows that the main reason for this was that 
the understanding of urgency and determination to build dominated, despite 
continuously being challenged by other institutions. The contractor simply never 
perceived it as an option to stop or postpone the build despite the main design project 
lacking coordination and the owner not approving or paying for requests for changes.  
      However, about six months before the project was handed-off, a financial 
settlement was made for a portion of the outstanding payments and this, according to 
contractor’s project manager, enabled the contractor to complete the final stages of 
the build. Also, the owner agreed to move into the lower levels of the building while 
the contractor completed the upper levels, resulting in an overlap between occupancy 
and build of two months. 
	 121 
Two years after completion the building operates almost entirely as required 
according to the owner. The contractor, façade supplier and owner are currently 
collaborating on redesigning the exterior shading solution, which proved to be 
insufficient and the parties have agreed to share the cost. To avoid delays and quickly 
be able to resolve the issue, the team has decided to not involve the architect in the 
process. Apart from the exterior shading, the final physical building reflects 
integration of phenomenological quality, functionality, sustainability, innovation and 
the owner’s professional values: (e.g. openness, state-of-the-art technology, quality of 
life, and uncompromising product quality).  
     In the contractor’s organization, the project serves as a bad example due to the lack 
of fiscal profit and poor collaboration. On the one hand, project 5 has become 
institutional debris for remaining projects. In project 1 efforts were made to overcome 
some of the constraints that characterised project 5. Furthermore, project 5 
contributed to the contractor’s organization establishing new procedures for how bids 
for tender and project contracts are reviewed and approved. On the other hand, the 
contractor has developed an understanding that this was a one off project with an 
unusually un-collaborative owner and architect.  
 
A still life of the constellation of institutions in project 5 
The figure below summarises the development of the constellation of institutions over 
the course of project 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. The figure illustrates the development of constellation of institutions in 
project 5.  
Project 5 was characterized by a constellation of on-going competition and conflict 
between institutions. During the detailed design phase economic short-term-gains and 
quality conflicted (i.e. the architect wanted to meet the deadline to avoid sanctions 
while also continuously wanting to optimize the quality of the project; and the 
contractor wanted access to the project in order to optimize it for production and 
project cost savings). During the build the constellation of institutions was interpreted 
to have been characterized by on-going competition. However, this time economic 
short-term gains competed with the efficiency of the building process. During project 
5 the contractor made several attempts at either integrating institutions or making the 
institution of the build dominate, however, the project team continued to contest the 
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domination.  
While it is possible to imagine on-going competition resulting in disruption of the 
project (e.g. the building process coming to a halt or never finishing) project 5 
illustrated that when institutions were sufficiently established they sustained the 
competition for long enough to produce a finished building and that the competition 
was instead settled during the project aftermath (i.e. the contractor’s fee was eroded). 
From such a perspective, the understanding that the building was of more value if 
completed may have dominated the constellation after all. In other words, while the 
competition between the owner and the contractor characterised the narrative about 
the project, the constellation can be interpreted to be a variant of domination exposed 
to severe contest. 
 
Constellations of institutions in projects 2-6 
 
Similar to project 5, projects 2, 3, 4, and 6 developed constellations of institutions. A 
brief analysis of each projects constellation follows below, including a summarizing 
table at the end. 
 
Project 2 
At project conception, the project was described as a repeat of existing projects in 
order to increase efficiency and reduce design costs while maintaining a particular 
level of quality. During the early and basic design phases the architect and engineers 
worked on the project in what was interpreted to be integration among collaboration, 
quality, designing efficiently, and cost optimisation. During the detailed design phase 
the contractor’s pursuit of short-term economic gains began dominating. For example, 
the project organization chose to operate with closed calculations, which supported 
the shared understanding that the contactor’s profit ratio was dependant on their 
ability to reduce the project cost. When interviewed, the owner stressed that each 
organization’s finances was ‘no one else’s business’. Furthermore, during the project 
cost negotiations it was suggested that a potential 40 mio. Dkr. could be saved by 
purchasing a number of materials from Southeast Asia. The owner and the contactor 
agreed that this was worth pursuing and a formal agreement to purchase materials was 
established. Also the architect was fiscally incentivised to pursue cost savings. While 
agreeing to this, the architect expressed frustration from being caught in the dilemma 
between having agreed to purchase cheap materials, while at the same time insisting 
on better quality to preserve professional integrity and fulfil the owner’s expectations, 
and at the same time maintain good collaboration with the entire project team. 
Ambiguously accepting the domination of short-term gains the architect continued to 
compromise on project materials and did not challenge the contractor. The lack of 
challenge did, at least retrospectively, greatly frustrate the owner.  
      At the beginning of the detailed design phase, the project team decided to 
postpone the start of the build by six months, so as to increase the level of detail of the 
design project in order to increase the quality and efficiency of the build. 
      As the detailed design progressed the owner made several major changes to the 
original project, which increased the cost of the project. The contractor covered the 
increased project costs with the savings from the purchases from Southeast Asia. This 
meant that the owner’s accumulated savings were reduced from an anticipated 40 
mio. Dkr. to 2 mio. DKr. The contactor justified their actions by claiming they saved 
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a number of work processes, however, the owner was left with a perception of having 
paid full price for poor quality. Nevertheless, the owner’s representative expressed a 
certain ambiguity about the contractor: on the one hand, he thought the contractor was 
‘bending the rules’ to accommodate their own interests; and, on the other hand, he 
perceived it to be ‘part of the game’.  
     The project was originally scheduled to be handed off to the owner in March 2011, 
however, the contractor negotiated an additional six months due to increased project 
scope. Nevertheless, the contractor was able to optimise and accelerate the building 
process and reduced the building period with six months, equally. Before the building 
was handed off in March 2011, the owner and contractor negotiated and settled on a 
premium that the owner paid for receiving the building six months prior to the 
negotiated schedule. Although the contractor justified their actions by referring to the 
juridical provisions for design-build projects, the owner was once again left with a 
sense of fundamental distrust towards the contractor: a sense that the contractor was 
‘greedy’. 
     Once occupying the building, the owner found that the cheap materials required 
extensive maintenance and repair work. However, the owner had agreed to take full 
responsibility for the overseas purchases and was left to resolve the problem 
independently. The contractor made a significant profit, while the architect expressed 
great frustration with the ambiguous demands that she had had to satisfy during the 
process and poor quality of the final building. 
 
Project 2 was interpreted to be characterized by ambiguous domination and co-
existence simultaneously. On the one hand, the project team developed an 
understanding that collaboration was important to increase coordination and made 
efforts towards increasing collaboration by for example establishing a project office. 
The project team also made efforts to preserve the co-existence of multiple 
organizations by engaging the architects and engineers in the design during the 
building process alongside the contractor and owner. On the other hand, while the 
architects and engineers interpreted this as an attempt to enable the co-existence and 
potentially the integration of multiple institutions, the contractor interpreted the 
institution of economic short-term gains to be dominating. Also, the entire project 
team formally agreed to make efforts towards pursuing short-term economic gains. In 
other words, although the project team expected and accepted the domination of the 
pursuit of short term economic gains during the detailed design and build phase, the 
project team members were ambiguous about the relationship between collaboration, 
quality and pursuit of short term economic gains.  
 
Project 3 
During project conception, the owner had spent two years conducting extensive 
analyses in an attempt to clearly define their project requirements. Then, the owner 
purchased the site from the contractor and selected an architect based on shared 
values, specifically; ‘their ability to be mindful of project costs and not exclusively 
pursue aesthetics’. During the early and basic design phases the architect and owner 
worked together on developing the preliminary design project, while the contractor 
prepared the site for construction. 
     At the beginning of the detailed design phase the contractor was awarded the 
project based on their ability to collaborate. The architect remained directly hired by 
the owner and the project team grew into what was referred to by the contractor’s 
design manager as a trio characterised by open and honest communication, where 
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‘everyone pulled in the same direction’ and trust and mutual respect grew stronger 
over the course of the project. However, the engineering disciplines were not 
independently represented in the project management team. Rather, the contractor’s 
engineering team had been assigned to the project and hired under the representation 
of the contractor’s design manager.  
     The architect had organised the design process according to themes and interaction 
occurred during scheduled meetings and workshops, and the project team was not co-
located at any point. Supporting the structured design process was the owner’s 
analytical approach to decision-making: ‘we are world-champions of analyses!’ their 
project manager proclaimed during an interview. For example, quantitative analysis 
of internal flows were made to determine if a bridge diagonally suspended across the 
multi-storey atrium was cost-effective compared to walking the perimeter of the 
atrium. According to the owner, all decisions had been made during the basic design 
phase. Nevertheless, according to the engineering project manager, the trio did not 
respect the project freezes and, in particular, the contractor continued to propose 
project changes during the detailed design phase in order to optimise the cost of the 
project. The optimisations, which later proved to be reductions, included for example, 
reduction of the heating capacity of the mechanical systems.  
     In other words, during the detailed design phase, quality, cost optimisation, 
collaboration and efficiency, which had otherwise been integrated during the basic 
design phase, were being challenged by the pursuit of short-term economic gains and 
urgency to build. As a result, the constellation fragmented during the detailed design 
phase. 
     However, the contractor started construction work with the outlook to be awarded 
the design-build contract. Gradually, as building work progressed, the constellation is 
interpreted to have regained a state of integration as the engineers finished their work. 
Six months prior to project hand-off a cloudburst damaged the building. However, the 
project team was able to collaborate with the building insurer in order to avoid 
internal negotiations over increased project costs. Also, the contractor was able to 
accelerate the building process and the owner able to postpone the move-in date. As a 
result the project was only delayed with three months. 
     The building reflects integration among architectural quality, functionality, 
sustainability and economy. Also, the project team was able to reduce project costs 
with 16% and all project team members made a profit. However, while integration 
was re-established during the build the result of the fragmentation during the detailed 
design phase was that for example, the mechanical system was insufficient to meet 
heating demands in the final building. 
     Therefore, while the project team may have been able to integrate multiple 
institutions, the project team was not able to fully integrate all the institutions in the 
constellation.  
 
Project 3 was characterised by integration of institutions more or less throughout the 
design and build processes. Integration started already in the project development 
phase where the owner, contractor and architect were able to coordinate their efforts 
and interests towards a shared goal (i.e. a new headquarter for the client on a site 
owned by the contractor).  
     Nevertheless, during the basic design and detailed design phases the project team 
made efforts towards integration as well as causing unintended conflict. Examples of 
integration included, the project team’s ability to analytically approach design 
development, maintain a shared project goal, be problem solution oriented and avoid 
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escalation of conflict. On the other hand, an example of gradual fragmentation turning 
into conflict includes, the contractor’s design manager continuously proposing 
changes to the project in order to reduce project costs, despite the contractor’s self-
perform engineers requiring the project to be frozen in order to finish the design 
project in time for construction.  
 
Project 4 
During the project development and early design phase, the understanding that only 
certain actors were able to add value to the project dominated; the architect explicitly 
claimed to see no value in involving the contractor during the early design phase. 
The constellation of institutions was interpreted to have been relatively settled during 
the basic design phase where quality and functionality dominated with the sub-
existence of collaboration and cost optimisation.  
     Once the contractor was awarded the project, at the beginning of the detailed 
design phase, the constellation was disrupted with the institution of the pursuit of 
short-term economic gains and the urgency and determination of the build. However, 
the institutions of quality, cost optimisation and collaboration did not cease to exist as 
the architect continuously appealed to the contractor to, for example, increase the 
quality of the materials, hire sub-contractors based on their ability to deliver the 
specified product instead of the cheapest product. However, the contractor wanted to 
maintain the domination of short-term gains, in order to ensure their own profit. To 
avoid having the architect disrupt the constellation and jeopardize the contractor’s 
ability to build within the project cost, the contractor acted increasingly 
autonomously. Also, the contractor dismissed the architect’s design manager when 
she warned, that according to her experience, the façade supplier would not be able to 
deliver the required quality of work. According to the architect and contractor, the 
project was characterized by poor collaboration, lack of mutual respect, lack of 
communication and perspective-taking among in particular the architect, owner, 
contractor and sub-contractors.  
     During the building phase the institution of the build dominated. However, the lack 
of coordination disrupted the project by stopping and delaying work on the building 
site. Specifically, rework on the steel beams, concrete slabs, balconies, the bankruptcy 
of the façade supplier are all examples of how poor coordination during the detailed 
design phase disrupted the project during construction and compromised building 
efficiency and economic gains.   
     Towards the end of the building phase the urgency and determination to build 
continued to dominate. In order to meet the final deadline, the contractor accelerated 
the building process. As a result, the different trades were working simultaneously 
and working conditions and quality of work became subordinate to finishing to a 
particular deadline. The final building reflected the domination of the pursuit of short-
term economic gains: while the buildings were perceived as an architectural show-
piece, residents complained over the poor quality of materials, the lack of heating 
capacity to enable the required indoor climate, and many errors and deficiencies 
pertaining to the interior finishes. Interestingly, the contractor’s fee eroded and no 
profit was made on the project. 
 
In summary, the constellation of institutions was characterised by domination of a 
particular institution yet, under on-going competition from the remaining institutions. 
     In project 4 the domination of the contractor and the institutions of pursuit of short 
term economic gains and the urgency and determination of the build, was also 
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expected by the project team, however, it was not left uncontested. While the 
contractor was expecting to manage the project relatively autonomously in order to 
reduce project costs and finish the build to the agreed deadline, the architect had the 
understanding that a certain level of quality was required in the project. As a result, 
the architect challenged the contractor and owner’s decisions to for example, cut 
quality of materials and use of particular sub-contractors. In other words, the architect 
expected a minimum of integration between the different institutions in the 
constellation. While the institutions of short-term economic gains and the progression 
of the build were interpreted to indeed have dominated, the architect continuously 
challenged the domination. In the early phase of the build, the challenges represented 
competition for domination however, the build increasingly dominated and the 
remaining institutions instead fought for integration (e.g. architect appealed for 
increased collaboration and quality of materials). 
 
Project 6 
During the programming phase and project conception, the owner was interpreted to 
have been guided primarily by efficiency and short-term economic gains. For 
example, the project had been defined as a copy/paste project of an already existing 
building on site. Also, the owner brought in the same architect and engineering team, 
and later at the detailed design phase, the same contractor who had built the other 
buildings on site.       
     During the early and basic design phase, the architect and owner collaborated to 
pursue a design to fulfil phenomenological quality and functionality in what is 
interpreted to have been peaceful-coexistence. For example, the architect included a 
number of features, for example, a vegetation wall in the reception area, closed 
offices, landscaping and more.  
    At the beginning of the detailed design phase the contractor was engaged in the 
project. At this point, the constellation of institutions is interpreted to have shifted 
from being dominated by architectural quality and functionality, to being dominated 
by the pursuit of short-term economic gains. Because the contractor wanted to reduce 
the project costs in order to increase their profits and meet owner’s required project 
cost, the contractor made an agreement with the architect to only produce what was 
referred to as ‘a half design project’. The building was considered to be of relatively 
low complexity and the contractor felt confident in their ability to develop design 
details on site in close collaboration with the sub-contractors and workmen. Also, the 
contractor perceived their professional managing role to concern optimising the 
project economically and expected to dominate the project team. For example, the 
contractor acted more or less autonomously and did not extend the architect’s contract 
to include finishing the main design project or inspections of the build. Also, the 
contractor conducted design and project meetings without the architect. Also, the 
green wall, landscaping and closed offices were later cut from the project by the 
owner and contractor in order to reduce project costs. The owner, engineer and 
architect expected and accepted the shift in institutional domination. This was 
illustrated for example, by the architect having agreed to, and when interviewed not 
being particularly ambiguous about, only producing a half-finished main design 
project and accepted that architectural features were cut from the project. 
    During the build the project was dominated by the urgency and determination to 
build. At the beginning of excavation it was discovered that the building had been 
incorrectly drawn on the site plan and that the excavation would have to extend onto 
the pavement. However, the excavation was shifted back onto the site and the 
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building process progressed. According to the contractor’s project manager, the 
permitting authorities ‘probably didn’t even notice’ that the original drawing had been 
incorrect. 
    At hand-off there were few or no errors and deficiencies. According to the 
contractor the owner was relatively relaxed with the quality of finishes because it was 
a property intended for leasing, not for the owner to occupy themselves. In that 
respect the constellation of institutions remained dominated by the pursuit of short-
term economic gains with the institutions of quality, functionality, and collaboration 
being subordinate.  
 
In summary, project 6 was characterised by stabilised domination of particular 
institutions at particular points in time. Also, the domination was interpreted to be 
sequential in that institutions were interpreted to be more or less decoupled from 
project phase to project phase. Also, sequential domination was characterized by the 
absence of institutional conflict, competition or ambiguous compromise. This was 
illustrated by the mutual acceptance of the domination of the institutions of pursuing 
short-term economic gains during the detailed design phase and the determination to 
build during the building phase. 
     Sequential domination can also be characterized as a form of decoupling 
institutions during the design and build processes and enabled the project organization 
to handle the complexity of multiple institutions. In project 6 cost optimization 
measures were decoupled from the early and basic design phase, while the pursuit of 
architectural quality and long term gains were decoupled during the detailed design 
and building phase.  
 
Summary of constellations of institutions in projects 2-6 
While all projects developed constellations of institutions that mutated over the course 
of the project, and each constellation is different, the still lifes of each constellation 
suggest that there are three characteristic constellation types with a number of 
variants: domination, integration, and competition and conflict. Project 2 was 
characterized as ambiguous domination, project 3 as partial integration, project 4 as 
contested domination, project 5 as conflict and competition, and project 6 as settled 
and sequential domination. These characteristic types are defined as representations of 
the constellation of institutions during the detailed design and building phase (i.e. 
when the highest number of institutions is interpreted to have developed). These 
characteristic constellation types are analyzed in relation to project performance in the 
following. 
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Project performance in projects 2-6 
 
In the following, an analysis of each project’s performance in relation to each 
project’s constellation of institutions is presented.  
     Project performance is defined as a phase at the transition from building phase to 
continued commissioning, hand-off and occupancy. While the transition itself 
represents a change in the constellation of institutions, the building itself and the time 
immediately following the transition also mark a temporarily stabilised constellation 
of institutions that were developed during the design and build process. 
 
Project 2 
As the detailed design phase progressed, project 2 became characterised by 
ambiguous domination: conflicting demands imposed on the project caused ambiguity 
to the architect and made them compromise on the architectural quality of the design 
solutions in order to maintain collaboration, loyalty, and increase project cost savings. 
In the end, the owner’s project manager complained that the building required 
extensive maintenance and repairs within the first year of occupancy and that the 
building solutions ‘didn’t look good’. Apart from a bittersweet perception of the 
building the project reinforced the owner’s perception of the contractor being greedy, 
which further maintained professional segregation and lack of professional empathy. 
Also, the architect expressed disappointment with the final quality of the building and 
said the process was ‘frustrating’ and ’stressful’. 
     During the detailed design and building phase the institution of the build and 
pursuit of short-term economic gains gradually came to dominate the constellation. 
As a result, the contractor was able to accelerate work and hand-off the building six 
months prior to the negotiated deadline and increase their profit by covering 
additional project costs with the savings from cheap material purchases.  
     Within the contractor’s organization project 2 is perceived as a success. However, 
the analysis shows that not all institutions were satisfied and thus the project is not 
unequivocally successful. 
 
Project 3 
Project 3 was characterised by an integrated constellation of institutions. While the 
constellation of institutions is interpreted to have been integrated during the early and 
basic design phases the constellation began fragmenting and conflicting during the 
detailed design phase as different understandings and norms started pulling efforts in 
divergent and conflicting directions. During the detailed design phase, the project 
team was unable to integrate institutions as the need for project cost reductions, 
project freezes, continuous changes to the design project and the urgency to build 
started conflicting with each other. While the project team perceived the organization 
to be integrated due to mutual respect and collaboration, the final building indicates 
that the project team was only partly integrated. Specifically, the building reflects 
integration between phenomenological quality, aesthetics, functionality, and the 
values of the owner’s organization. As the owner’s representative exclaimed: ‘when 
you look at the building you can’t see that we had to save 100 mio DKr. [16% of the 
project cost]’. Similarly, the project team’s ability to adapt to and repair the damages 
caused by the cloudburst and only be three months delayed, indicate that the project 
team was able to integrate despite disruption. However, in the aftermath of the 
project, the mechanical heating system was short of heating capacity, with the result 
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that the lower levels of the building could only be heated to 17° C, during the winter. 
Also, the architect expressed embarrassment from not having been able to deliver a 
building that was not as low-energy performing as the owner had intended and paid a 
premium for. 
     And while the contractor and architect made a profit on the project, the project 
team more-or-less dissolved at project hand-off constraining the project team’s ability 
to resolve the issues relating to the indoor climate.  
     Within the project team and the contractor’s organization, project 3 represents a 
textbook project in terms of collaboration. However, the analysis shows that there was 
fragmentation and conflict during the detailed design phase that resulted in 
mechanical design errors and later fragmentation during project occupancy when the 
project team was unable to resolve the problems pertaining to the indoor climate even 
two years after project hand-off. 
 
Project 4 
Project 4 was characterised by a constellation of contested domination and conflict. 
The unsettled domination resulted in the interior finishes being of poor quality and 
insufficient heating capacity. In that respect, the building reflected the domination of 
the institution of pursuing project cost reductions over quality, functionality and 
collaboration. On the other hand, a building was constructed, handed-off and 
occupied after all and in that respect, at least the project team was able to create 
representation of multiple institutions in the building. 
     Project 4 could serve as an example of poor collaboration, however, the stories of 
the process from project 4 appear to have been forgotten or suppressed in the 
contractor’s organization. In the contractor’s organization project 4 is celebrated as a 
success partly due to the architectural and public prominence surrounding the project.  
 
Project 5 
Project 5 was characterised by a constellation of conflict during the detailed design 
phase as well as conflict and competition during the building phase. The conflicting 
institutions resulted in extensive rework and increased scope of work during the 
building phase. For example, the concrete contract alone increased from 80 mio. Dkr. 
to 150 mio. Dkr. 
     Despite the many conflicts, the final building reflects integration of multiple 
institutions including; state-of-the-art technological and architectural design, 
functionality, owner’s organization values, and, sustainability. For example, light 
fixtures were integrated in the wooden strips that clad the ceiling and follow the 
curves of the building. Also, the exterior park functions as both a recreational area for 
the owner’s employees, whilst also being a public park to enrich the neighbourhood in 
general and contains a sophisticated water collection system. However, while the 
building visually represents integration, the contractor’s fee was entirely eroded and 
the process was characterised as stressful and mentally straining. 
     Project 5’s performance is thus ambiguous for several reasons: the project team 
was unable to integrate the multiple institutions in the project during the design and 
build process, yet, they were able to produce an integrated product; and, while the 
final building was integrated, the contractor did not make a profit, and thus the 
constellation of institutions was not entirely, but only partially, integrated. Despite 
conflicting institutions during the detailed design phase and competing institutions 
during the building phase, the project team was able to sufficiently maintain the co-
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existence of multiple institutions and deliver a finished building that reflects 
integration. This is interpreted to be a result of the project team’s shared 
determination to interact to maintain distinct institutions in the project: the architect 
and engineers insisted on pursuing functionality and quality, and the contractor and 
owner were determined to complete the build regardless.  
 
Project 6 
The constellation of institutions in project 6 was characterised by settled sequential 
domination. While the design and build processes were perceived by the project team 
to have been ‘smooth’ and ‘unproblematic’, the anecdotes from the empirical material 
indicate that there were changes and rework to be carried out during the building 
phase. Also, while the project is perceived by the contractor to have been a success 
due to project team members having made a profit and the owner being satisfied with 
the project, the project also reflects that the institutions that were developed over the 
course of the entire design and build processes were not represented in the final 
building. Specifically, many of the architectural features that were developed during 
the early and basic design phases were cut from the project during the detailed design 
and building phase. And while the project team may have accepted this and developed 
the perception that the project satisfied the owner’s requirements despite lacking these 
features at the time of project hand-off, the final build didn’t reflect all the multiple 
institutions that had been developed over the course of the project. Instead, the 
building reflected the last institution to have dominated the constellation: the 
institution of the pursuit of short-term economic gains. 
 
Relationships between design-build constellations and project 
performance 
 
Still lifes of constellations of institutions and project performance 
First of all, the analysis showed that there is a potential correlation between the 
characteristic constellations of institutions during the design and build processes and 
the projects’ successful integration of all institutions at project hand-off and during 
subsequent occupancy and facility management. 
     While it can be argued that all projects were dominated by the understanding that 
the building must be completed, because every studied project did manage to deliver a 
finished building regardless of the circumstances of the design and build processes, 
acknowledging variation in constellations of institutions is fruitful to understand 
variation in project performance. 
     For example, in project 2 the owner developed disappointment with the project 
performance when maintenance and repair work was required during the first year of 
occupancy. And since the owner was legally responsible for the risk associated with 
the overseas purchases the project team did not collaborate to resolve the problems 
pertaining to maintenance. As a result, the constellation had found a stabilized order 
reflecting domination of a particular institution. Specifically, the poor quality of 
materials and extensive repair and maintenance work on the building in project 2, 
reflects on the domination of the pursuit of short-term economic gains and the 
subordination of the institutions of collaboration, architectural quality and 
functionality. 
     Similarly, projects 4 and 6 both reflected conflict, domination and integration 
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respectively. 
     It is worth noting that project 3 reflected the integration of the trio: the owner, the 
architect and the contractor’s design manager.  However, the poor quality of the 
indoor climate reflected the institutional fragmentation and conflict during the 
detailed design phase where the engineer struggled to complete the mechanical design 
due to on-going project changes; the architect and contractor continued to propose 
change to optimize the project; and the contractor reduced the number of heat 
exchangers in order to cut project costs. Also, while the trio represented the owner, 
the architect and the contractor, the project team did not equally represent for 
example, a mechanical engineer, who could have acted as a steward for the indoor 
climate. In order words, the trio only partially represented the institutions represented 
in the project and thus, the final building also only partially satisfied all institutions.  
          Projects 4 and 5 were characterized by conflict and competition. In project 4 an 
on-going conflict between quality, collaboration, and short-term economic gains 
conflicted during the detailed design phase. Gradually, the constellation developed 
into quality and collaboration challenging the domination of the build and continuous 
pursuit of short-term economic gains. The final building is interpreted to reflect the 
conflict and the domination of the pursuit of short-term economic gains: the poor 
quality of materials, the dissatisfied residents, the insufficient heating systems, 
damages to the interior walls caused by the overlapping trades, the bankruptcy of the 
façade supplier, and the lack of profit for the contractor.  
     Project 5 is similarly characterized by conflict between collaboration, avoiding 
sanctions, preparing for the building phase, continuous improvements to the 
architectural design and disputes over increased project costs. Interestingly, project 5 
produced a building that reflects integration of multiple institutions, as described 
previously. Therefore, project 5 can be considered a deviating case, a paradox and 
indeed a high performance project. However, the contractor’s profit was entirely 
eroded, which means not all institutions were satisfied after all.  
     Interestingly, despite projects 4 and 5 being characterized by similar constellations 
of institutions they performed very differently. Project 4 reflects conflict and on-going 
contested domination, while project 5 reflects integration. The difference is 
interpreted to be the contractor acting increasingly autonomously in project 4 and 
purposefully having pursued decoupling of institutions to pursue cost reductions. In 
project 5, on the other hand, the contractor is interpreted to have pursued purposeful 
integration among collaboration, economic gains and the build. 
     Therefore, the performance of project 5 can be interpreted to be a deviation from 
the pattern: despite the conflicting and competing institutions that characterized the 
design and build processes, the project team was able to produce a building that 
reflects integration. As mentioned, this is attributed to the slight dominance of the 
understanding that finishing the build was more important than resolving the conflicts 
and settling the competition. However, a competition implies either a draw or a 
winner and a loser. And in this case, while the building might have won to the degree 
that it reflects integration, the contractor made no profit. In that respect, the projects 
performance reflects a competition, or at least, partial integration.  
 
Particular phases and project performance 
Across the five projects, certain phases are interpreted to be characterized by certain 
constellation of institutions.  
     On all five projects the early and basic design phases are interpreted to be 
relatively stable with peaceful co-existence or integration among institutions. For 
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example, typically the owner, architect and engineer collaborated during these phases; 
and the project team members had a shared understanding that architectural design 
and functionality dominated.  
     At the transition to detailed design phase the constellation of institutions changed 
in projects 2, 3, 4, and 5 with competition and conflict between the institutions of 
quality, economy, efficiency, and collaboration. 
     The conflicts that developed during the detailed design phase gradually settled 
during the building phase where the determination to build dominated in projects 2 
and 6 and integrated with the constellation of institutions in project 3. In projects 4 
and 5 the conflicts did not settle and the building process continued to be 
characterized by conflict and competition. 
     The constellation of institutions around hand-off and occupancy was interpreted to 
have been relatively integrated in projects 5 and 6. However, in project 2, 3 and 4, the 
constellation of institutions became conflicting when the building failed to satisfy the 
perceived required level of functionality, durability and sustainability. In project 2 a 
perception of disappointment developed with the owner despite the project team 
agreeing to pursue cheaper materials from Southeast Asia. In project 3 there was an 
on-going conflict between the owner’s understanding of having purchased a fully 
functioning building, the contractor’s understanding of no longer being responsible 
for the project, yet wanting to collaborate to resolve the problem, and the engineers 
and sub-contractors being engaged in new projects. In project 4 residents complained 
over the quality of materials and lack of heating capacity, while the project team 
engaged in other projects.  
     In summary, the conflict during the detailed design phase and hand-off constrained 
project performance. Also, the ability to collaborate and create an integrated 
constellation of institutions during the early and basic design phase and during the 
build phase is interpreted to be a main enabler to successful project performance. 
 
Summary of project performance in projects 2-6 
 
Table 7 summarizes the relationship between the constellation of institutions that 
characterized the design and build processes and the constellation of institutions 
reflected in the final project. 
Project Process characteristic Project performance 
2 Ambiguous domination. Domination with compromise of other institutions. 
3 Integration. Partial integration. 
4 Contested domination and competition. 
Compromise of multiple 
institutions. 
5 Competition and conflict. Partial integration. 
6 Settled domination. Domination. 
Table 7. Relationships between project characteristics and project performance. 
The analysis showed that the final building and subsequent project aftermath in 
projects 2, 3, 4 and 6 all reflected the constellation of institutions as it developed 
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during the design and build processes. 
Projects 2 and 6 were characterized by ambiguous domination and settled sequential 
domination respectively.  
     Project performance in project 2 was characterized by poor quality resulting in 
extensive maintenance and repair work and a disappointed owner and architect. 
      Similarly, project 6 was perceived to fulfill owner’s requirements, although the 
building did not reflect the institutions that had been represented over the course of 
the project. 
      Common for projects 2 and 6 is that the contractor made a substantial profit and 
that the finished buildings reflect the domination of a particular institution (i.e. the 
pursuit of short-term economic gains) while the remaining institutions are represented 
but subordinate.  
     Project 3 was characterized by both integration, fragmentation and conflict during 
the design process and integration and disruption during the building process. The 
fragmentation during the detailed design phase resulted in the final build only 
partially representing the institutions represented in the project.  
     Projects 4 and 5 were both characterized by conflict and competition during the 
design and build processes. The final building of project 4 is interpreted to reflect the 
conflict and the domination of the pursuit of short-term economic gains, while, 
interestingly, project 5 reflects, at least partial, integration. 
 
Summary part 2 
 
Institutions 
The analysis showed that a range of institutions developed in projects 2-6, including: 
phenomenological quality, functionality and aesthetics; sustainability; collaboration 
as pragmatism and trust, collaboration as professionalism and loyalty; cost 
optimisation; cost reduction; designing and building efficiently. Also, some 
institutions only developed on few projects, for example: the collective pursuit of 
long-term gains; and, an analytical approach to organization, decision-making and 
design development. 
     These are interpreted to represent institutional debris introduced by organizations 
in the project team. 
 
Types of constellations of institutions 
Each project developed different constellations of institutions over the course of the 
project. During the detailed-design and early build phase the five projects are 
interpreted to represent three main types of constellations of institutions: domination 
of a particular institution; integration among the majority of institutions; and, conflict 
and competition among institutions. However, each project represents variation within 
these types including: ambiguous domination, settled and sequential domination, and 
contested domination. 
Sequential settled domination was characterized by shared acceptance of the 
domination of a particular institution for example, the pursuit of short-term economic 
gains, such as illustrated in project 6. Ambiguous domination was illustrated in 
project 2 where project team members formally agreed to pursue short-term economic 
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gains but were frustrated and ambiguous about the compromises they had to make 
regarding functionality, quality, and collaboration. 
Integration occurred in project 3 where the majority of institutions were integrated. 
Despite integration during the basic and detailed design phase, diverging 
understandings of the relationship between quality, efficiency and economy started 
fragmenting the constellation of institutions with the result that the mechanical design 
was compromised and never fully integrated in the project, even when the remaining 
project was integrated. 
Conflict, competition and contested domination were illustrated by projects 4 and 5 
where the continuous pursuit of improved project quality conflicted with the mutual 
pursuit of economic gains and urgency to build. While conflict predominantly 
characterised the detailed design phases and the early build, the constellation 
developed into being characterised by competition during the building process (e.g. 
the architect continued to challenge the contractor’s work in project 4 and the owner 
continued to not approve or pay for requests for change in project 5). 
Project Performance 
The analysis showed that there is a potential correlation between the constellation of 
institutions during the design and build processes and project performance. 
     Specifically, the analysis showed that the final building and subsequent project 
aftermath in projects 2, 3, 4 and 6 all reflected the constellation of institutions as it 
developed during the design and build processes. 
     The performance of projects 2 and 6 reflected compromise and the lack of 
integration among a number of institutions due to the domination of a particular 
institution. The performance of project 3 reflected partial integration. Similarly, 
projects 4 and 6 reflected conflict, domination and integration respectively. 
     Project 5 stands out: the design and build processes in project 5 were characterised 
by conflict and competition, yet the building reflects partial integration. Integration 
was attributed to in particular, the contractor’s determination to progress the build and 
the architects and contractor’s determination to collaborate despite conflicts. 
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Discussion 
 
The following chapter presents a discussion of the empirical findings from the six 
design-build projects in relation to the literature reviewed for this research project. 
First, a discussion of the research design and method is presented followed by a 
discussion regarding institutions and constellations of institutions. Then, a discussion 
of institutional work is presented and the chapter finishes with a discussion on project 
performance. 
 
Research design & method 
 
Methodological insights from the ex-ante study 
The observations of project 1 allowed for a deep insight into the mundane everyday 
efforts that were made towards coordinating the project. Also, by observing the 
project for over six months it was possible to gain an insight into the intended and 
unintended consequences of these efforts and therefore to understand whether or not 
these efforts actually resulted in coordination. In that respect, ongoing observations 
helped to develop a processual understanding of coordination (Zilber, 2008). 
     However, observing the coordination process in action made it challenging to 
interpret what constituted stabilizing elements in the project. As discussed previously 
in the method chapter, deterministic definitions of institutions made it possible to 
more-or-less only define the design-build project itself as an institution, while a 
definition rooted in institutional works (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) made every 
established conduct, procedure, understanding and rule an institution in itself. In that 
respect, catching stability in flight (Pettigrew, 1986) was challenging using 
observation as an isolated method. 
 
Methodological insights from the ex-post study 
The ex-post studies of projects 2-6, on the other hand, enabled a relatively 
uncomplicated catching of institutions. However, since only five (or less) interviews 
were conducted for each project, not all the stewards representing institutions in the 
project (Kraatz, 2009) were heard. While it was not obvious during the interviews that 
certain institutions were not mentioned, it became clear when site visits to the projects 
were conducted. The final buildings reflected a much wider range of institutions than 
I was able to extract from the interviews alone. For example, sustainability was very 
rarely mentioned during the interviews, yet four out of five buildings had some 
sustainable elements (e.g. water collection systems and LEED certification). 
Similarly, the meta-analysis of the contractor’s organization showed that health and 
safety was rhetorically emphasized (and site visits to project 1 illustrated that safety 
measures were also highly enacted on site). Yet, health and safety never emerged in 
the material from the interviews on projects 2-6.  
     In that respect, while the ex-post method may have enabled clear deciphering of 
stabilized institutions, catching multiple institutions requires interviewing a broad 
representation of institutional stewards or conducting more structured interviews. 
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The relationship between analysis part 1 & part 2 
The ex-ante and ex-post studies were intended to shed light on two different types of 
institutional processes. The ex-ante study was intended to shed light on the micro-
process of institutional work in order to understand the process of coordination. The 
ex-post studies were intended to inform how the development of multiple co-existing 
institutions during the design and build processes relate project performance.  
     While the two analyses were relatively distinct in purpose and method, they did 
also support each other. For example, while the ex-ante method made it challenging to 
catch particular institutions, the ex-post studies allowed for a much clearer distinction 
between institutions. Therefore, once taken-for-granted meanings and patterns of 
interaction on project 1 had emerged, these were compared to the empirical material 
from projects 2-6 to understand if they were specific to project 1 or design-build 
projects more broadly. Therefore, the study supports the recommendation of Suddaby 
& Greenwood (2009) using a combination of methods to research institutional 
processes. 
     However, combining methods to capture stabilized institutions only worked for 
those institutions that were indeed stabilized. In other words, capturing proto-
institutions was a challenge with the ex-post method, while it was quite possible with 
the ex-ante method. One example of this includes, BIM. To elaborate, the ex-ante 
study allowed for observations of how the BIM coordinator’s role was interpreted by 
the project team. Also, the observations showed how efforts were made towards 
coordinating the project through BIM reviews on project 1 – even though they failed. 
These failed efforts would probably not have been captured by an ex-post method, 
and thus not given insight into how proto-institutions enter or contest the constellation 
of institutions. 
 
Institutions in projects 1-6 
 
Challenges defining institutions 
Extending the points concerning the challenges pertaining to clearly defining what 
constitutes an institution, projects 1-6 illustrated that even the definition developed for 
this research project (i.e. an institution was defined as a more-or-less taken-for-
granted shared meaning, underpinned by normative understandings and conduct, and 
potentially rules, that guide and provide meaning to social interaction) was not 
unproblematic. 
     For example, the meta-analysis of the contractor’s organization showed that BIM 
was being rhetorically and economically supported on the projects by the head 
organization. Also, increasing use of BIM standards in Denmark (and abroad), the 
engagement of a BIM coordinator and the efforts made towards conducting BIM 
reviews on project 1 illustrate that BIM can be interpreted as a proto-institution. 
However, given the meanings-oriented definition of institutions and the more-or-less 
taken-for-grantedness of these meanings, BIM is currently framed as normative 
conduct, normative understanding and rules supporting the taken-for-granted 
meanings of coordination and building efficiently. 
     Similarly, taken-for-granted meanings appeared in the empirical materials that 
could have been interpreted as institutions, including; the understanding that late 
changes are inevitable; and, that cost, time and quality are linked. To elaborate, late 
changes being inevitable were interpreted to be one of the primary default 
explanations for any delays or constraints that the project team experienced. Late 
	 137 
changes were openly referred to and used as justification for redoing, postponing and 
stalling work. Late changes were often described as part of the ‘natural development’ 
of a project. However, the analysis of projects 1-6 showed that late changes during the 
detailed design and building phases were a result of lack of integration between 
institutions during the early and basic design phases. For example, in project 1 the 
early and basic design phases were characterised by peaceful-coexistence between the 
institutions, which only postponed the moment when integration of institutions had to 
occur. By the time the project team expected integration to occur (i.e. during the 
detailed design phase) a conflict between the need to integrate institutions and the 
need to let the building process structure the detailed design phase arose. This conflict 
constrained the project team’s ability to integrate institutions. As a result, developing 
final design solutions that could by agreed upon and interpreted as decisions made 
was a muddled process that dragged on. This muddled process was interpreted as late 
changes. However, changes were supported by moral obligations (e.g. proposing late 
changes made project team members ‘disloyal’), formal procedures (e.g. change 
orders and request for changes) and legal sanctions (e.g. service specifications) and 
thus could have been framed as an institution.  
     Similarly, there was a shared understanding that quality, cost and time were 
inevitably connected: i.e. an increase in quality would result in increase in either time 
or cost or both; and a decrease the cost would result in decrease in project quality and 
time. However, because the design-build projects (except project 3 and to some extent 
project 1) were unable to integrate all institutions in the early and basic design phase, 
the project teams were unable to produce a holistic optimisation where increased 
quality could also have resulted in decrease in cost and time. In other words, the result 
of peaceful co-existence or sequential domination that characterised the design 
processes of project 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 was that projects could not be optimised 
holistically. Therefore, the project teams had developed an understanding that the 
negative reductive relationship between cost, quality and time was not only a norm, 
but a law of nature. 
     In other words, while these taken-for-granted meanings could have been 
interpreted as institutions, they are instead framed as rationalised myths (i.e. 
‘structure that have become isomorphic with the myths of the institutional 
environment’) (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p.340).  
 
Constellations of institutions in projects 1-6 
 
Coordination: processes of integration & fragmentation 
The analysis of project 1-6 showed that institutions developed in multiple types of 
relationships. Projects 2 and 6 were characterized by sequential domination, similar to 
institutional change theorized by e.g. Suddaby et al. (2006). Projects 4 and 5 were 
characterized by conflict and competition, also discussed previously by e.g. 
Rowlinson and Jia (2015), and Viking and Lidelöw (2013). Project 3 was 
characterized by integrative processes, such as shown by Zietsma & McKnight 
(2009), Kraatz (2009), and Yu (2013).  
     Project 1, specifically, provided insight into how a constellation of institutions can 
develop during a design-build process and illustrated peaceful co-existence, 
integration, fragmentation, conflict, and competition.  
     In particular, project 1 provided a deeper insight into integrative processes by 
illustrating that integration could occur occasionally, partially or continuously. 
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Although Zietsma and McKnight (2009) were concerned with co-creation at the field 
level their study suggested that co-creation of new institutions involve collective 
collaboration as well as competition and conflict among institutions. Similarly, 
project 1 illustrated that the project team was able to collaborate and integrate 
multiple institutions in the case of the design and build of the façade system, while 
quality and efficiency otherwise competed and conflicted during the detailed design 
phase. 
     The institutional process studied by Zietsma and McKnight (2009) is interpreted to 
develop purposefully but without a clearly defined common goal, while the project 
teams in projects 1-6 had to fulfill a relatively defined common goal, as well as 
divergent sub-goals. While the institutions in the field studied by Zietsma and 
McKnight (2009) collaborated, competed and conflicted in the pursuit of individual 
interest, the project team in project 1 had to balance individual and common interest 
to enable integration in order to deliver a high performance project.  
     Project 1 suggests that coordination for the purpose of producing high performance 
projects require the purposeful, occasional and temporary fragmentation followed by 
collective, purposeful and occasional integration of multiple institutions. 
Fragmentation enabled the project team to pursue individual institutions in order to 
optimize the design according to each particular institution, while integration enabled 
the satisfaction of each institution through common uniform effort. 
     Also, Yu (2013) is concerned with integrative processes at the intra-organizational 
level that are potentially goal oriented and show that new institutions are the result of 
on-going contest and political negotiation forming a temporary negotiated order. 
Similarly, project 1 showed that the design and process was indeed one of on-going 
contest (and collaboration), for example, when the project team had to negotiate and 
lobby with the city architect and permitting authorities to ensure the issuing of the 
building permit. Furthermore, the similar, yet varying project performance of projects 
2-6, indicate that the build is precisely, a negotiated order or a number of institutions 
that depends on actors’ values, perceptions (Yu, 2013) and norms (Phua, 2005). 
However, on project 1, the project team members were not interpreted to be political 
savages in pursuit of their own interests alone, rather the project team members made 
efforts to maintain multiple institutions throughout the project. In other words, 
integration was not only necessary due to the co-existence of multiple institutions; it 
was also pursued for the purpose of delivering high performance buildings. 
 
Occasional, on-going or partial integration of institutions  
While Yu (2013), Kraatz (2009) and Zietsma and McKnight (2009) do not theorize 
the phenomenon of integration of institutions, the findings from projects 1-6 suggest, 
that integration occurs occasionally, partially and more-or-less continuously. 
Project 1 illustrated occasional integration where, the by now much discussed 
example of engaging the façade supplier in the basic design phase, was an occasion of 
integration where all institutions represented in the project were satisfied, yet 
remaining independently represented. Project 1 suggests, that integration doesn’t have 
to be a permanent state of the constellation or formally structured. Implicitly, 
integration is considered to be occasional by Kraatz (2009) and Yu (2013) given that 
they consider the institutional environment a temporary negotiated order. In that 
respect, no particular relationship can be anything other than occasional. However, 
project 1 suggests that occasional integration followed by occasional fragmentation 
could be purposefully aimed for, as opposed to being a result of failing to win a 
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contest for permanent domination. 
Project 3 illustrated attempted permanent states of integration in that integration 
occurred from the early stages and more or less through out the project. For example, 
the project team reflectively made efforts towards changing the constellation of 
institutions towards integration from the beginning of the project by selecting the 
project team based on shared understandings, values and norms and managed to 
predominantly maintain the integration through out the project. However, project 3 
did experience disruptions in the form of, for example, a cloudburst. Nevertheless, the 
project team was able to adapt and recreate an integrated constellation of institutions.  
     This perception of institutional change, as a pursued stabilized state continuously 
under contest from external disruption (Suddaby et al., 2006) and competing 
institutions (Greenwood et al., 2011) is currently represented in the literature, 
however, only Zietsma and McKnight (2009) and Yu (2013) are concerned with 
integrating processes of institutions.  
 
Apart from occasional or stabilized integration, projects 1, 3 and 5 show that a 
constellation of institutions can also be partially integrated. Partial integration means 
that multiple institutions are integrated while one or few institutions remain 
fragmented. In project 1, the institutions were interpreted to be relatively integrated 
while the project team has been unable to design a solution for smoke ventilation that 
fulfilled code requirements. In project 1, partial integration is attributed to lack of 
integration during the basic design phase and temporary blending of institutions 
during the detailed design phase that constrained the contractor’s ability to critically 
assess the quality of the engineers’ work. 
     In project 3 the final building was interpreted to satisfy all institutions, except 
being able to fulfill requirements for the indoor climate due to insufficient heating 
capacity. The lack of complete integration in project 3 is attributed to a stabilized 
integration among the three key project members (owner, architect, and contractor) 
who neglected to critically consider if they were able to develop and maintain all 
necessary institutions intended to be represented in the project.  
     In project 5, the building was interpreted to satisfy all institutions, except profit for 
the contractor. The lack of complete integration in project 5 was attributed to 
conflicting and competing institutions. 
     While partial integration can resemble domination, the difference is that 
domination often concern the domination of a single institution with one or more sub-
ordinate institutions (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2002) while partial integration indicates 
that multiple institutions integrate and collectively dominate, with only one or few 
institutions remaining fragmented. Also, often the literature assumes that domination 
occurs through a process of contest (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2011) while integration 
occurs through a process of collaboration. In that respect, integration is also different 
from co-creating (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) which occurs through a process of 
collaboration and competition. 
 
Fragmentation as a pursuit of expertise 
Apart from integration, project 1 showed that institutions can also fragment during a 
design and build process. Despite the owner’s attempt to create integration through 
both formal structures (e.g. target cost) and interaction (e.g. early contractor 
involvement and establishing a project office) the contractor, owner, architect and 
engineer gradually started developing and adhering to different understandings of 
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what was important and right for the project. While this gradual fragmentation is 
interpreted to have constrained coordination, the example of the design of the façade 
solution indicates that fragmentation can be used purposefully in order for each 
institution to be satisfied. More specifically, the architect actively engaged with the 
contractor, owner, engineers and façade supplier in order to ensure that the right color 
of frame, tint and reflection of glass, and slope of windowpanes were selected. 
Similarly, the contractor engaged with the façade supplier, architect, owner and 
engineers to ensure accurate pricing of the façade, reduce contingencies and nuture 
the owner’s acceptance of the increased costs associated with the façade. In other 
words, project 1 suggests that purposeful fragmentation of the constellation of 
institutions can be used to pursue excellence within each institution represented in the 
project. 
     Importantly, project 1 also suggests that an integration process should follow 
fragmentation in order to prevent the postponement of a conflict until, for example, 
the detailed design phase. 
     Similarly, fragmentation as a pursuit of expertise was illustrated by its absence in 
project 2. For example, in project 2 where the architects continued to accept 
compromises to the quality of the building solutions and materials in order to satisfy 
the dominating institutions (e.g. short-term economic gains and collaboration as 
personal interaction and affection). According to the architect, the owner considered 
the architect the steward and defendant (Kraatz, 2009) of quality of interior and 
exterior finishes and blamed her for accepting the solutions proposed by the 
contractor. In other words, by attempting to be loyal to the contractor and pursue 
short-term economic gains that the project team had agreed to, the architects had to 
compromise on their expertise. As a result, in project 2, the institution of quality was 
subdued. However, in order for the institution of quality to have become manifest in 
the final building the institution of quality would have had to challenge the 
dominating institutions either by competition or by fragmenting and pulling the 
project in a different direction until a potential conflict could have arisen. Also, as 
expressed by the architect in project 2 when interviewed: on the one hand, 
compromising one institution may not have resulted in its incomplete fulfillment in 
the final building; on the other hand, compromising avoided the risk of being entirely 
expelled from the constellation of institutions. 
     Fragmentation has not been developed in the literature on institutional processes. 
While segmenting and partitioning of work (Waldorff et al., 2013) was proposed as a 
an avenue for co-existence of otherwise conflicting institutions, fragmentation 
indicates a processual understanding; i.e. that institutional are increasingly requiring 
diverging efforts to be satisfied and that fragmentation is a temporary development, 
not a permanent condition. Perhaps the lack of attention to fragmentation of 
institutions is due to limited attention to micro-processes of multiple institutions as 
well as limited attention to the outcome of institutional processes. To the latter point; 
it is this research project’s focus on institutional processes in relation to project 
performance that emphasizes the fragmentation process. In other words, because the 
end goal is to produce a high performance project, fragmentation emerges as an 
important processual mechanism that can be used purposefully to increase excellence 
within a particular institution (e.g. professional area of expertise). 
 
Institutional masquerade: fragmentation disguised as peaceful co-existence 
Similar to temporary blending, peaceful co-existence resulted in the same 
postponement of institutional conflict as negative choice and deliberate ambiguity 
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(Gestel & Hillebradn, 2011). In project 1 peaceful co-existence developed the 
perception among project team members that the basic design process was 
characterised by collaboration, when rather, it disguised the fragmentation of the 
constellation of institutions and postponed integration of the multiple institutions. In 
that respect, a fussy and broad conceptualisation of collaboration within the project 
team acted as a mechanism of co-existence similar to deliberate ambiguity (Gestel & 
Hillebrand, 2011). Gestel and Hillebrand, (2011) showed that deliberate ambiguity 
resulted in the postponement of an institutional conflict, such as the conflict that arose 
during the detailed design phase in project 1. 
Finally, as described previously, peaceful co-existence can disguise fragmentation, 
since neither caused tension among project team members. However, peaceful co-
existence (Koch & Buser, 2014) was interpreted to represent a potentially stable state 
deprived of the ability to develop endogenous change, while fragmentation indicated 
continues movement of institutions in diverging directions.  
 
Institutional work in projects 1-6 
 
Paradox of working on institutions and/or constellations 
Contributions on institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2009) have mainly concerned 
purposeful work on one institution at a time, albeit in a context of multiple other 
institutions. Even in studies that concern institutional processes of multiple 
institutions (e.g. Zietsma & McKnight, 2009; Yu, 2013), there is a core assumption 
that actors are trying to either make a particular institution dominant or create a proto-
institution. Thus institutional efforts have predominantly been framed as directed 
towards one institution in particular (an important exception is Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013-A).  
     However, the analysis of project 1 showed that institutional work breaches more 
than one institution, and that project team members had to work on integrating 
multiple institutions simultaneously in order to coordinate the project. For example, 
the contractor’s design managers were expected to be able to both guide and assist the 
architects and engineers to further develop the design project, while also having to 
prepare the contractor’s construction team for production. 
     However, in the process of coordinating multiple institutions, while also 
maintaining individual institutions a paradox was interpreted to have arisen. 
     To elaborate, while work aimed at maintaining an institution resulted in the 
maintenance of that particular institution, it also had the unintended consequence of 
resulting in disruption of the constellation of institutions. For example, when the 
owner and contractor in project 1 had agreed to use a target cost and engage in early 
collaboration this was intended to create an integrated constellation of institutions.  
     However, the owner also negotiated a reduction of the target cost, which disrupted 
the constellation of institutions because it steered the contractor’s focus away from 
optimising the project and instead towards guarding the target cost. By maintaining an 
individual institution (i.e. trying to keep project costs to a minimum) the owner 
constrained the project team’s ability to maintain an integrated constellation of 
institutions. 
     Similarly, the reverse was also true; attempts at maintaining the constellation of 
institutions required the organisations to compromise the institutions their 
normatively represented. This was illustrated on project 1 where the contractor’s 
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design manager had maintained an understanding of professional segregation to avoid 
responsibility but ultimately decided to engage in the negotiations with the owner, 
architects and city in order to ensure the issuing of the building permit and the 
progression of the building process. Another, and perhaps more critical example of 
this, was when the contractor’s design managers developed an expectation that the 
final design project would be lacking in quality and further accepted to extend the 
deadline for the hand-in of the remaining design project at least three times during the 
first year of construction. On the one hand, the expectation of a poor design project 
and the practice of extending the deadline numerous times enabled the design project 
organization to continue work that fed into the construction work on a just-in-time 
basis. On the other hand, the expectation of a poor design project and extending the 
deadline numerous times also reinforced the shared understanding that a main design 
project is not required or even intended to be fully coordinated. The understanding 
that a design project wasn’t intended to be fully coordinated undermined the 
contractor’s efforts towards making the design team deliver a fully coordinated main 
design project in time for construction and jeopardized the efficiency of the 
construction process. In other words, in their attempt to maintain the constellation of 
institutions and enable the design process to continue to fulfill owner’s requirements, 
the contractor jeopardized the efficiency of the construction process (a single 
institution).  
 
The paradox between changing a single institution and a constellation of institutions 
is interpreted to be an indicator of a larger change in the field of design and 
construction. The change is interpreted to involve a gradual development from non-
collaborative project delivery methods guided by opportunistic economic gains and 
efficiency, to increasingly collaborative project delivery methods guided by quality 
and project performance stability. If organizations become increasingly collaborative 
and oriented towards pursuing long-term gains, the paradox may potentially dissolve 
and institutional work aimed at a single institution will be integrative with 
institutional work aimed at a constellation of institutions. However, it is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to elaborate on this discussion further. 
 
Project performance of projects 1-6 
 
Project performance as a mix of intended and unintended consequences 
The paradox between working on a single institution and a constellation of institution 
pertains to the discussion on intended consequences versus unintended consequences 
(Lawrence et al., 2009).  
     Institutional work concerns purposeful actions aimed at creating, maintaining or 
disrupting institutions (Lawrence et al., 2009) and while recognizing that actions have 
consequences that can be either intended or unintended, institutional work is 
explicitly not concerned with the consequences of action.  
     However, design-build projects have a relatively clear purpose (albeit sometimes 
poorly defined and continuously negotiated and changed): the development of a 
building that satisfies a number of institutions. As a result, on the one hand the project 
team has an interest in managing the integrating constellation of institutions in order 
to increase the amount of intended consequences in order to stabilise project 
performance. On the other hand, project performance can be defined as a combination 
of intended and unintended consequences of institutional work carried out during the 
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design and build processes. Contending that the current constellations of well-
established and proto-institutions on design-build projects result in a paradox between 
efforts aimed at single institutions and efforts aimed at the constellation of institutions, 
then project performance is per definition a result of intended and unintended 
consequences.  
 
While no literature was found on institutional processes and organizational 
performance explicitly, previous contributions on institutional processes frame 
temporarily stabilized institutional arrangements as ‘negotiated orders’ (Oliver, 1992; 
Yu, 2013). In accordance, project performance was previously defined in this 
dissertation as a temporary stabilisation of the constellation of institutions reflecting a 
particular negotiated order. Similarly, the analysis of projects 2-6 showed that project 
performance was a negotiated order of proto-institutions and institutional debris. Due 
to the ex-post method, it was not possible to gain insight into the mundane 
institutional work carried out on projects 2-6. However, the analysis of project 1 and 
the finding that there is a paradox between working on a single institutions and a 
constellation of institutions, show, that project performance is also the result of 
intended and unintended consequences of actors negotiating, experimenting, 
competing, fighting, collaborating, and doing what they perceive to always have been 
doing. 
 
Project performance is relatively stabile, yet subject to variation 
The process of negotiating, experimenting, competing, fighting, collaborating, and 
doing what they perceive to always have been doing, closely resembles the process of 
co-creating institutions (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009). While co-creation among 
multiple institutions in a field (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) was described as process 
that doesn’t follow a particular path (although bearing traces of institutional debris), 
projects 1-6 suggest that constellations of institutions in projects develop according to 
certain patterns. To recap: peaceful co-existence characterized the early and basic 
design phases, but was gradually eroded by the perception of a value-chain, the 
pursuit of short-term economic gains, late changes, and lack of institutional leadership 
that fragmented the constellation of institutions and was repeated across projects. The 
lack of integration among institutions during the early and basic design phases 
resulted in a conflict during the detailed design phase between understanding 
coordination as a means to increase project quality and understanding coordination as 
a means to enable efficient building processes. During the building phase the 
institution of the build dominated either autonomously, in competition, or in 
collaboration with remaining institutions. And in the transition to occupancy, all 
projects struggled to integrate all institutions (e.g. mechanical installations were 
associated with deficiencies; poor quality of materials; and fee erosion). In other 
words, the analysis of projects 1-6 suggests that while actors negotiate, experiment, 
compete, fight, and collaborate, they to some degree reproduce the same intended and 
unintended consequences from project to project. This supports the findings of 
Kadefors (1995) who showed that projects vary little in process and outcome.  
     On the other hand, project teams were able to create different constellations of 
institutions and projects that performed differently. This is attributed partly to 
institutional work albeit it being sporadic, short lasting, and mostly initiated by 
individual organizations in each project. And to that end, until projects succeed in 
collectively, reflectively, purposefully and continuously integrating constellations of 
institutions, projects are interpreted to more-or-less remain similar, yet different.   
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Integrated design-build management  
 
The analysis of project 1 presented in a previous chapter showed that the coordination 
process was constrained when institutions conflicted, competed, dominated or 
temporarily blended. On the other hand, coordination was enabled when the project 
team was able to occasionally integrate and fragment the constellation of institutions.  
     Furthermore, the second analysis showed that constellations of institutions 
developed in the design-build process were reflected in the projects’ performance.  
 
In the following section, proposals as to how the constraints on coordination may be 
overcome and how coordination can be further enabled are presented. The proposals 
are interpreted to bridge and extend research on coordination, collaborative project 
methods and institutional theory, and combined constitute a management concept 
referred to as Integrated Design-Build Management. 
     The IDBM concept is based on the empirical analysis of the six design-build 
projects as well as a selective literature study of collaborative project delivery and 
process methods. These include: virtual design and construction (Kunz & Fischer, 
2012); integrated project delivery (e.g. Cohen, 2010; Lahdenperä, 2012); partnering 
(e.g. Lahdenperä, 2012); project alliance (e.g. Lahdenperä, 2012); scrum (e.g. 
Sutherland, 2014); LEAN (e.g. Koskela et al., 1997); target value design (Zimina et 
al., 2012); knot-working (Korpela & Kerosuo, 2014); BIM (Berard, 2012); integrated 
concurrent engineering (Khanzode, 2010); and pull-scheduling (Ballard, 1999). It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to include the full analysis of these project 
delivery and process method, therefore, in the following, references will primarily be 
made to the empirical analyses. 
     The purpose of the IDBM concept is to enable project teams to coordinate projects 
(i.e. occasionally and purposefully integrate and fragment institutions) to enable 
project performance that satisfies multiple institutions represented over the course of 
the project. 
       In the following the key points of the concept are presented. First, new meanings 
and underpinning structures are proposed, including: leadership and management; 
collaboration and coordination; separating design and build; an integrated phase 
model; project and process requirements and performance evaluation; and BIM as a 
social tool. Secondly, the proposed meanings, norms, and rules are discussed and 
thirdly, the chapter is summarized.   
     An elaborated description of particular parts of the IDBM concept (in particular 
the normative process models) can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
Proposed meanings, norms, rules & interaction 
 
The IDBM concept proposes to create, disrupt and maintain a number of meanings, 
norms, rules and ways of interacting in order to enable project coordination. The 
proposals offered by the IDBM concept are aimed at enabling a gradually integrating 
constellation of institutions over the course of the design process and enabling a final 
building that reflects integration of the institutions represented in the project. 
Importantly, an integrating constellation of institutions refers to a constellation that 
increasingly becomes integrated and involves occasional fragmentation. In other 
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words, the IDBM concept does not propose a method for a single institution to 
dominate the constellation alone and this is an important point of departure. 
 
Leadership & management 
 
The IDBM proposes that project team members interpret leadership and management 
as institutional concepts.  
     Specifically, leadership is interpreted to be institutional work aimed at creating 
and/or disrupting institutions or constellations of multiple institutions. Leadership 
involves engaging in on-going collective negotiating, experimentation, compromise, 
learning, layering and creating new meanings, values, norms, perceptions, and rules. 
In the project, leadership is aimed at collectively, reflectively, purposefully and 
gradually developing an integrating constellation of institutions. Importantly, 
leadership is also aimed at occasionally fragmenting the constellation of institutions in 
order to pursue the satisfaction of each institution.   
     Furthermore, management is interpreted to be institutional work aimed at 
maintaining an existing institution or constellation of multiple institutions. 
Management involves collective governing and negotiating to ensure the adherence to 
and reproduction of existing shared meanings, normative conducts, and regulations. In 
the project, management is aimed at maintaining a particular institution to support 
either the process of integrating or fragmenting the constellation of institutions. Also, 
management can be aimed at maintaining a constellation of institutions once 
stabilisation of the constellation is required. 
     These definitions extend the understandings proposed by Alvesson (2011). 
Alvesson (2011) proposes to understand management as the reproduction of basic 
values, assumptions and meanings in the form of socialising new employees, and 
continuing to keep current employees interested and motivated. Leadership, on the 
other hand, is interpreted as work aimed at ‘attaching positive meaning to one’s 
intentions, acts, arrangements and outcomes’ both within and outside the 
organization (Alvesson, 2011, p.159). Therefore, Alvesson (2011) interprets 
management to be mainly focussed on internal institutional maintenance and 
leadership to be mainly focussed on both internal and external work aimed at creating 
institutions.  
     Therefore, the coordination process (i.e. occasionally fragmenting and integrating 
constellations of institutions) can be interpreted as a combination of leadership and 
management.  
     Apart from institutional leadership in projects, institutional leadership also has to 
be developed outside of the projects. Organizations have to conduct institutional 
leadership to enable an integrating constellation of institutions across organisational 
support functions and project production and through partnerships or long-term 
relationship with other organizations where shared meanings, norms and rules can be 
developed and maintained. 
 
The role of reflectivity  
While the coordination mechanisms presented in the theory chapter of this 
dissertation can serve as a tool box for leadership, the most important aspect of 
leadership is reflectivity. This includes reflection of the coordination process, as well 
as reflection of what norms, rules and meanings collaborating organizations adhere to. 
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This resembles Hemphill’s (2009) proposal that the ability to understand the 
perspective of others is a coordination mechanism in itself. Importantly, this also 
includes self-reflectivity, i.e. an organizations’ ability to critically reflect upon what 
taken-for-granted meanings, norms and rules it adheres to itself. In addition, 
understanding ones own perspective, and what meanings, norms and rules underpin 
that particular perspective has the ability to coordinate because it enables the 
purposeful disruption or development of shared understandings. This was illustrated 
in project 3 where the owner conducted extensive programming analyses and 
guaranteed the contractor a certain profit. Contrary, project 2 illustrated how the 
contractor did not reflect on their own norms and meanings and pursued short-term 
economic gains despite compromising mutual respect, trust, and the quality of project 
materials. Furthermore, as illustrated by all the studied projects, competition for 
domination among understandings and norms occurred during the detailed design 
phase and in project 4 and 5 also during the building process. In other words, the lack 
of self-reflection constrained the project teams’ ability to integrate the institutions, 
and instead enabled institutional maintenance.  
 
Separating Design & Build 
 
The IDBM concept proposes to separate the design and build processes into two 
temporally and socially distinct processes. Temporal distinction means that design 
work is only done during the design process in which the project is coordinated before 
the building process begins. Social distinction means that two distinct constellations 
characterise the design and build processes respectively: an integrating (i.e. on-going 
occasional fragmentation and integration) constellation of institutions characterises 
the design process; while the building process is characterised by an integrated 
constellation of institutions.  
 
The purpose of separating the design and build processes is to resolve the institutional 
conflict between coordination for the purpose of pursuing integration and 
coordination for the purpose of building efficiently. While the conflict could be 
settled by proposing that one or the other institution become dominant, separating the 
design and build processes acknowledges the importance of maintaining both quality, 
efficiency and long-term economic gains. The separation of the design and build 
processes enables coordination of institutions before it is too late. This means, 
changes to the design in order to integrate a particular institution can be relatively 
easily done during the design process, without jeopardizing the stability of the 
building phase once building systems have been ordered, produced and perhaps even 
installed. 
     Therefore, the IDBM concept proposes that separating the design and building 
process is built on a shared understanding among project organizations that the main 
design project has to be fully coordinated before the building process begins. This 
shift in meaning is accompanied by a re-conceptualisation of the design and building 
processes: a virtual project followed by an assembly process. 
 
Design as virtual action & build as assembly 
First, the design process can be conceptualised as a virtual project. A virtual project 
implies the extensive use of digital tools to facilitate the design development and to 
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represent the main design project, which also implies a much more active engagement 
of the contractor, suppliers and sub-contractors in design work. The virtual design 
project would culminate with the hand-off of a fully coordinated virtual project. In the 
studied projects, the design process was perceived by the contractor more or less as an 
extended architectural workshop with co-existing organizations awaiting integration 
to occur during the detailed design and building phases. IDBM proposes an 
interpretation of the virtual project as a process of analysis and coordination of all the 
institutions intended to be represented in the project’s performance.  
     Second, the building process would be referred to as an assembly process in order 
to emphasise that coordinating efforts are intended to occur during the design process, 
and not during the building process.  
 
Collaboration & coordination 
 
The IDBM concept proposes change of the meaning of collaboration. Specifically, the 
IDBM concept proposes that a shared meaning of collaboration as coordination 
becomes institutionalised or that coordination is developed as an institution in itself. 
     The purpose of changing the shared meaning, conduct and rules that support 
collaboration is to resolve institutional conflicts, enable shared goals, and ensure that 
accurate information is available to the team when needed.   
  
To increase the shared meaning of collaboration as coordination, the term 
collaboration can be continued to be used, while, for example, analytical selection of 
organizations to collaborate in the projects is emphasised. 
     To develop a shared understanding of coordination that extends past its technical 
meaning to also encompass the social, projects could develop and rhetorically refer to 
a project’s particular coordination strategy. The project coordination strategy could 
include a definition of coordination and outline what coordination mechanisms the 
project team are making efforts to develop in the project and how. The coordination 
strategy is intended to act as an instrument to spark collective reflection. 
 
New Coordination Mechanisms 
The IDBM concept proposes that both functionalist and relational coordination 
mechanisms are developed in projects and that the specific setup of coordination 
mechanisms is tailored to each project.  
     However, as developed under leadership and management, the IDBM concept also 
proposes a new coordination mechanism to create an integrating constellation of 
institutions: self-reflection. Self-reflection emphasizes the importance of not only 
developing the ability to understand the norms, values, meanings and perceptions of 
other organization and take their perspective, but also ability to understand one’s own 
perspective (e.g. what institutions an organization adheres to itself). This coordination 
mechanism can be referred to as reflective capacity. 
     In addition to reflective capacity the IDBM proposes that transparency be 
considered a coordination mechanism. Transparency is overlapping to coordination 
mechanisms such as accurate, timely and frequent communication (Gittell, 2008), but 
also encompasses, for example, honest communication. Honest communication is 
defined as project team members communicating genuine intent, ambiguity, and 
potentially socially illegitimate ideas and perceptions. In other words, while the 
coordination process itself is defined partially as a political process in which actors 
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compete for domination (Lawrence et al., 2009) coordinating a project to increase 
project performance requires that actors increasingly negotiate the institutional order 
not to dominate, but to integrate. While competition for domination potentially 
requires not disclosing genuine intent, collective efforts aimed at integration, on the 
other hand, require transparency. Transparency enables integration because the social 
elements that require integration become increasingly perceivable.  
 
The integrated phase model 
 
The IDBM concept proposes that the currently institutionalised linear phase model be 
replaced with a phase model that supports integration of institutions during the virtual 
project process. 
     The integrated phase model enables project teams to respectively fragment and 
integrate the institutions during the virtual project process. Furthermore, the 
integrated phase model is aimed at resolving the conflict between integration and 
domination during the detailed design phase, by enabling integration from the 
beginning of the design process. 
     The integrated phase model is based on the understanding that the virtual design 
project develops from multiple fragments of design (abstract or detailed) to a 
gradually integrated design project. The IDBM proposes the project team works on 
both conceptual and detailed design at the same time. 
 
Design development as systematic iteration 
The IDBM concept proposes that the current multiple sub-design-processes running 
in parallel be replaced with a series of two to four iterative project loops each 
consisting of a number of short design sprints during the detailed design phase. The 
iterative work process is referred to as systematic iteration. 
 
Systematic iteration is based on an analytical approach to organizing work elements 
during the design development phase in order for the project team to work through the 
design project two to four times. Iteration enables re-evaluation and re-development 
of the different institutions required to be represented in the project, while systematic 
iteration enables coordination (i.e. purposeful occasional fragmentation and 
integration). 
 
Systematic iteration means dividing the design development phase into a number of 
distinct loops. In each loop all institutions are represented and pursued. Since the 
project team works with both detail and abstraction in all loops, the design develops 
from several fragmented design proposals in the first loop, towards gradually 
integration of the multiple fragments. By the end of the last loop the multiple design 
proposals have the potential to have been integrated and form a single coordinated 
design project. Parallels to structuring work as systematic iteration are found in 
concepts such as scrum (Sutherland, 2014), integrated design (Knudstrup, 2008); and 
knot-working (Korpela & Kerosuo, 2014). 
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Project & process requirements & performance evaluation 
 
The IDBM concept proposes that the project teams work with project and process 
requirements and performance systematically and continuously, in order to facilitate 
reflective and collective efforts towards the integration of all the institutions 
represented in the project.  
     The proposals support the meaning that project performance is not a simple 
quantitative snapshot measure, but rather a negotiated order of intended and 
unintended consequences of institutional work and taken-for-granted institutional 
debris.  
     In that respect, project and process requirements and performance evaluation is 
intended to both keep the project on track as well as continuously purposefully and 
collectively define, and potentially redefine, that track.  
 
BIM as a social tool 
 
The IDBM concept proposes that BIM is increasingly understood as a social tool, not 
just a technical tool. While functionalist coordination through for example, 3D 
geometry reviews, scannings and collision controls, 4D planning of the building 
process, and quantity takeoff’s for cost estimation and production, were applied to 
varying degrees in projects 1-6, BIM was not perceived as a tool to create social 
coordination. 
     The IDBM concept proposes that BIM is understood as a tool for institutional 
change. For example, the BIM review sessions be used as an opportunity for 
perspective taking and building mutual trust and respect. To elaborate, the BIM 
review session could center around the purpose of trying to create collective 
responsibility for design errors detected in the 3D model, collective responsibility for 
problem solving, and multi-membership). Furthermore, the project team could use the 
BIM review session as an occasion for understanding how and why certain project 
team members might be constrained in delivering required work. To do so, the BIM 
review would have to be a collective effort where the project team members make 
efforts to integrate institutions, not maintain or make dominant any one institution in 
particular. This requires collective reflection and discussion, as well as a change in 
rhetoric. 
 
Reflections on the IDBM concept 
 
The IDBM concept proposes enabling coordination by creating an integrating 
constellation of institutions that occasionally and purposefully integrate and fragment 
respectively. 
 
The IDBM concept is an outline of meaning and normative structures that not only 
leave room for but also encourages reflective and purposeful actions aimed at creating 
integrating constellations of institutions. Since no two projects are identical, the 
constellation of institutions will vary from project to project. This variation is 
reflected in the IDBM concept, in that some of the proposed structures are relatively 
extensive and guiding (see Appendix 1), while other are relatively undefined. For 
example, the change of the meaning of leadership towards reflective social 
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fragmentation and integration is a relatively uncompromising recommendation of the 
IDBM concept. On the other hand, the loops and design sprints proposed for 
systematic iteration are intended for adaptation to each individual project without 
compromising their inherent meaning of enabling systematic social fragmentation and 
integration.  
     In the following, opportunities and resistance to the IDBM concept are discussed. 
 
Opportunities and resistance to the IDBM concept 
 
IDBM as a stepping stone (from current disruption) 
The design-build project delivery form offers an opportunity for architects, engineers, 
contractors, suppliers and owners to collaborate for an extended period of time, before 
the build begins. However, as we saw in Project 1, extended collaboration caused 
confusion about how the contractor was supposed to interact with the rest of the 
project team during the basic design phase (e.g. the contractor withdrew from design 
meetings) and exercise leadership during the detailed design phase (architects 
expected clear guidance, contractor expected consultants to be ‘professional’ and able 
‘to think for themselves’). In other words, the IDBM concept proposes a further 
disruption of current design-build practices which may cause confusion and paralysis 
at worst. On the other hand, as project 1 illustrated, disruptions to well-established 
patterns of interaction in design-build projects are already occurring and thus there is 
an opportunity for the IDBM concept to be diffused as well as support further co-
creation of a new design-build norm. 
     In order for the IDBM concept to become part of a co-creation process for a new 
design-build process, the meanings, norms, rules and interactions proposed by the 
IDBM concept require institutional work.  
     The sections below discuss what and how this institutional work can be done. 
Although institutional work contributes to creating, disrupting and maintaining 
institutions at the same time, in the following each is discussed separately to enable a 
discussion across the proposals. Therefore, the text below may appear somewhat 
fragmented. 
 
Creating 
The IDBM proposes to create a reflective and analytical approach to coordinating 
institutions and constellations of institutions in projects. 
     Creating a shared understanding of reflective integrating leadership, social 
coordination and the separation of design and build could be supported through 
narratives about how institutional fragmentation during the design process 
performance can result in poor buildings that reflect a lack of integration. For 
example, project 3 could be used to illustrate how the lack of bringing in the 
necessary skills during the design process and the contractor reducing the capacity of 
the heating system resulted in a finished building that was unable to meet indoor 
climate requirements. And Project 5 could be used to illustrate how lack of 
coordination of project expectations can result in inefficient building processes and 
significant fee erosion. Similarly, project 3 could also be used to illustrate that 
integration among institutions resulted in (more-or-less) integrated buildings. 
     Along side these narratives, reflective discussion among project teams could be 
facilitated in order to develop more nuanced understandings of the relationship 
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between institutional processes and project performance. Such reflective discussions 
could take the form of everyday conversation, as well as more formal project 
presentations where project teams share their story with other project team members 
and support staff at the respective organizations. 
     Furthermore, the IDBM concept suggests, that someone, either an individual or an 
organization, is formally appointed the responsibility of institutional leadership and 
management in a given project, to emphasize that institutional work is an on-going 
effort within the project team in order to create or maintain an integrating 
constellation of institutions. While, for example, integrated project delivery (AIA, 
2007) suggests that assigning a group leader is unnecessary since the contract 
structure aligns the interest of the parties, the analysis of project 1 showed that 
divergent understandings and norms caused fragmentation and conflict during the 
basic and detailed design phase and that on-going maintenance of the integrated 
constellation of institutions was indeed required.  
 
Apart from developing new narratives about the project, redefining professional roles 
can also support the IDBM concept. For example, the early involvement and central 
role of the contractor during the virtual project process can result in a shift in the 
meaning of what constitutes the contractor. In projects 1-6 the meanings associated 
with the contractor was closely related to the building process and segregated from, in 
particular, the meaning associated with the architects. The IDBM concept proposes 
that the meaning of the contractor changes to one of consulting contractor during the 
design process who provides virtual design and analysis services, as well as, extended 
project management services. 
     Similarly, the emphasis on the virtual project and re-framing of the building 
process as building assembly supports a shift in meaning of the contractor, sub-
contractors and workmen. To avoid the meaning of building assembly to be 
interpreted as a degradation of the skills and responsibility of those involved in the 
building assembly, the project team would have to develop new narratives about the 
work carried out on site to give it legitimate and attractive meaning.  
 
Furthermore, the normative structures proposed by the IDBM concept (i.e. the 
integrated phase model, systematic iteration, and project and process performance 
evaluations are structures that underpin the proposed meanings of reflective, 
integrating leadership. 
     First, stressing systematic iteration might increase the legitimacy of iteration. In 
project 1 in the previous analysis, when interviewed, in particular the contractor’s 
representatives had an understanding that iteration was equal to a chaotic and 
inefficient process that only enabled architectural quality and increased project costs. 
Therefore, emphasizing systematic iteration as a method by which the design process 
becomes increasingly efficient will make systematic iteration more legitimate. Also, 
systematic iteration unfolds an extensive and relatively guiding work structure that 
can help prevent reproduction of taken-for-granted existing work structures. 
     Secondly, an appreciation of the ambition of trying to integrate the project has to 
be developed and legitimized. If systematic iteration can be associated with increase 
productivity without extending the expected duration of a design process or increasing 
its cost, systematic iteration will satisfy the institutional logics of efficiency and 
economy. 
     Thirdly, to gain legitimacy, systematic iteration has to leave room for the project 
team to adapt the loops and design sprints to each project. As illustrated by the 
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analyses of project 1-6 early collaboration among all organizations is rare and thus, it 
is important for systematic iteration to be able to adapt to a particular project and 
accelerate the process of integration if required. 
 
Disrupting 
First, the new meaning of leadership also means disrupting the previous meaning of 
leadership as being a matter of distributing carrot and stick appropriately and a matter 
of being a hard or soft person.  
     The analysis also showed that structures for distribution of risk and reward are 
supported by regulations (e.g. design-build standards, collaboration agreements, 
design-build contracts and sanctioned deadlines), normative conduct (e.g. the project 
managers using increasingly firm rhetoric and engaging in verbal fights to make 
particular institutions dominate) and shared meanings (e.g. stick and carrot are 
considered the primary, and sometimes only, mechanisms to make a particular 
institution dominate). As a result, disrupting the institution of leadership and 
management requires multi-level efforts. 
     The new meaning of leadership as institutional work aimed at creating an 
integrating constellation of institutions also requires the disruption of previous 
understandings of leadership as a matter of making a particular institution dominant. 
The finding that actors take-for-granted the pursuit of dominance was supported 
empirically as well as theoretically. For example, Zietsma and McKnight (2009, p. 
148) address how ‘institutional actors create new institutional arrangements, and 
adapt them as they compete for dominance in disrupted environments.’ Therefore, the 
pursuit of integration requires an institutional change to happen. Specifically, the 
project team needs to create the shared understanding that satisfying all institutions in 
the project does not, contrary to common perception, lead to compromising individual 
institutions. In other words, understanding that the collective and long-term gains also 
result in stable and profitable projects for the individual organization has to be 
created. 
     Similarly, creating institutional management requires disruption. In projects 1-6 
fragmentation resulted in frustration among project team members, however, 
purposeful fragmentation requires an appreciation of the divergent institutional 
demands. 
 
Second, the separation of the design and build processes would result in a temporal 
gap between the design and build process respectively, while building systems are 
being produced off site and until construction work on site is ready to begin. In order 
for the separation of the design and build processes to become legitimate the urgency 
to begin the build has to be disrupted. Also, the temporal void has to be either 
accepted or filled with something that is perceived to be meaningful. Acceptance of a 
temporal void may be developed through discussion within the project team that the 
void is necessary to ensure the required project integration. Meaningful activities may 
include visits to building systems production facilities. This would enable the project 
team to experience how a complete and coordinated design project enables efficient 
production processes. Also, the project team may begin to prepare the hand-off 
manual during this phase. This would enable coordination of interfaces between the 
sub-contractors and potentially result in a higher build quality. Furthermore, preparing 
the hand-off manual during the time between design and building process would shift 
the project team’s focus towards delivering a finished building.  
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The separation of the design and build processes may also meet resistance from those 
adhering to the understanding that the overlap between design and build processes is 
necessary in order to save time and meet the final deadline for the finished building. 
Therefore, in order for the separation of the design and build processes to become 
legitimate the project team has to be able to increase the efficiency of the design and 
build processes respectively and maintain current project durations.  
 
Third, the integrated phase model proposes working simultaneously with detail and 
concept. Working simultaneously with detail and concept during the design 
development phase requires a disruption of the current well-established norms of the 
linear phase model and the value-chain. This could be achieved through 
delegitimization of the linear phase model and the value-chain. To elaborate, the 
linear phase model and the perception of a value-chain could simply be referred to as 
old-school or, if time for reflective discussion is granted, anecdotes illustrating how 
the linear phase model results in an institutional conflict during the detailed design 
phase and is unable to lead to high performance projects could be told. Furthermore, 
the linear phase model and value-chain could be framed as the means for a particular 
institution to dominate as opposed to integrating institutions.  
     Furthermore, because systematic iteration proposes an extensive work structure for 
the project team, systematic iteration will meet resistance from those adhering to the 
understandings that ‘the project team is not a kindergarten’ and that ‘as professionals, 
project team members ought to be able to figure out what to do for themselves’. These 
understandings can be delegitimized if they become understood as irresponsible lack 
of leadership and lack of competence to grasp ‘the slippery eel’.     
 
Maintaining 
Since coordination requires both integration and fragmentation of institutions the 
IDBM concept implicitly proposes that certain institutions can be purposefully 
maintained. 
     The current meanings of collaboration, phenomenological quality, aesthetics, 
functionality, sustainability, cost optimization, building efficiently are proposed to be 
maintained because these are interpreted to support high performance projects (i.e. 
both integrative processes as well as valuable qualities in the final build). 
 
Furthermore, while individual well-established institutions can potentially be 
maintained, the IDBM concept is ultimately a proposal that offers stabilization of 
project and project performance. While the process of integrating (and fragmenting) is 
dynamic and one of inherent change the IDBM concept proposes stabilization of the 
project by creating an integrated project performance.  
     To elaborate, while it is beyond the hermeneutic method to quantify for example, 
potential time and fiscal savings, the IDBM concept offers projects the ability to 
purposefully reflect upon and change constellations of institutions or adapt to 
changing constellations of institutions. This in itself offers a degree of stability and 
predictability of project performance. 
     Furthermore, the integrating constellation of institutions can reduce the number of 
both anticipated and unforeseen conflicts among institutions and organizations during 
the projects. Therefore, integration of institutions can increase stability, predictability 
and performance of individual projects as well as portfolios of projects. 
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Methodological consideration 
 
IDBM is a leadership and management concept, not a project delivery 
method 
Project delivery methods such as IPD and partnering have focussed mainly on 
reconfiguring the economic structures or normative work processes (e.g. tools, 
processes, contracts, multiparty agreements, and distribution of risk and reward) and 
only implicitly proposed new meaning to projects. However, none of the project 
delivery methods reviewed explicitly proposes to also change the shared meanings 
underpinning projects.  
     The IDBM concept aims at creating institutional change, by proposing new and 
disrupting existing shared meanings and norms for work processes and collaboration. 
In that respect the IDBM concept represents a contribution by attempting to 
‘overcome the tendency to use tools, techniques and formal structure to engineer 
culture’ (Bresnen & Marshall, 2010, p.162). Since institutional change is an on-going 
process requiring experimentation, collaboration, reflection, and potentially 
competition and conflict, the IDBM concept is, like for example the concept of LEAN 
(Green & May, 2005), not a delivery method that can be applied as a instrumental 
framework, rather it is a proposal to on-going efforts towards changing the project 
and collaborating organizations from within the framework. Therefore, the IDBM 
concept is interpreted to be leadership and management work.  
 
Transferability of the IDBM concept 
While projects 1-6 showed that design-build projects in Denmark at the beginning of 
the 21st century developed the institutions of quality, efficiency, economy, 
collaboration and coordination, other project delivery methods, projects in different 
geographic regions, and future projects may develop different constellations of 
institutions. The IDBM concept proposes a method that will enable organizations and 
project teams to coordinate projects other than design-build ones, outside of Denmark 
and in the future. 
     Furthermore, while it may be challenging to separate design and build due to the 
well-established norm of overlapping design and build processes, separating the 
design and build process is an institutionalized norm on design-bid-build projects.  
    Therefore, design-bid-build projects offer a second possible collaboration form for 
creating integrated projects. Design-bid-build projects constitute 52,2% of the 
contractor’s project portfolio and while the contractor is typically not invited to 
participate in the design process in these projects, as strategic relationships with key 
client develop, the contractor could be invited to participate as a consultant during the 
design process.  
     Similarly, extended collaboration to also encompass an understanding of shared 
project responsibility are also found in integrated project delivery (AIA, 2007) and 
partnering projects (Lahdenperä, 2012). 
     Therefore, the IDBM concept is based on, but not limited to, design-build projects. 
Because the IDBM concept is a management concept and not a project delivery 
method, it can be applied to a variety of project delivery methods, including design-
build, design-bid-build, integrated project delivery, and partnering. 
 
Similarly, the IDBM concept can be applied to design-build projects where the 
projects follow the linear phase model and the contractor has been invited to 
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participate in only the detailed design phase. 
   On those projects, the project team has no choice but to alter the process structures 
proposed by the IDBM concept or accept that normative design-build structures 
dominate. However, the IDBM concept would recommend that the contractor takes 
full responsibility for executing institutional leadership for the remainder of the 
design process. This includes, making efforts to articulate, discuss and create an 
integrated constellation of institutions with the other organizations in the project team, 
or collectively and openly negotiate the domination of a particular institution.  
     Also, the IDBM concept would recommend that the contractor consider forming a 
new project team, with new architects and engineers to disrupt previous patterns of 
interactions and enable a new integrated institution or the domination of a particular 
institution. Furthermore, the urgency to build could be disrupted and the start of the 
build postponed until a coordinated design project is available.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents the conclusion concerning the chosen theoretical framework and 
research design, as well as concluding insights into project coordination and project 
performance. Finally, the conclusions of the IDBM concept are presented. 
 
Theoretical framework & research design 
 
The purpose of this research project is to understand how coordination defined as an 
institutional process of design-build projects is constrained and enabled and how 
coordination (or the lack of it) relates to project performance. 
     In order to gain this insight, coordination was defined as both as structural and 
relational phenomenon.  
     Also, an institutional works perspective was adapted in order to be able to 
understand coordination as a social process. An institution was defined as: a more-or-
less taken-for-granted shared meaning, underpinned by normative understandings and 
conduct, and potentially rules, that guide and provide meaning to social interaction. 
     Importantly, the project is characterized by a constellation of institutions i.e. 
multiple institutions developing in particular relationships to each other and mutating 
over time. As a result of mutation, constellations of institutions are characterised by 
incremental change and temporary stability. While institutions can be more-or-less 
taken-for-granted and self-reproducing, the purposeful mutation of the constellation 
of institutions requires institutional work aimed at creating, maintaining or disrupting 
institutions. Institutional work is concerned with explaining how reflective actors 
change or maintain institutions and interaction to coordinate projects.  
 
To understand coordination and coordination in relation to project performance a 
combination of literature studies and a double-qualitative empirical study of design-
build projects was chosen.  
     The first qualitative study concerned gaining insight into the phenomenon of 
coordination. Following the institutional works perspective, gaining insight into 
emergent micro-processes of coordination required ex-ante project observations and 
collecting project documents. In order to account for past events and future 
expectations, the observations were accompanied by interviews with project team 
members. 
     The second qualitative study concerned understanding any potential relationship 
between institutional processes during the design-build phases and project 
performance. Project performance was defined as an emerging temporarily stable 
constellation of institutions. To understand potential relationships between 
institutional process and project performance, an ex-post study was conducted of five 
completed design-build projects. Specifically, the longitudinal ex-post studies did not 
enable an understanding of the micro-processes of institutional work, rather, it 
enabled understanding relationships between institutions through episodes of for 
example, conflict, ambiguity, negotiation, and the intended and unintended 
consequences of these episodes. 
     Both the ex-ante and ex-post studies were analysed and discussed through 
reflexive interpretation at four levels: the empirical material itself; as concepts of 
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coordination and institutional process; in a broader societal (or at least field level) 
context; and critical reflection of the role of the researcher.  
 
The coordination process constrained 
 
For all the studied projects, the main challenge to the project teams was, to varying 
degree, enabling coordination among institutions during the design process.  
During the early and basic design phase institutions in project 1 co-existed in what 
was perceived as peaceful collaboration, however, the project team became gradually 
fragmented and the need for integration of institutions was postponed until the 
detailed design phase. As a result, an institutional conflict arose during the detailed 
design phase between on the one hand increased design quality, cost optimization, 
functionality; and, on the other hand, building efficiently.  
      While partial integration enabled coordination among a number of institutions, on-
going integration and temporary blending constrained the project team’s ability to 
critically access the progress of the design process and the quality of work of other 
project team members. 
     Reflection and purposeful efforts to coordinate project team members were 
interpreted to have occurred at project conception based on previous project 
experience and as new actors entered the project. Also, institutional work aimed at 
creating a new institution or mutate the constellation of institutions took the form of 
minor experiments inspired by previous projects and tailored to each new project. 
There was no collective, on-going or holistic reflection concerning a greater 
transformation of the constellation of institutions in order to improve coordination. 
Instead, project members were left to interpret variation in collaboration form 
independently and predominantly began maintaining particular institutions for the 
purpose of making it the dominant institution in the constellation. As a result, the 
design process stalled, re-circuited, or dragged on and the main design project was 
delayed and not fully coordinated.  
 
The coordination process enabled 
 
Regardless of the constraints on coordination during the design process, the project 
team succeeded in beginning and progressing the building process.  
     Coordination occurred when project teams were able to integrate institutions, by 
satisfying different institutions through unified efforts. Integration in project 1 
developed as partial, on-going and occasional integration. However, to enable 
coordination, integration was only required occasionally. Occasional integration also 
offered opportunity for potential occasional fragmentation, which ensured the project 
team’s pursuit of satisfying a particular institution and critical reflection of the work 
made by other project team members. Thus, coordination was enabled through an on-
going process of integration and fragmentation of institutions in the constellation. 
Integration of institutions required institutional leadership and was primarily 
conducted at project conception.  
     The project team succeeded in starting and progressing the building process 
because the determination to build gradually came to dominate the constellation of 
institutions. The domination was supported by: the project team being able to adapt to 
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the project to continue collaboration by extending the overlap of the design phase 
further into building phase; decoupling the design team from the construction team; 
the construction team making efforts to figuring out what should be built when the 
main design project was lacking coordination and detail; and by extending the 
deadline of hand-off of the finished building. Also, as the project team developed the 
shared understanding that the build had to begin and progress the remaining 
institutions either gradually or more-or-less instantly became subordinate. However, 
the contractor continued encouraging collaboration, accepted rework, and 
continuously re-adjusted the building schedule to accommodate the progression of the 
design project; this shows that the institution of quality and collaboration was 
maintained to some degree. 
 
Constellations of institutions & project performance 
 
The analysis of projects 2-6 showed that project performance is an emerging 
qualitative construct as the aftermath of the projects gradually settled.  
     While each project developed multiple relationships between multiple institutions 
over the course of the projects, projects 2 to 6 were characterized by particular still 
lifes of constellations of institutions. These still lifes included: settled domination, 
ambiguous domination, contested domination, integration, conflict and competition. 
Overall, three main types of constellations characterized the six projects: domination; 
integration; and, conflict and/or competition.  
     Constellations of institutions characterized by either type of domination resulted in 
project performance that predominantly satisfied the dominant institution. This was 
illustrated in projects 2 and 6. The institution of pursuing short term of economic 
gains dominated both projects and both project teams expected and more-or-less 
accepted that the remaining institutions were compromised. As a result, project 2 
didn’t fulfill the owner’s requirements for maintenance, while project 6 was 
characterized by reductions to the architectural quality. On the other hand, the project 
teams made satisfying profit on both projects and did not need to extend the deadline 
for the hand-off of the final building. 
     An integrated constellation of institutions resulted in a final building satisfying the 
institutions represented in the constellation. On-going integration resulted in project 
performance where all the institutions in the constellation were integrated. This was 
illustrated by project 3. However, in project 3 on-going integration resulted in the 
project team’s lack of ability to critically assess if all necessary institutions were 
represented in the constellation of institutions and as a result, the mechanical design 
was underestimated and incorrectly designed and installed. Fragmentation of 
institutions resulted in inability to resolve mechanical deficiencies during occupancy. 
     Constellations of institutions characterized by conflict and competition resulted in 
project performance characterized by fee erosion for the contractor and architect. 
Interestingly, the final buildings of project 4 and 5 performed very differently at the 
end of the projects. Project 4 was unable to negotiate project hand-off with zero error 
and deficiencies or extension of the deadline for the final build. Also, the indoor 
climate and building materials were of poor quality resulting in dissatisfied residents. 
On the contrary, project 5 resulted in a building in which the majority of institutions 
in the constellation were integrated and a highly satisfied owner. 
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The IDBM concept 
 
The IDBM concept presents proposals for new meaning, norms and rules to improve 
project coordination. The IDBM concept is based on the understanding that an 
increasingly, collective, reflective and analytical approach to leading and managing 
the social structures and interactions in projects can improve project coordination and 
project performance. Also, the IDBM concept builds on the insight, that occasional 
integration and fragmentation of institutions in the constellation improves 
coordination.       
     Specifically, the IDBM concept proposes that coordination can be improved 
through: institutional leadership and management; separation of the design and build 
phase; an integrated phase model; increased use of BIM as a social tool; new 
coordination mechanisms and the development of coordination strategies; systematic 
and on-going definition and evaluation of project and process performance. 
 
Contribution 
 
The contribution of the research presented in this dissertation is three fold: insight into 
project coordination; insight into project performance; and a proposal for a new 
integrated design-build management concept. 
 
Insight to project coordination 
First the ex-ante study represents an empirical contribution: observations and site-
visits provided a detailed account of how project teams coordinate and don’t 
coordinate. Second, the analysis of project 1 has provided insight into the 
coordination process of design-build projects adding to our understanding of 
coordination as a matter of structure and interaction, by introducing an institutional 
works definition of coordination.  
    Second, the ex-ante study has contributed to a limited body of literature on design-
build projects in an institutional perspective by providing insight into how 
coordination is respectively enabled and constrained through a process of purposeful 
efforts and taken-for-granted meanings, norms and rules. 
     Third, the research presented in this dissertation developed the concept of 
institutional integration further, by distinguishing between partial, full and occasional 
integration of institutions, as well as introducing the concept of institutional 
fragmentation. 
     Fourth, the analysis of coordination provided a processual model of coordination 
(i.e. occasional integration and fragmentation) understanding coordination as an on-
going process of negotiation, adaptation, experimentation and reproduction of taken-
for-granted structures. 
 
Insight into project performance 
The ex-post analysis has contributed to research by highlighting that project 
performance is a qualitative and social construct that develops as the aftermath of the 
projects settles. Furthermore, project performance can be interpreted to reflect the 
constellation of institutions that characterized the design and build processes. Thus, 
the analysis (part 2) adds to a limited body of research by shedding light on potential 
relationships between constellations of institutions and project performance. 
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A proposal for integrated design and build management 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to practice by proposing a new integrated design 
and build management concept that is not exclusively concerned with creating new 
formal structure, but predominantly shared meanings and norms.  
     Also, the IDBM concept contributes to the concept of institutional work by 
extending its application to normative proposals for design-build practice. 
Specifically, the IDBM concept proposes how organization can use institutional work 
to purposefully integrate and fragment constellations of institutions to stabilize and 
increase project performance. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The following appendix contains an elaboration of particular parts of the IDBM 
concept. These may be of particular interest to practitioners. 
 
Collaboration & coordination 
 
Early collaboration 
To enable the integration and fragmentation of all institutions during the design 
process, the IDBM concept proposes that collaboration between stewards of the 
different institutions represented in the project (e.g., the owner, architect, engineers, 
contractor, key sub-contractors and suppliers) starts before the design process begins 
as the project idea is being formed. 
 
Repeated collaboration 
One implication of beginning collaboration during project conception is that 
participating organizations cannot enter the project based on bid. Instead, the IDBM 
concept proposes that organizations purposefully develop relationships with other 
organizations with whom they share understandings and values, who have the 
necessary technical and social skills, and the capacity to collaborate on large design-
build projects. Social skills refer to an organization’s awareness of and ability to 
participate in institutional change.  
     With the institutionalisation of the IDBM concept comes the challenge of ensuring 
that the level of skills and reflexivity remain high. This means making sure the 
organizations in the projects continue to critically reflect and develop meanings, 
norms and skills within their own organizations.  
 
The project core group 
Another implication of early collaboration is that each organization has to be 
represented by a small number of people. The IDBM concept proposes that each 
project develops a project core group. The core group consists of a number of 
stewards each representing the institutions represented in the project, for example, the 
owner, the architect, the main engineering disciplines, and key sub-contractor and/or 
suppliers.  
 
The core group has to remain small in order to enable collective reflection on how to 
enable and continuously maintain coordination among organizations. The core group 
is responsible for enabling both integration as well as fragmentation as required by the 
project.  
     However, each organization is also responsible for representing a particular area of 
expertise, and thus perhaps, a particular institution. The IDBM concept proposes that 
temporal domination of particular organization can be used purposefully to fragment 
the constellation of institutions. 
      Importantly, while each representative is responsible for a particular area of 
expertise, not all required areas of expertise might be represented by the core group. It 
is the core group’s responsibility to ensure that all areas of expertise are included in 
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the design team at the required point in time during the design process. 
 
The project team 
The IDBM concept proposes that projects host a design team consisting of experts in 
the different areas required to develop the project.  
     An implication of this proposal is that the design team members are engaged in the 
project on an ad hoc basis as required by the project. The project team is responsible 
for maintaining a particular institution and pursuing it purposefully, as well as 
willingly integrating their work with the remaining project as and when required.  
     The dynamics of an ad hoc design team enables fragmentation of institutions and 
makes it even more critical that the core group enables occasional integration. 
 
Collaboration contracts 
The IDBM concept doesn’t seek to establish collective responsibility through contract 
or fee structures, such as other project delivery methods (e.g., IPD and partnering) but 
rather establish collective responsibility through shared meaning and norms. For that 
reason, the IDBM concept doesn’t propose details for a particular contract structure or 
a particular fee-structure. However, the IDBM concept proposes that projects use two 
collaboration contracts. 
 
First, to signify the importance of active engagement and organizations taking 
responsibility for the project, a collaboration contract is made between all the 
organizations represented in the project core group at the beginning of the virtual 
project. 
 
The collaboration contract may include, but is not necessarily limited to: 
 
• Value-statements to build shared meaning and execute collective 
reflection 
• The organizational structure of the core group 
• Each organization’s responsibility (institutional leadership, area of 
expertise, representation of particular institutions or institutional 
logics, participation and so on) 
• The overall project requirements (e.g., target cost, schedule, profit, 
quality level, visions and so on) 
• The project’s coordination strategy (e.g., definition of coordination and 
what and how coordination mechanisms will be developed (e.g., 
integration of institutions, adaptive capacity, mutual respect, direct 
supervision, BIM, project office, and so on) 
• A map of the virtual project process & process performance 
requirements (workshops, deliverables, deadlines, and so on) 
• Use of standards or other agreements (ex. ICT-agreement) 
• Distribution of project cost, profit and contingencies 
 
The term ‘collaboration contract’ is useful because it emphasizes that the point of it is 
to make the organizations collaborate in order to develop and coordinate a project, but 
that organizations have a legal responsibility to deliver a virtual project. In other 
words, the virtual project is as important as the physical building project. 
     The first collaboration contract covers the entire virtual project process and 
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finishes with the hand-off of the finished virtual project. 
     The collaboration contract proposed by IDBM replaces current consultants 
agreements, service specifications, and collaboration agreements. 
 
Following the collaboration contract for the virtual project is a collaboration contract 
for the assembly of the building.  
     The collaboration agreement is made between potentially all the organizations in 
the project core group to ensure that all the required institutions remain represented in 
the project; however, during the assembly phase, deliverables are different (e.g. a 
physical, not a virtual, building). 
 
New roles 
The separation of the collaboration contracts for the virtual and physical projects 
allows the contractor the opportunity to offer a contractor consulting role during the 
virtual project. Currently, the norm is for the contractor to offer their services for free 
during the design process and collect their profit during the building process. 
However, by offering the contractor a fee for not only participation but leadership of 
the virtual project, the contractor is incentivized to share their knowledge and exercise 
multi-membership with the other organizations. At the end of the virtual project 
process, once a finished virtual project and a final project cost had been established, 
the owner could be free to take the virtual project and bid it out to other contractors. 
This opportunity might appeal to some clients still adhering to the understanding that 
pursuing short-term economic gains create value. However, due to the contractor’s 
involvement in the virtual project, that particular contractor would have given the 
most accurate price and have the deepest understanding of the project. This would 
allow the contractor participating in the virtual project to produce and assemble the 
physical project more efficiently and to the required quality than competing 
contractors. Therefore, over time, the opportunity to open up the project for bidding at 
the end of the virtual project may become more symbolic to inspire trust rather than 
actual practice. 
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Project phases as gradual integration 
 
The integrated phase model 
The following section elaborates on the proposed structure for the integrated phase 
model. 
 
First, the integrated phase model is based on the understanding that the virtual process 
is characterised by an integrating constellation of institutions, while the assembly 
phase is characterised by an integrated constellation of institutions, as illustrated by 
figure 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Figure 8 illustrates the phases of the integrated phase model and the 
different constellations of institutions during the virtual project and assembly 
respectively. 
  
Similar, to the currently institutionalised phase model, the integrated phase model 
divides the virtual project process into a series of sub-phases inspired by integrated 
design (Knudstrup, 2008): idea, design basis, design development and synthesis. 
Although being a fussy boundary, everything before the virtual project is referred to 
as pre-idea. Everything after the virtual project is referred to as building assembly. 
 
Pre-idea 
During the pre-idea phase, the project has yet to be established and efforts are directed 
towards initiating and nurturing strategic relationships and reflecting on institutional 
debris available from other on-going or completed projects. It is also during the pre-
idea phase that the project team starts developing their business case and 
opportunities for project funding. 
 
Idea 
The distinction between pre-idea and idea can be blurry and during the idea phase the 
project team continues to refine their business case. However, during the idea-phase, 
members of the coming core group participate with early urban analysis (e.g. building 
typology, traffic, property market, historic, socio-demographic and so on) in order to 
help refine the owner’s business case.  
     During the idea phase the project core group is gradually established which may 
involve interviews and workshops to determine the best group for the project. The 
idea phase involves a preliminary analysis of the institutions represented in the 
project. The idea phase also involves defining reference projects, although the pitfall 
to avoid here is to ‘copy’ old design ideas and unintentionally pick up intuitional 
debris that compromises the ability to meet project requirements. Integration 
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workshops could be a part of the ideas phase too, where project teams collectively 
reflect and develop awareness of social coordination and the specific coordination 
strategy. 
     The idea phase also includes developing a target cost for the project and clear 
definitions of how increases are covered or decreases shared. Also, process 
performance criteria and preliminary project requirements are established during the 
idea phase. Questions such as: Why are we building? Where are we building? And 
who is participating in the project? should all be answered during the idea phase. 
Finally, a coordination strategy and process map is developed and the collaboration 
contracts for the virtual project are made. 
 
Design Basis 
During the design basis phase, extensive analyses are made to clearly define project 
requirements in detail. During this phase user group analyses are carried out to 
establish a detailed building programme. Also, analyses of building assembly 
logistics, soil analysis of the site, wind and sun studies, archaeological analyses, 
phenomenological analyses, just to mention some that might be relevant, are carried 
out.  
     Particular opportunities or obstacles to this project are identified during the design 
basis phase. Opportunities may include collaborating with the local authorities on 
developing the local urban master plan. Another example would be the opportunity to 
develop new products in collaboration with building system suppliers. 
     The extensive and comprehensive analyses carried out during the design basis 
phase enable the contractor, engineers and suppliers to be more proactively involved 
in the design development (Koch & Buhl, 2013) in the virtual project.  
 
Design development 
Not until the design development phase begins, does the design team begin to sketch 
out ideas, find details on product and building systems. The design development 
phase is characterized by the simultaneous efforts to develop both conceptual design 
and detailed information. In current design-build design processes, these two follow 
as a sequence: from concept to detail. With IDBM, the two occur simultaneously 
based on the understanding that the details inform the concept as much as the concept 
informs the details. Or put in other words, the details is what enables the design team 
to fully understand the consequences of certain conceptual choices, and thus detailed 
design is required for both technical and social coordination.  
     The design phase constitutes a series of distinct loops each representing a single 
iteration of the building design. The loops ensure a systematic iterative development 
of the entire building design: the building design will have been thoroughly developed 
a number of times. With each loop, it is not the level of detail that increases, but 
rather, the level of integration between the different institutions (and e.g., building 
systems) in the project that increases. In the following sections, a more detailed 
description of the work carried out in these loops follows. 
     The output of the design development phase is one coherent design proposal, in 
which all building systems and their interfaces have been explored, evaluated and 
chosen for their ability to fulfill the project requirements.  
     The design development phase finishes with the hand-off of the virtual project. 
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Presentation & off-site production 
The establishing of the second collaboration contract for the building assembly marks 
the beginning of the presentation & off-site production phase. The presentation of off-
site production phase concerns preparing design material for production and the start 
of off-site production based on the virtual project. During the presentation & off-site 
production phase the contractors starts preparing the building site. Also, the project 
team starts preparing commissioning and the hand-off manual in collaboration with 
the owner’s facility management. The project team also conducts site visit to 
production facilities to gain insight into production methods and strengthen 
collaboration with suppliers. 
 
Building assembly & commissioning 
During the building assembly phase early construction work on site begins and the 
building systems are delivered and assembled on-site. It is beyond the scope of this 
research project to propose new structures for the building process and therefore this 
will not be developed in detail.  
     Alongside the installation of building systems, commissioning of building systems 
occurs. Commissioning continues into occupancy until all buildings systems have 
been commissioned for all four seasons. 
 
Hand-off, occupancy & facility management 
The project is handed-off to the owner at the end of building assembly, however, the 
project team continues to collaborate with the owner’s facility management, to ensure 
that the building is commissioned to perform as required. It is beyond the scope of 
this research project to propose new structures for the building process and therefore 
this will not be developed in detail.  
 
Kick-offs & project reviews 
Each phase begins with a collective kick-off workshop where the upcoming process is 
developed and mapped and the project team begins developing a shared 
understanding of what the goal of the phase is. Work structures and process tools are 
collectively developed. Also, interfaces between project team members and work 
activities are defined and work groups are established as required. 
 
Similarly, each phase finishes with a collective project review. During the project 
review project progress and quality is evaluated. Also, project shortcomings are 
identified and strategies for how these can be addressed are made.  
    The process performance is also evaluated. During the process performance review, 
shortcomings of the completed process are evaluated and potentially altered for the 
following phases. Also, importantly, each organization’s performance is evaluated, 
and if necessary, organizations are dismissed from the project team and new 
organizations representing particular institutions or contributing to an integrated 
constellation of institutions are brought in. 
     Once the project team has approved the project and process performance review 
and the next phase can begin. 
 
Duration of phases 
For each project the duration of each sub-phase will have to be specified explicitly. 
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The IDBM concept doesn’t propose a particular duration of each sub phase, but it 
does indicate the relative duration of each sub-phase to another. The design basis 
phase is about half the duration of the design development phase. This emphasizes the 
need for in depth analysis of for example, site conditions, building systems, owner’s 
requirements, before the actual design development and integration begin. Also, 
notable, the design development phase is as long as the building assembly phase. This 
indicates the emphasis of diligent coordination before the building process begins. 
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Design development as systematic iteration 
 
Loops 
The first loop is characterised by the highest degree of fragmentation and the project 
team is guided by the question: what would be a great idea? This question guides 
each organization to develop excellence or best-practice design ideas within each of 
their respective areas of expertise. The first loop is characterised by mutual education, 
team inspiration, and idea generation.  
     The first loop finishes with a project review in which the design proposals 
developed during the loop area systematically evaluated against the project 
requirements. The project review process can extend over several days and is a 
collective effort including the entire project team. The evaluation of design ideas is 
intended to result in the exclusion of certain proposals narrowing down the number of 
options to work on during loop 2. At the end of loop 1 the project team is 
metaphorically speaking, left with a spread of disconnected jigsaw puzzle pieces. 
Also, project cost estimates, scope, schedule and process performance are reviewed. 
Finally, the project team determines if and how to proceed with the project and 
project team.  
 
During the second loop the project team works with fewer options for building 
systems and overall design proposals. The guiding question during the second loop is: 
what works for the project? Because the project team work with both details and 
abstraction simultaneously, they are able to begin analysing which ideas work 
together. Thus, the second loop represents the first level of integration. At the end of 
loop 2 the design project and process is evaluated as it was at the end of loop 1. 
Metaphorically speaking, the project team have sorted the jigsaw puzzle pieces during 
loop two and started putting together the first pieces. 
 
During the third loop the goal is to develop one fully integrated design proposal. 
Therefore, the guiding question for loop 3 is: what works with everything else in the 
project? The focus of the third loop is ensuring that all parts of the project satisfy all  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The figure illustrates the three loops, the guiding questions of each loop and 
associated levels of integration. 
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Institutions required. At the end of the loop 3 the project and process are evaluated 
and the project team determines if and how to proceed with a collaboration contract 
for the building process. Finally, a completed and coordinated virtual project is 
handed-off to the owner. Metaphorically speaking, the project team have now solved 
the jigsaw puzzle. 
 
Design sprints 
Each loop consists of a number of short design sprints. Each design sprint lasts one to 
two weeks and has a particular theme or focus. The content and sequence of themes 
are determined for each project and should reflect purposeful planning by the project 
team to enable project coordination.   
     The duration of each design sprint cannot be extended. Once the design sprint is 
temporally over, the project team moves on to the next design sprint. At the end of a 
design sprint, design work is not necessarily complete, but remaining work will be 
finished during the following loop. 
 
Duration & content 
The IDBM concept recommends three loops to ensure integration. However, it does 
not propose specific durations of each loop. The duration of a loop depends on the 
complexity of the project. 
     Similarly, the content of each loop can vary across projects depending on project 
complexity or particular constellation of institutions.  
     For example, during the implementation workshops when testing the IDBM 
concept, the workshop team developed the following design sprints for a project 
consisting of 81 housing units, mixed row-houses and apartments (note, the project 
was already developed to preliminary design project). 
 
During loop 1, the design sprints were organised on an inside-out basis, meaning that 
the project team had to start with detailing the floor layout, then design the layout of 
the green areas and outdoor lighting, then installations in the houses and finally 
determine the structural design of the buildings. This organization allowed the project 
team to develop the design project based on how to fulfil occupancy functionality 
requirements. 
     During loop 2, the design sprints were organised on a unit-to-unit basis. The 
project team would develop one type of unit during the first design sprint, and then 
move on to a different type of unit in the following design sprint. This organization 
allowed the project team to develop the principles for loadbearing structure, 
ventilation, power and heating and cooling across all the housing units. 
     During Loop 3 design sprints were organised around individual building systems 
so that each design sprint focussed on a particular building system. 
Organization of design sprint 
Each design sprint is organised over a particular work structure in order to enable 
fragmentation and integration of institutions. 
     The IDBM concept proposes the following work structure for the design sprints 
during the first loop: collective kick-off, independent team work 1, presentation 1, 
integrated design session, independent team work 2, presentation 2, project 
evaluation, and finally process review. 
	178 
During loop 2 and 3 an increased focus on integration would guide the workflow. 
This might mean, for example, that during loop two and three, independent work is 
increasingly replaced with project teamwork and integrated concurrent design 
sessions. 
 
Kick-off 
The kick-off session is intended to give the project team a shared understanding of the 
success criteria, goal and workflow for the particular design sprint. Therefore, it is 
essential that the projects core group as well as the design team is present.  
       The leader for the kick-off session is responsible for developing a shared 
understanding of the project and process goal. Collectively, the project team will then 
define performance criteria for the particular work element in focus, interfaces 
between building systems and project team members, and determine work groups.  
 
Independent work 1 
The kick-off session would be followed by independent work by each of the 
organizations or areas of expertise across the multiple organizations in the project 
team.  
     The goal of independent work is to develop best-practice design proposals within 
each area of expertise. Independent work may include research and development of 
architectural concepts, mechanical systems, IT simulations, water collection scenarios 
and importantly, critical evaluation of design solutions.  
    Independent work may still involve a number of people teaming up, but because 
the focus of the first loop is not a high-level of integration, but rather developing ideas 
that best satisfy each institution, independent work is more reliant on expert 
knowledge about a particular design solution, than shared understandings. Minimum 
three proposals are required: the first proposal might be the normative choice; the 
second proposal might be the obvious alternative; while the third proposal may 
require some creative and critical reflection. 
 
Presentation 1 
Once the project team members have completed independent work it is time to 
present the work to the project team. The presentations include presenting the three 
proposals of, for example, the building envelope. Importantly, all project team 
members or working groups present proposals (e.g. not only the architects, but also 
the engineers, the contractor, the supplier, the owner and potentially more have 
developed proposals pursuing their particular area of expertise.) 
    Each area of expertise is responsible for presenting the design proposals, as well as 
an analysis of how the three proposals meet, or fail to meet, project requirements.  
     It is then possible for the project team to identify which proposals need more work 
and if certain proposals can be dismissed or selected.  
 
Independent work 2 
After the integrated design session it is then time to continue independent work in 
order to collect more information, develop new or refine the existing design 
proposals.  
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Integrated design session 
The integrated design session is intended to be a workshop, in which the project team 
interacts to integrate the independent design proposals into one or a few holistic 
design proposals. During the integrated design sessions each organizations ability to 
add detailed and accurate information to the project is critical. This is because the 
integrated design sessions are intended to specifically solve particular design 
problems and establish a platform for integration of both technical and social work 
elements.  
     The integrated design session enables the potentially equal integration of all 
institution, in that the session is not based on for example, a preliminary architectural 
design. Furthermore, the integrated design session enables the development of a 
shared understanding of the particular design solution and a forum for negotiating the 
institutional order of the design.  
 
Presentation 2 
The second round of presentations includes presenting refined and potentially new 
proposals to the project team. As in the previous presentation round, all proposals are 
evaluated in relations to the project requirements.  
      
Design evaluation 
Presentation round 2 is followed by the design evaluation. The purpose of the design 
evaluation is to select those design proposals that can met project requirements (i.e. 
embody all institutions represented in the project) and dismiss, or at least consciously 
select, design proposals that cannot meet project requirements. The design evaluation 
is thus intended to enable reflective and purposeful negotiation of the constellation of 
institutions, as it will be represented in the final building.  
  
Process review 
The final stage of the design sprint is the process evaluation. Since design sprints and 
loop are repeated, evaluating the project team’s ability to coordinate their work is 
important to be able to make on-going adjustments to the process and foster collective 
reflection. 
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Project & process requirements & performance 
 
Project requirements 
Project requirements cover both the owner’s requirements as well as the requirements 
of the other organizations represented in the project. Therefore, the core group 
develops the project requirements collectively.  
     The project requirements are intended to reflect the particular constellation of 
institutions that the core group wants the final building to reflect. Therefore, the 
project requirements depend on the specific project. 
 
A detailed, yet preliminary version of the project requirements is developed during 
the idea phase. For each phase requirements are evaluated and refined to reflect 
changes and learning that has occurred. The project requirements can be changed, and 
the on-going evaluation enables the project team to become aware of how project 
changes affects their ability to integrate the project and re-organize the design process 
accordingly. 
     The project requirements must be an accurate representation of the institutions the 
project team wants represented in the final project. For example, an owner might want 
the project to target a 100% safety record, however, once the design process begins, 
the owner might be more concerned with keeping the budget. In such a case, the 
100% safety record requirement should be shifted to a lower priority, even if this 
seems unethical and socially illegitimate. Alternatively, the requirement can act as a 
mechanism to make organizations act on their value statements. In any case, the 
coupling or decoupling between project requirements and intended constellation of 
institutions should be an open discussion in the project team.  
 
Process requirements 
The process requirements depend on the specific coordination strategy and 
constellation of institutions that the project team intends to develop. Therefore, like 
the project requirements, process requirements are specific to each project. 
 
For a project of high complexity, where magnified purposeful fragmentation and 
integration is required, process requirements may emphasize mechanisms supporting 
fragmentation and integration respectively. The requirements can be expressed 
through a set of questions forming the basis for collective evaluation, including for 
example: 
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• Does the design team develop best practice design solutions?  
• Do other project team members challenge my work? 
• Does the design team exercise multi-membership? 
• Does the design team have adequate time to research component solutions? 
• Does the design team have the time to simulate design solutions? 
• Does the design team have the hard- and software to simulate the design 
solution? 
• Is information timely? 
• Is information accurate? 
• Has the number of proposals been narrowed down since last loop? 
• Have project criteria changed? 
• Has the scope of the project changed? 
 
The process criteria can, just like the project requirements, be changed during the 
process. However, since the process criteria are intended to reflect the coordinating 
strategy and desired constellation of institutions, the project team will have to 
reflexively evaluate on any changes made to the process criteria. 
 
